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“If there were such a thing as decentralization, it did not reach down yet. What has been 
constant all these years though, is the order from above.”  
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ABSTRACT 
 
  Devolution of power, responsibilities, and resources from central to local 
governments has been the foundation of decentralization reforms in developing countries 
like Ethiopia. The most recent decentralization reforms in Ethiopia began in the early 
2000s at the woreda (district) level, focusing on strengthening local governments as 
institutions of democratic governance and efficient service delivery. Until now, 
decentralization in Ethiopia has attracted very little research; this study aims to fill that 
knowledge gap. The extent of decentralization is examined from a holistic framework, 
including the three dimensions of decentralization (political, fiscal and administrative), 
while its impacts are explored by focusing on access, equity, efficiency and quality 
indicators of education service delivery. Using a qualitative case study approach, this 
research consists of semi-structured interviews of key informants in government and 
educational administration, field observations, and review of relevant documents. Four 
local governments and twelve schools within two regional states of Ethiopia were 
selected as the sample frame.  
 This dissertation argues that the implementation of woreda decentralization 
reforms in Ethiopia has proven problematic, as the official establishment of devolution 
	  	   vii	  
operates within centralized structures and practices. Regional governments have 
established political, administrative and fiscal decentralization, as evidenced by the 
existence of legal authority and mechanisms of accountability, expanded functions, and 
significant allocation of unconditional grants transferred to woredas. Despite much 
progress, the further deepening of decentralization reforms has been hampered by 
centralizing practices, including the dominant roles of the ruling party, weak 
administrative capacity at the local government and school levels, and limited resource 
base of local governments.   
 The link between decentralization reforms and improved local service delivery 
has been inconclusive. This study suggests that the impact of decentralization on primary 
education has been mixed. While decentralization reforms may have facilitated the 
impressive expansion of access to primary education, quality indicators such as dropout 
rates and student learning assessments have shown little to no improvements.  
 This study lays the groundwork for continued research into the vital link between 
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
 
 In January 2011, I returned to Howassa, the city of my birth, to conduct research 
on decentralization and education service delivery in Ethiopia. For the first time, the city 
had an elected mayor. It also had an elected city council and the municipal court, and 
many sectoral offices were run by better-educated and trained officials than they have in 
previous years. When asked, most people indicated that these changes were the result of 
decentralization policies of the current federal government. However, when I went back 
to Howassa a year later, the situation was different. The mayor I interviewed had just 
been elected after his predecessor was removed for corruption charges, as was generally 
known around the city. The people of Howassa were also aware that the mayor, as well as 
many of the officials working in various public capacities, were in fact appointed by the 
national government as opposed to elected by local constituents. I also gathered from my 
conversations with the mayor that the majority of the service improvements evident in the 
city had more to do with strong accountability from higher central and regional 
authorities, rather than demand driven by local citizens, whom many public officials 
perceived as not yet sufficiently informed to drive effective decision-making.    
 This simple reality depicts what is contradictory about the nature and 
implementation of decentralization efforts in Ethiopia and other similar countries. On the 
one hand, this dissertation argues that to the extent to which decentralization reforms 
have been designed and implemented has an important bearing on the policies and 
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practices affecting basic service delivery. On the other hand, this relationship is not 
straightforward and can be particularly complicated in places such as in Ethiopia, where 
substantial decentralization reforms have taken place simultaneously with practices of 
centralization or re-centralization; impacts on basic services have shown similarly mixed 
outcomes.  
 This study also builds on the argument (e.g. Smoke 2003; Olowu and Wunsch 
2004) that in spite of recent expansive programs of decentralization in many developing 
countries, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, key decision-making power to determine 
the level and quality of services as well as the resources and accounting for them 
continues to remain in the hands of central and provincial governments. This 
development is contrary to the underlying rationale for decentralization, which asserts 
that local governments and institutions have better knowledge of local conditions, are 
better able to respond to the needs and priorities of citizens (Rondinelli et al 1983).  
 Does decentralization1 lead to improvements in service delivery? What kind of 
political and institutional settings facilitate or impede the potential benefits of 
decentralization in regard to basic services?  These are two of the most crucial questions 
facing political scientists and policy makers across the developed as well as developing 
countries. Although answers to these questions largely dependent on the particulars of 
national and local contexts (Burki, Perry, Dillinger 1999; Crook 2003; Selee and Tulchin 
2004; Smoke 2003; World Bank 2003; Wunsch 2001), some studies have noted key 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The term “decentralization” is used here to refer to one of its extensive form, devolution. I will define 
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factors that influence outcomes of decentralization reforms.2 
 Despite the promise for more effective local government services, 
decentralization has so far achieved mixed and inconclusive results (e.g. Azfar, 
Livingston, and Meagher 2007; Devarajan, Khemani, and Shah 2009; Robinson 2007; 
Saito 2000; World Bank 1994, 2003). The reasons for these are rather varied, but highly 
influenced by political motivations and objectives. In many Sub-Saharan African 
countries, the implementation of decentralization reforms is still in its early stages and 
there are few studies that have assessed their performances in any systematic and 
comparative way. Thus, this study contributes to the knowledge base by taking a more 
holistic and comprehensive approach to examine how key dimensions of decentralization 
– political, fiscal and administrative – operate in an environment where local autonomy 
and accountability has been officially established but significantly constrained by such 
factors as single party dominance, fiscal dependency on central transfers and limited local 
administrative capacity to achieve decentralization’s purported benefits.  
 The following section explores some of the theoretical and empirical arguments 
as well as evidence found in literature pertaining to decentralization and its effects on 
service delivery.  
1.1 Decentralization and Service Delivery: Theoretical Perspectives 
 
 In most decentralization reforms, improving the effectiveness and efficiency of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 These include: the degree of political commitment by central government, the length of time and 
sequencing of reforms, the design of intergovernmental transfers, local financial management, the power of 
political parties and local elites, and the capacity of countervailing institutions, such as the local legislature 
and the judiciary, civil society and the media (Campos and Hellman 2005; Crook and Sverrisson 2002; 
Devas and Grant 2003; Tendler 1997). 
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public service delivery is only an implicit motivation behind broader political, social, and 
economic strategies. Thus, the complex nature of decentralization efforts makes it 
difficult to establish direct relations between a particular decentralization project and 
improvements in public services. For example, with the exception Cote d’Ivoire and 
Uganda where the provision of basic services was explicitly mentioned as the main 
motivation for decentralization reforms, for most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
politics of democratization and ethno-regional relations were the main drivers of 
decentralization efforts (Crook, 2003; Crook and Sverrisson 2001; Ndegwa 2002; Shah 
and Thompson 2004; Smoke 2003;). Furthermore, it was also within these larger national 
policies, governments, theorists and various international agencies have usually 
advocated for the need to devolve powers and resources to local governments as a means 
of improving the quality of public services.  
 As most basic services, such as education, health, drinking water and sanitation 
are provided for local consumption, proponents of decentralization often attest that it 
brings decision-making power closer to the people and enhances their ability to hold 
government officials accountable for delivering these services. In its 2004 Development 
Report (2003:1) the World Bank emphasized the need for decentralized services and 
accountability: 
 Too often, services fail poor people – in access, in quantity, and in quality. 
            But there are strong examples where services do work, which means           
            governments  and citizens can do better. Putting poor people at the center  
 of service provision enables them to monitor, and discipline service providers, 
 amplifies their voice in policymaking, and strengthens the incentives for providers 
 to serve the poor.  
 
 The World Bank’s and others studies suggest that decentralization can be an 
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effective means to ensure accountability among key actors (policy makers, service 
providers and citizens) in service delivery chains, and consequently, improve people’s 
access to goods and services (Ahmad et. al. 2005; Campos and Hellman 2005; Devarjan 
et al. 2007; Schroeder 2004). Still, others have found accountability to be crucial for 
successful public services but argue that certain conditions or mechanisms of 
accountability have to be in place as part of decentralization reforms. For instance, in 
their study of decentralization in West Africa and South Asia, Crook and Manor (1998) 
found that four conditions are essential for decentralization to improve accountability: a 
competitive party system, a widely distributed free press, a professional civil service, and 
a public “culture of accountability” which is ready to scrutinize politicians or civil 
servants.  Blair (2002) also argued that a wide range of mechanisms could serve as agents 
of accountability, including: civil society organizations, the media, public meetings, 
formal grievance procedures and opinion surveys. Likewise, Olowu and Wunsch (2004: 
69-80) utilized the principles of “exit” and “voice” accountability mechanisms as 
alternative strategies for better delivery of services. They observed that while exit 
strategies would not fit African conditions where most people lack easy options to 
relocate when dissatisfied with services (i.e., “voting with their feet”), many voice 
mechanisms, such as local councils, elections, recall, third-party monitoring, participatory 
budgeting, local taxation, local conflict resolving agencies and mandatory public 
information, could provide the most potential to enhance local accountability. 
In addition to the benefits of accountability, economists defend decentralization on the 
grounds that local governments are more efficient in allocating and providing goods and 
	  	   6	  
services. The classical arguments in favor of decentralized local governments suggest that 
local governments compete with other jurisdictions to better satisfy the heterogeneous 
preferences of citizens (Tiebout 1956), or tailor public goods output to preferences of 
more homogenous local groups (Oates 1972). However, in recent years, this theory has 
been supplemented by later studies focusing particularly on experiences of the 
developing countries. For instance, in their study of expenditure decentralization in poor 
countries, Bardhan and Mookherjee (1998: 5) argued that “the assumption of mobility of 
fully informed citizens in search of a perfect match between their preferences and public 
services is inapplicable in many cases.”  In this and other studies (Bardhan and 
Mookherjee 2000; 2005), the authors examined the potential risk of “capture” of public 
resources by local elites under decentralization, especially in cases where the institutional 
structure of local accountability are not well established.  Moreover, critics have pointed 
out other pitfalls associated with decentralization, such as the widening of regional 
disparities in service provision, macroeconomic instability and corruption caused by 
weak fiscal discipline, and lack of technical, human and financial resources to produce a 
wide range of public services that respond efficiently to local needs (Crook and 
Sverrisson 1999; Prud’homme 1995; Smith 1985; Tanzi 1996; Van Braun and Grote 
2000).   
 Another potential benefit of decentralization has been the concern for equity and 
justice of service provision across different localities. Concerns about equity usually 
include inter-regional disparities of endowment of resources and capacity, and 
interpersonal differences across different groups within a locality based on gender, 
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income, or other categories (Litvack et al. 1998: 7). Similar to the argument for efficiency 
gains of decentralization, theorists have contended that local governments are believed to 
be more familiar with local circumstances and therefore are able to more equitably 
distribute public resources as well as provide more opportunities for the poor within their 
own jurisdictions (Ibid). However, as Prud’homme (2001: 16) argued, a more 
decentralized system could also exacerbate disparities, as poorer local jurisdictions will 
have lower tax bases, and therefore fewer resources with which to provide public 
services.  Conyers (2000: 8) also made the point that decentralization might lead to “a 
situation in which those regions or localities with good financial or technical resources 
prosper at the expense of those without.” As a remedy to the kind of equity problems the 
above authors pointed out, central governments usually design various intergovernmental 
transfer programs with the objective to distribute resources. Local governments also play 
a role in implementing the distributional objectives of central governments through a host 
of tax, expenditure and intra-locality transfer schemes (Ford 1999: 7).  
 As the available literature demonstrates, although the potential advantages of 
decentralization outweigh the alleged negative consequences, there seems to be a 
consensus that decentralization is not necessarily a panacea for poor or inefficient service 
provision. At the same time, most of the theoretical rationales about how decentralization 
leads to improved efficiency, equity or accountability in basic services are to be proved 
against common assumptions that are not often backed by strong empirical evidence. 
Robinson (2007: 1) points out three of these assumptions:  -­‐ power and responsibility will be devolved by benign central governments to 
elected local bodies that are accountable and responsive to their constituents 
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-­‐ financial resources will be available to support the provision of services at the 
local level through a combination of central government fiscal transfers and local 
taxation -­‐ local administrative capacity will be adequate to deliver the expected increase in 
the production of local services. 	  
 Although there is limited evidence suggesting that the above assumptions hold 
true in the majority of cases, successful decentralization does require a combination of 
factors that studies have found to have important bearings on the expected service 
outcomes. In the following section, I discuss these factors within the three main 
dimensions of decentralization – political, administrative, and fiscal.  
 
1.1.1 Political Factors 
 Political decentralization is often associated with greater participation of citizens 
in public decision-making, including the ability to freely elect local representatives who 
are responsive and accountable to their needs and preferences. It also implies that 
decisions made at the sub-national level are better-informed and more relevant to diverse 
interests in society than those made solely by central authorities (Litvack and Seddon 
1999: 2). However, the benefits of political (democratic) decentralization both at the 
central and local levels are not automatically evident in most cases.  
 First, the political incentives of central governments to devolve power and 
responsibility to lower levels of government is believed to be one of the key factors in 
determining the level of their commitments in enhancing local participation in decisions 
regarding public services or other local matters. For instance, scholars generally make a 
distinction between those who adopted decentralization by design, or by default. In the 
former case, countries are likely to delegate power and resources believing that 
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decentralization could serve their policy objectives, be this poverty reduction, efficiency 
or widening democracy (Jutting et al. 2005: 638-9). However, Conyers (2007: 24) 
pointed out that in many decentralization experiments in SSA governments have been 
reluctant to decentralize adequate power to local level governments to enable them to 
have significant impact on local service delivery. Andrew and Schroeder (2003: 36) 
identified three reasons why national politicians generally show a desire to maintain their 
influences over local public services: (1) these services are highly visible to political 
constituencies, (2) they provide important opportunities for donor funding, and (3) 
decentralization can create political threats.  
 Second, for decentralization to succeed, the political commitment by national 
authorities needs to be supported by political leadership at the local level. As 
Prud’homme (2001: 13) noted, “there is no decentralization without relatively 
independent and politically responsive local (or more precisely: sub-national) 
governments” (13).  Yet, there seems no inherent reason that local governments with 
power and resources should be more responsive or accountable to the electorate than 
central governments. Although local politicians may have advantages of proximity and 
opportunities to interaction with voters to build credibility and reputation, these same 
advantages may also make it easier for politicians to create and fulfill clientelistic 
promises at the local level at the expense of broad public goods (Ahmad et al. 2005: 16). 
Most importantly, as mentioned earlier, mechanisms of political accountability such as 
local council oversight and an election system that guarantees fair and competitive local 
elections, are required to improve service delivery for all people, especially the poor. 
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Furthermore, Onyach-Olaa and Poter (2000: 1, 9) argued that local governments’ 
accountability to their own constituencies is contingent on central governments being 
accountable to local governments for delivering timely and accurate policy guidelines, 
monitoring, mentoring, compliance verification and so forth.3   
 
1.1.2 Administrative Factors  
 Administrative capacity is one of the key issues facing local governments and 
often determines the effectiveness of decentralized service delivery. Administrative 
decentralization deals with the transfer of authority and responsibilities for the planning, 
financing, and management of certain public services from the central government to 
various sub-national governments, such as field units of government agencies, 
corporations, and regional or district authorities (World Bank 2001a). According to 
Rondinelli’s (1981) classic typology, administrative decentralization takes three major 
forms–deconcentration, delegation, and devolution–each with different implications to 
service delivery.4  
 Deconcentration, used by unitary states and commonly considered to be the 
weakest form of decentralization, gives sub-national governments some responsibility for 
basic services but maintains the actual decision-making in the central government. 
Regional and local governments function simply as field administrations or branch 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Quoted in Ribot (2002: 30).  
 
4 Privatization  (also known as market or economic decentralization) is also referred to as a form of 
decentralization in which governments delegate powers and resources to private sector for undertaking 
functions that had previously been monopolized by government (Litvack and Seddon 1999).  
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offices of the central government and lack independent discretion over the structure and 
management of services. Boko (2002: 2) argued that despite its limitations, if 
deconcentration is carried out properly (such as providing local representatives with 
adequate means to carry out their functions) it can help to improve the efficiency and 
effectiveness of public good provision and service delivery.  
 In the case of delegation, the central governments transfer responsibility for 
decision-making and administration of public functions to semi-autonomous 
organizations or units that are not wholly controlled by the central government, but are 
ultimately accountable to it (Rondinelli 1999: 3). Organizations such as housing, 
transportation authorities, regional development corporations, and semi-autonomous 
school districts may enjoy considerable discretionary authority and possibly be exempt 
from constraints placed on regular civil service personnel. These organizations may also 
be able to charge users directly for their services (Ibid).  
 Finally, devolution is a more extensive form of administrative decentralization 
and usually indicates the transfer of authority for decision-making, finance, management 
and delivery of services from central governments to semi-autonomous units of local 
governments (Litvack et al., 1998). Devolution also entails that local governments have 
clear and legally recognized geographical boundaries over which they exercise authority 
and within which they provide public services to local citizens they are accountable to. 
(Rondinelli 1999: 3; Yilmaz et al. 2008: 1). In devolution, local governments have the 
power to hire, fire and determine the terms and conditions of employment of local staff. 
Furthermore, local governments in a devolved system can reallocate resources and 
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determine spending priorities based on local circumstances.  However, they still have to 
work within general guidelines and rules set by the central government. This study 
primarily focuses on this type of devolution in order to underscore recent developments 
in developing countries, particularly on the African continent, where decentralization 
reforms grew so substantial over time that they became associated with “democratic” 
decentralization (Olowu and Wunsch 2004). 
 There is not one form of administrative decentralization that best fits all 
situations. However, literature based on Sub-Saharan Africa suggests that administrative 
performance at local levels is often extremely weak due to factors that are common 
across the region. These include a lack of education and training, vague or inappropriate 
processes and systems, inadequate devolution of power (particularly over finance and 
staff), corruption and abuse of power, poorly motivated staff, and lack of ‘downward’ 
accountability (Batley and Scott 2010: 5; Conyers 2005: 26).  
 
1.1.3 Fiscal Factors 
 A key concern in many decentralization reforms is the need to have adequate 
fiscal resources to carry out expenditure responsibilities and provide public services 
effectively at the local level. Fiscal decentralization delineates the assignments of 
financial responsibilities between the central government and local governments, 
including own-source revenues and inter-governmental transfers. Through 
decentralization, local governments are expected to have enhanced discretion over 
assigned public functions. As Smoke (2003) observed, since there is almost universal 
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deficiency of local revenues to undertake devolved responsibilities and functions, 
intergovernmental transfers play a critical role in closing the fiscal gap as well as in 
mitigating interregional resource disparities.  
 The intergovernmental fiscal decentralization usually involves four elements: 
expenditure responsibilities, revenue assignments, intergovernmental transfers/grants, 
and sub-national borrowing (Litvack and Seddon 1999).  First, local governments use 
their own revenues to provide goods and services from a variety of sources, such as 
property or sales taxes, user charges, fees and licenses; they also share revenues with the 
central government. Principles of efficiency for revenue decentralization suggest that 
local revenue bases should be relatively immobile, should not compete with central bases, 
and should establish links between payments and benefits (Smoke 2007). Moreover, if 
local governments are responsible for financing local services largely through local taxes, 
it is believed that citizens are likely to hold their elected officials accountable (Ibid.).   
 Second, intergovernmental transfers are the main source of revenue for 
subnational governments in most developing countries. They are mostly used to alleviate 
the imbalance between local governments’ expenditures and their own revenues, as well 
as to correct fiscal inefficiency and equity arising from differentials in fiscal capacities in 
local governments. Through a combination of conditional (i.e. given for specific projects) 
and unconditional transfers, central governments usually make some kind of tradeoff 
between national priorities and distributional objectives (Smoke 2007). But as studies 
show, regardless of the particular structure, good intergovernmental transfers are believed 
to reflect certain common characteristics:  (1) they are determined as objectively and 
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openly as possible by a well-established formula and are not subject to hidden political 
negotiation; (2) they are relatively stable from year to year to allow rational local 
budgeting, but at the same time are sufficiently flexible to ensure that national 
stabilization objectives are not thwarted by subnational finances; (3) the transfer formulas 
are transparent, are based on credible factors, and are as simple as possible (Bah and Linn 
1992; Shah 1999).  
 Third, few subnational governments in most developing countries have borrowing 
privileges, and those that do are highly regulated by central governments. One of the 
arguments for limited access to financial markets by subnational governments is based on 
a moral hazard problem, which suggests that subnational borrowing may involve implicit 
or explicit central government guarantees that lead to imprudent action by lenders and 
subnational governments, and ultimately create unplanned liabilities for central 
government (Ahmad 1999).  For instance, this problem can be manifested in the case of 
“soft-budget constraint” wherein local governments tend to over-borrow, expecting that 
their deficit will eventually be filled by the central government (Bardhan and Mookherjee 
2006; Rodden, Eskeland and Litvack 2003). However, with due regulation by central 
governments, access to financial markets is still considered important for various 
economic reasons, such as financing capital expenditure, matching expenditure and tax 
flows within a particular fiscal year and fostering political accountability at the local level 
(Ibid.).   
 In addition to the above three approaches, there are other financial strategies for 
improving sub-national government service delivery, including donor-financed 
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community development funds and various public-private partnerships. For instance, 
Smoke (2007) pointed out that public-private partnerships usually involve users 
participations through monetary and labor contributions and other similar cooperation 
schemes. The success of these and other alternative fiscal avenues depends on the level of 
national commitments and coordination, the financial and administrative capacity of local 
governments, as well as the quality of accountability relationships between various 
government and non-government agencies. 
 
1.2 Decentralization and Service Delivery: Empirical Evidence  
 Although there is a vast and diverse literature on decentralization reforms in 
Africa and other parts of the developing world, very few studies deal specifically with the 
impact of decentralization on public service delivery. As Smoke (2003: 16) noted, “given 
that claims of service improvements are so central to the arguments of decentralization 
advocates, it is somewhat surprising that so little research has been conducted to see if 
decentralization indeed increases the level of services delivered and their quality.” This is 
likely due to the complex and multifaceted nature of decentralization reforms, making it 
difficult to measure their effect on a specific outcome, such as improved service 
provision. Another problem relates to the logistic complexity and cost of undertaking the 
necessary research, which ideally requires ‘before’ and ‘after’ studies in a number of 
different countries (Conyers 2007: 21).  
 The few studies that provide some evidence on the potential impact of 
decentralization on service delivery have been mostly negative and/or inconclusive. As 
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Ribot (2002: 10) noted, “evidence that decentralization or deconcentration leads to better 
provision is thin.” After reviewing a number of recent studies from Africa, Asia, and 
Latin America,5 Robinson (2007: 2) concluded that, “the quality of public services has 
either declined or remained unchanged as a consequence of democratic decentralization.” 
In her review of studies in Sub-Saharan Africa, Conyers (2007) arrived at a similar 
conclusion, “The main impression gained from the limited data on the actual impact on 
service delivery is that decentralization has done little to improve the quantity, quality or 
equity of public services in the region” (21). According to Conyers, the problem for these 
poor outcomes should not be blamed on decentralization per se, but on local government 
weaknesses stemming from the high level of centralization and relative lack of 
accountability in many African countries.  
 Likewise, other studies have also found a lack of correlation between 
decentralization and improved local services. For example studies by Azfar and 
Livingston (2002) and Azfar, Livingston and Meagher (2007) on public service provision 
in Uganda found that despite some progress such as in local discretionary power and 
voting patterns, efficiency and equity of public service delivery did not improve 
following decentralization.  Additionally, Fjeldstad et al. (2004) found that in a survey of 
six local governments (including 42 villages and wards in Tanzania) corruption was 
perceived to be a problem causing poor performance of service delivery in all the case 
councils. Although the extent of perceived corruption varied across councils, on average, 
60 percent of the respondents thought corruption was a problem and 58 percent saw a gap 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 These studies are assembled and reviewed in the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) Bulletin, volume 
38, no. 1, January 2007, pp. 1-88. 
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between the money collected and service delivered. Furthermore, evidence from six Latin 
American countries indicated that transferring resources and responsibilities down to 
local governments had neither improved service delivery nor contributed to containing 
costs (Burki, Perry, and Dillinger 1999: 85).  
 Despite the general dismal result within the relatively scant empirical evidence, a 
few studies have found some positive impacts of decentralization on provision of basic 
services. For instance, in their review of 56 studies published since the late 1990s, Shah, 
Thompson, and Zou (2004) identified two studies that showed a positive correlation 
between decentralized management and improved poverty alleviation goals. In these two 
studies: one in West Bengal, India (Bardhan and Mookherjee (2003) and another in 
Bangladesh (Galasso and Ravallon (2001), the authors suggested that the level of central 
governments’ resource allocation as well as the relative power of villages (or panchayats) 
in local decision-making could have significant impact on the success of pro-poor 
targeting programs. In a similar vein, case studies in a number of Latin American 
countries suggest that transferring responsibilities for basic services such as health and 
education to local governments and local communities could increase efficiency and 
quality of these services. For instance, Bossert et al. (2003) study of health care in 
Colombia and Chile indicated that decentralization under specific policy mechanisms 
(e.g. population- or needs-based allocation of resources) could contribute to, or at least 
maintain, more equitable utilization of health services across municipalities of different 
incomes and locations (rural and urban). Other Latin American studies in the education 
sector (a topic discussed more broadly in the next section), such as Eskeland and Filmer 
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(2002) in Argentina, and King and Ozler (1998) in Nicaragua also showed that given the 
degree of de facto autonomy schools possess and the level of parental (community) 
participation in schools, decentralization could contribute to improved student 
achievement scores.  
 One frequently quoted study on fiscal decentralization in Latin America came 
from Faguet (2001; 2004), who examined the expenditure patterns at the local level in 
Bolivia and found that decentralization led to a better match between local preferences 
and budgetary allocations for access to and quality of social services. His research also 
showed that decentralization has changed government investment in primary social 
services, such as in education and water/ sanitation to smaller regions and municipalities 
that were neglected prior to decentralization. Another much heralded decentralization 
experiments came from Brazil in Porto Alegre municipality where Santos (1998) found 
that access to basic services such as water and sewage improved through participatory 
budgeting of local finances made possible by decentralization.   
 Faguet and Sanchez (2008) found similar results in Columbia, where districts with 
greater local control of finance and policy-making were able to increase enrollment rates 
in public schools. Meanwhile, in districts where local finance was still controlled by 
central government, school enrollment did not show any improvement. Likewise, using 
case studies of 16 municipalities and opinion surveys in Columbia, Fiszbein (1997) found 
that through creating strong local leadership and increased participation of the 
community, decentralization improved government performance in terms of goods and 
services provided to the community.  
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 Two other studies on Colombia also validated the positive effects of 
decentralization. While Bossert (2000) found that the increased local ‘decision space’ 
created by decentralization contributed to enhanced utilization of health services and 
health expenditure per capita, Soto, Farfan and Lorant (2012) discovered that fiscal 
decentralization led to reduced infant mortality rates. However, these improvements 
indicated by Soto et al. were more pronounced in non-poor municipalities than in poor 
ones. 
 In one of the few studies documenting a positive correlation between 
decentralization and service delivery in Sub-Saharan Africa, Mehrotra (2006) reported 
that decentralization of primary health care services to locally elected health committees 
in Benin, Guinea and Mali led to an increase in the number of people with access to 
affordable health services. This in turn contributed to decreased mortality rates for those 
under age five and increased immunization levels. In the same study, Mehrotra also 
found similar outcomes in Mozambique, where committed local governments were able 
to improve vaccination coverage and prenatal consultations by increasing staffing and 
focusing on outreach services.  In all the cases, the positive outcomes are believed to be 
strongly correlated with the democratic nature of decentralization, especially where local 
governments and organized communities were given greater ‘voice’ and responsibilities 
in the management of services.  
 In their study of decentralization and primary health care in Nigeria, Olowu and 
Wunsch (2004) reported that in the years between 1988 and 1995, robust and radical 
decentralization reforms led some local governments to significantly improve their 
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provision of health services. They also found that leadership at the political and 
managerial level, coupled with community responsiveness to government initiatives, 
were crucial in explaining these successes amidst widespread failures of health services 
throughout the country.  
 Saito (2000: 11-14) also found some evidence for improvements in local services 
in his study of decentralization in Uganda, a county that has pursued some of the most 
ambitious decentralization reforms in Africa. He noted that the claim that decentralization 
has significantly improved service delivery came from service providers (health workers 
and teachers), and this was one of the reasons why decentralization was supported by the 
civil service staff in Uganda.  However, contrary to the providers’ claims, service 
receivers have not agreed that services were improved in recent years. This, he noted, has 
created a ‘perception gap’ that needs to be tackled in the near future. This mixed outcome 
was also confirmed by Francis and James (2003: 333) who reported that “decentralization 
(in Uganda) has not been able to stabilize the deterioration in agricultural services, and 
that the improvements in social services are attributable to increases in central conditional 
funding rather than the very limited scope which decentralized institutions have provided 
for local decision making.”  
 Some evidence can also be found in regard to local road infrastructure in 
developing countries such as those in Sub-Saharan Africa. For instance, a World Bank’s 
(1994: 75) review of 42 developing countries found that decentralized road maintenance 
was associated with lower backlogs, better conditions of roads and a greater proportion of 
paved ways. The study pointed out that decentralization was also correlated with higher 
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unit costs of maintenance (partially reflecting the higher share of paved roads) and 
greater differences in quality of roads across regions (partly reflecting the differences in 
institutional or human capacities among regions). Similarly, Andrew and Schroeder 
(2003: 38) cited another World Bank cross-country study by Humplick and Moini-Araghi 
(1996), which found that decentralized rural road maintenance in countries such as South 
Africa and United States led to lower costs of maintenance and better quality of roads. 
Finally, Ribot (2002: 10) quoted a study of decentralization in 10 developing countries in 
which decentralization improved infrastructure expenditures at national and subnational 
levels.  
 The above country-specific and cross-country evidence points to positive links 
between decentralization and service delivery, particularly in the health and local 
infrastructure services. But, the vast majority of these studies also underscore the fact that 
decentralization is highly context-specific and its impact varies across countries and 
sectors. Based on the assumption that decentralization is context-specific, this dissertation 
reveals that both the nature and implementation of decentralization reforms involve 
contradictory processes in many countries with strong bearing on service delivery 
outcome. In the following section, I further explore the literature on the impact of 
decentralization on one specific sector, the education service.   
 
1.3 Effects of Decentralization on the Education Sector: Arguments and 
 Evidence 	  
 Educational decentralization is a very popular government policy both in 
developed and developing countries. International aid organizations, such as the United 
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States Agency for International Development (USAID) and United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), as well as non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) of various sorts have been supportive of decentralization efforts as 
a means of improving educational access and performance. Generally, African education 
decentralization occurs in the context of severe deficiencies in educational access and 
quality (Gershberg and Winkler 2004). In recent years, this awareness was followed by 
renewed commitments both by African countries and donors to increase funding for basic 
education, as well as a more rigorous monitoring made possible through international 
projects, such as the MDGs and the Education for All (EFA) initiatives (Ibid.).  
 In addition to the overall political objectives to seek greater equity and access 
across regions and ethnic groups, educational decentralization has been adopted for other 
related reasons, such as improving administrative and financial efficiency and increasing 
local government responsiveness and accountability. However, the available evidence 
(examined more fully later in the section) suggests that a mere reorganization of the 
education system, such as through transferring responsibilities to lower tiers of 
government, has little impact on the delivery of education. In most cases, the outcomes of 
decentralized education depend on how it is designed and implemented, as well as a 
number of factors that include the level of human and financial capacities at all levels of 
government, historical and cultural factors, and the socio- economic and political 
environments within which decentralization takes place.  
 The design of educational decentralization, like all forms of decentralization, 
varies from country to country and takes three principal forms: (1) the deconcentration of 
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education which entails reallocating decision-making within the education ministry and 
bureaucracy, (2) the devolution of education which involves permanently transferring 
decision-making responsibilities in education from central government to lower levels of 
governments, such as to provinces, municipalities, or districts, and (3) delegation of  
education or school autonomy which refers to the administrative or legal transfer of 
responsibilities to elected or appointed school governing bodies such as school councils, 
school management committees, and school governing boards (Winkler and Yeo 2007).  
In addition to the above three approaches, the degree of educational decentralization can 
also be assessed using school-level decisions that are decentralized. For instance, 
Gershberg and Winkler (2004) cited the methodology used by the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) for measuring the level of 
decentralization by dividing educational functions into four groups: the organization of 
instruction, personnel management, planning and resources.  
 Besides the process of designing the transfer of complex set of school functions, 
the implementation of education decentralization faces various challenges. There is often 
a divergence between what is formally stated in official documents and what is actually 
practiced in the country. While decentralization may result in new decision-making 
powers for local leaders and citizens, it also may negatively impact certain groups. For 
example, teachers unions that have a strong stake in maintaining central bargaining and 
civil servants at the central ministry who find their jobs becoming redundant or their 
power to influence the allocation of resources diminished are on the losing end of the 
policy (Fisk 1996; Winkler 2006). Thus, the challenge of achieving consensus among 
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different stakeholders is considered to be one of the crucial factors in successful 
implementation of educational decentralization efforts.  Furthermore, the speed of 
implementation of educational decentralization reforms can have an important bearing on 
the success of decentralization. 
 While a rapid legislative or constitutional transfer of responsibilities from the 
national to lower levels of government may be the best way of using the window of 
opportunity made possible by the reform, it also brings risks on the ground that local 
governments lack the required capacities to handle newly assigned responsibilities (Shah 
and Thompson 2004; Winkler 2006). Although a more gradual implementation may 
allow local governments to gain administrative and technical capacities, it can also 
provide a time for those who are opposed to decentralization to organize and fight against 
such reforms (Ibid).   
 Another important concern of educational decentralization is how resources for 
education are generated and allocated between different levels of governments. As 
Winkler (2006: 4) pointed out, “the choices made concerning education finance are 
extremely important as they determine both the degree of effective control local 
governments have as well as the implications for efficiency and equity.” In most 
developing countries, regional and local governments receive the bulk of their primary 
and secondary education expenditures from central governments through a combination 
of block grants and special education funds. Block grants are usually allocated based on 
negotiations between different levels of government or capitation formulas based on 
certain consideration such as political ties, population, education needs, and revenue 
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raising incentives. As Winkler noted, in countries such as Chile and New Zealand where 
government grant formulas include average daily student attendance as opposed to the 
number of registered students, grants can be powerful incentives to attract and retain 
students (Ibid.). Moreover, limited local governments’ own revenue resources, as well as 
the fiscal disparities among jurisdictions of varying incomes, entail that central 
governments continue to play crucial roles in providing additional funding for education 
and addressing equity through intergovernmental grants.  
 The effective implementation of education decentralization is also impacted by 
the accountability relationships between different stakeholders such as policy makers, 
principals, teachers, parents and other community members (World Bank 2003). These 
accountability relationships are based on arrangements that include delegating, financing, 
performance, informing and enforcing (ibid.). In theory, if the ‘long route’ of 
accountability functions well, government policies associated with education provision 
will match local citizen’s demands (expressed through voting, voicing in local councils 
and other actions) and service providers (principals and teachers) will be held 
accountable to their performances (Ibid). Whereas, in the ‘short route’ of accountability, 
citizens can directly influence service providers by participating in decision-making, 
school oversight and management (Ibid). A good example of the latter would be 
community schools in many African countries (especially in rural areas) that have strong 
parental voices and high decision-making authorities, including the selection of school 
governing boards, which in turn select school directors and other personnel (Gershberg 
and Winkler 2004: 347- 51). However, most of these schools suffer from lack of 
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transparency and reliable information on school finances and performance and their 
dependency on government subsidies and international aid complicates, if not weakens, 
the direct accountability of service providers to local communities (ibid.).  
 The available empirical evidence on the impact of decentralization on improved 
education outcomes (such as in access, quality and quantity of schooling) is mixed as 
well.  Outcomes seem largely dependent on the motivations of governments for 
educational decentralization and the design and implementation of decentralization. As it 
is with decentralization reforms in general, the methodology of measuring educational 
decentralization is difficult for many reasons, including the long period of time it requires 
for school outcomes to change in response to any kind of educational intervention and the 
difficulty of controlling for external shocks – ranging from natural disasters and fiscal 
crisis to changes in national educational leadership – which may also influence school 
outcomes (Burki, Perry, and Dillinger 1999: 60).   
 Despite the difficulty of measuring the impact of educational decentralization, 
many studies have found a positive relationship between decentralization at the school 
level and educational achievements. For instance, in a survey of international 
experiences, Winkler and Gershberg (2000) found improved learning outcomes 
associated with increased local autonomy in such places as El Salvador, Nicaragua, 
Chile, and United States (Chicago and Memphis). Winkler and Gershberg (2004) also 
argued that the evidence for educational decentralization in Africa has been consistent 
with the international experience; transferring responsibility to schools governed by 
elected school councils can improve accountability and performance. However, they also 
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underscored the difficulty of evaluating education decentralization due to factors such as 
lack of base line data, incomplete implementation of many elements of reforms, and lags 
between implementation and the changes in such factors as behavior and resource 
allocation, which affect learning.  
 A number of other studies from Latin America also suggest a positive correlation 
between education decentralization and student achievements. In their evaluation of El 
Salvador’s Education with Community Participation Program (EDUCO), Jimenez and 
Sawada (1999) found that increasing parents’ participation in the community managed 
schools resulted in fewer number of teacher and student absenteeism. Similarly, King and 
Ozler (2000), in their study of school autonomy reform in Nicaragua, discovered 
significant relationship between the degree of autonomous decision-making, particularly 
with regard to teacher management (staffing, monitoring, and evaluation), and student 
achievement as measured by test scores.  
 Galiani and Schargrodsky’s (2002) study on the effects of provincial-level 
secondary school decentralization on educational quality in Argentina, suggested positive 
gains in student test scores.6 However, they also found that the advantages of 
decentralization might be weakened in provinces with poor fiscal management. 
Furthermore, Paes de Barros and Mendonca (1998) have examined the effects of 
Brazilian decentralization reforms on a number of school outcomes, such as gross 
enrollment rates, repetition rates, and student achievements on the national examination 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Galiani and Schargrodsky (2002) noted that due to limited data and simultaneous transferring of 
responsibilities to different tiers of governments, it is impossible to measure the impact of decision-making 
authority on the quality of education. Moreover, the authors acknowledged the fact that test scores are only 
one indicator of school quality and do not capture all the dimensions of school system achievements.   
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(SAEB). They concluded that school grants, school councils, and the election of a school 
director instituted through decentralization are strongly associated with student 
attendance and reduced age-grade lags. However, they found only modest improvements 
in student achievement as measured by test scores.  
 In contrast to the above examples, other studies point to a lack of correlation 
between decentralization reforms and improved education achievements. For example, 
after reviewing data from 14 OECD member countries, Walberg et al. (2000) concluded 
that decentralization features have little or no influence on learning. They suggested that 
conditions in classroom and schools have more consistent causal relations with learning 
than how decision-making is divided among units of governments, including schools. 
Another comparative review of four Latin American countries (Argentina, Chile, 
Colombia, and Mexico) by Prawda (1993) concluded that the process of decentralization 
did not lead to any discernible improvements in educational quality, equity, efficiency, 
and management capabilities. Rather, decentralization produced negative outcomes, such 
as increased disparities between the better off and worse off schools, decreased 
government educational expenditure (with the exception of Argentina) and sharp decline 
in teacher’s salaries. In a recent Africa Educational Watch (AEW) report by 
Transparency International (2010) on the educational systems in seven African countries7 
revealed that decentralization has not improved the quality of basic education but instead 
has left district officials ill-prepared to manage their new responsibilities. The report also 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 The seven countries are: Ghana, Madagascar, Morocco, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Uganda. The 
Report is based on data analyzed from 8,500 questionnaires completed by households, head teachers, heads 
of Parent Teacher Associations (PTAs), and district education officers.  
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stated that district officials did not have adequate decision-making powers or resources to 
operate in the field, nor did they have full control over the funds they received or 
adequate training to use them efficiently and creatively to support the schools under their 
supervision.  
 Although the educational reforms and increased international focus have led to 
higher student enrolment in the majority of the countries mentioned above, this usually 
leads to a trade-off between quantity and quality, as the findings of this dissertation 
highlights. The low quality of education remains a substantial problem particularly in 
countries with poor governance systems and practices, lack of clarification of roles and 
responsibilities among different stakeholders at different levels of government, limited 
transparency and accountability in school budgets and management, and weak parental 
awareness and engagement. 	  
 
1.4 Research Purpose and Questions 
 The main purpose of this study is to shed light on the complex and ambiguous 
relationship between decentralization and service delivery in the context of recent 
Ethiopian decentralization reforms. Specifically, it examines the design and 
implementation of decentralization reforms in relation to primary education, a sector that 
is among the most highly devolved of basic services. While the conflicting goals of 
decentralization are hardly captured by looking at one aspect of decentralization, this 
study provides a more nuanced analysis by taking all the key aspects of decentralization 
(political, fiscal and administrative). At the same time, this study focuses on one sector as 
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a sample to look closely at the possible effects of decentralization, since the study of 
numerous basic services that are devolved to the local government would be too broad for 
meaningful analysis. To this end, this study evaluates major indicators of educational 
access, equity, efficiency and quality. 
 Based on the above research purpose, there are some specific questions that 
guided this study. Initially, I explored political decentralization and the extent to which 
this new reform reflects local governments’ decision-making power and autonomy to 
manage their formally devolved responsibilities, particularly in the provision of primary 
education. At the same time, I assessed whether local citizens have access to political and 
social mechanisms for holding their elected representatives and service providers 
accountable for their performances.  
 Second, I looked at administrative decentralization and the roles and functions of 
local governments and schools in particular, to determine how these responsibilities are 
defined and practiced. This also includes assessing whether woredas and schools have the 
autonomy and capacity to manage their civil servants or staff in order to plan and execute 
their devolved responsibilities.   
 Third, I sought to identify the nature and practice of the fiscal relationship 
between different levels of government. Some specific questions I examined focused on 
whether local governments have adequate discretion and revenue resources to manage 
basic services, as well as how local authorities and service providers are held accountable 
to local citizens’ needs on spending. Moreover, under the purview of assessing fiscal 
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decentralization, I found it imperative to also examine the overarching question of having 
access to reliable and timely information about government and school budgets.  
 Fourth, I explored the impact of decentralization reforms on service delivery by 
scrutinizing the quantitative data available in order to better understand indicators of 
access, equity, efficiency and quality of education. Following this inquiry, I examined 
and analyzed these indicators to identify the challenges of implementing decentralization 
especially in relation to basic education service delivery, as well as to draw important 
lessons from the Ethiopian experience.  
 
1.5 Research Design and Methodology 
 
1.5.1 Qualitative Case Study 
 This study utilizes a qualitative and comparative case-study approach to examine 
how the woreda decentralization (or DLDP) has been implemented in Ethiopia and to 
what extent has it affected basic service delivery, particularly primary education. 
According to Gerring (2007:20), a case study is defined as “the intensive study of a single 
case where the purpose of the study is –at least in part- to shed light on a larger class of 
cases (a population).” Yin (2003:13) also explains the case study research method as an 
“empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomena within its real-life 
context; when the boundaries between phenomena and context are not clearly evident; 
and in which multiple sources of evidence are used.”  
 At the same time, a qualitative approach was chosen that is suitable to this kind of 
inquiry where not much is known in the research literature and very little, mostly 
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incomplete, data is available. According to Maxwell (2005:22), “the strengths of 
qualitative research derive primarily from its inductive approach, its focus on specific 
situations or people and its emphasis on words rather than numbers.” To that end, this 
study is heavily dependent on key informant interviews and field observations 
supplemented by quantitative data and information from various reports and documents 
in order to elicit both primary and secondary evidence. 
 In addition to my initial interest in exploring the contradictions of decentralization 
reforms as well as their mixed impacts, I chose Ethiopia as a case because the Ethiopian 
experience offers a rich context in which to study the nature and consequences of 
decentralization reforms for the following reasons:  
 First, decentralization reforms have been taking place in Ethiopia amid impressive 
economic growth in the last decade, making the country one of the fastest growing 
economies in Africa.8 Although it is considered one of the Least Developed Countries in 
the world, Ethiopia is making the third-fastest improvements towards reaching the 
MDGs, according to a recent study by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI 2010).  
 Second, as one of the more ethno-culturally diverse countries in the world and the 
second most populated country in Africa, Ethiopia provides an ideal environment for 
observations of factors and conditions that can account for variations in the effects of a 
program like decentralization. In the last two decades, Ethiopia has pursued an 
assortment of institutional and structural reforms, such as democratization, federalism, 
and state-led development (“developmental state”) along with decentralization. To that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 For instance, Ethiopia’s per capita GDP – using PPP constant 2005 international USD – increased from 
$557 to $912 between 2001 and 2010, according to the World Bank. 
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end, the combination of these factors playing out in the Ethiopian context can shed light 
on similar experiments in other African countries and add to our knowledge on how these 
interactions can yield varied or similar results.  
 Third, unlike the more incremental and partial decentralization reforms 
implemented in many countries, Ethiopia’s decentralization was rapid and simultaneous 
(hence called the “big-bang”), involving all dimensions – political, fiscal and 
administrative. This holistic approach, designed to enhance the efficiency and 
effectiveness of local governance and improve service delivery, and coupled with notable 
central policy coordination (particularly through the party structure), can provide another 
rich ground for inquiry and lessons of experience.   
 Fourth, Ethiopia’s decentralization and public service reforms have attracted a 
large number of international donors and development partners that are engaged in 
financing various initiatives and projects throughout the country, using both government 
budget and off-budget mechanisms. Although Ethiopia remains historically among the 
lowest recipients of Official Development Assistance (ODA) on per capita basis,9 it has 
managed to muster a large and increasing amount of development aid, exceeding three 
billion annually, in recent years. For instance, as one of the largest multi-donor 
development programs in Ethiopia, the Protection of Basic Services (PBS) has been 
providing financial support, along side domestic resources, directly to regional and 
woreda governments through federal un-earmarked block grants since 2006. Thus, the 
experience of PBS and other similar government/donor partnerships in Ethiopia will 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 According to Mattina (2006), for instance, Ethiopia received $11 in 2004/5 as compared to the average of 
$23 for Sub-Saharan Africa. 
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continue to generate interest and new inquiries that could provide valuable insights on 
such matters as aid effectiveness, accountability and sustainability.  
 As I take Ethiopia as a larger case to explore decentralization, a few smaller cases 
(i.e., local governments) have been chosen in an attempt to create an in-depth and 
comparative study that could result in analytical generalizations, as well as implications 
for other regions across the country. These local governments (woredas) are found within 
two comparable but distinct regional states in Ethiopia, including two urban and two rural 
administrations. The local governments in Ethiopia follow similar administrative 
structures and patterns across regions and are responsible for establishing and managing 
basic services such as primary education. For instance, woredas follow the same tripartite 
structure of council, executive committee and sector bureaus through out the country. 
Similarly, urban administrations in Ethiopia have the same status as woredas and perform 
state and municipal functions. As Table 1.1 below shows, the two rural woredas chosen 
for this study are Aleta Wendo woreda in Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples 
Regional State [SNNPRS] and Seharti Samre woreda in Tigray Regional State [TRS]). 
Likewise, the two urban woredas or city administrations selected for this study are 
Mekelle in TRS and Hawassa in SNNPRS (See chapter four for brief description of these 
areas).  
 I chose two regions (TRS and SNNPR) as representative samples among the four 
larger Ethiopian states (representing 87 percent of the population) that have implemented 
decentralization reforms at the woreda level since 2002. While the TRS is smaller in size 
and culturally homogenous, the SNNPRS is one of the largest regions in Ethiopia and 
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encompasses a multitude of ethnic and cultural groups within its state boundary. Four 
local governments in the two regions are purposively selected as case studies to allow a 
comparative analysis between urban and rural administrations as well as between two 
municipalities in two separate regions, creating a diverse pool from which to make 
inferences about other parts of the country. Particularly, I chose these local governments 
because of physical accessibility and my relative familiarity with the culture and people 
who reside there. This familiarity, compounded by the ability to speak the main 
languages, has afforded me the ability to navigate the already scarce resources more 
effectively. In addition, twelve primary schools - three from each woreda - are randomly 
chosen for field observations, interviews and other data collection sources, which are 
used to explain the possible effects of decentralization on primary education.  
 
Table 1.1 Case Study Local Governments 




Male         Female 
Number of 
Teachers 






































































Source: CSA, 2011; Field Data 2011/12 
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1.5.2 Data Collection and Analysis 
 The evidence and information for this study has been collected from primary and 
secondary sources. Semi-structured interviews were the primary source of data collection 
and analysis for this inquiry. As Simons (2009: 43) points out, interviews can allow 
people to “reveal more than can be detected or reliably assumed from observing a 
situation.” Hence, interviewees were purposefully selected for their knowledge of the 
subject matter and the leadership position they occupied in the three levels of government 
– federal, zonal, woreda – as well as at the school level. I asked a wide range of questions 
to gather views and perceptions of the public officials interviewed to better understand 
the complexities of the decentralization process in relation to providing basic services. 
For each interview, a list of initial questions was prepared in accordance with the study’s 
analytical framework, and the interview itself took on a primarily open-ended and 
flexible tone. Since most informants were not comfortable with tape recording, I took 
field notes for all the interviews conducted.  
 Altogether, I interviewed 58 as individuals and 13 others in groups of two and 
three. The interviews were conducted within ten-month period of field research, between 
January 2011 and May 2012. The interviews usually took between 30 and 45 minutes. 
Table 1.2 below indicates the profile and number of key informants participated in this 
study (See Appendix B for all names of interviewee and dates of interviews). 
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Table 1.2 Profiles of Key Informants 
Background Number of Interviews 
Individual 
 
          Group         
of two of three 
MOE Head officers 2 - - 
Regional Education Bureau Heads 2 - - 
Zone President 1 - - 
City Mayors* 2 - - 
City Administration Education Heads 3 - - 
Woreda Administrators 3 - - 
Woreda Education Heads 2 - - 
Principals of Schools 6 - - 
Vice Principals 3 3 - 
Principals with Vice Principals - 2 - 
Primary School Teachers 22 - 1 
PTA Presidents 12 - - 
University Department Head 1 - - 
Total 59 10 3 
 
* The Mayor of Mekelle was not available for in-person interview and instead answered the Interview 
questions by writing them out on paper.  
 
 Data collected from the interviews are corroborated with other sources, including 
field observations and document reviews. Field observations have proven instrumental to 
witnessing how local governments and schools work in their natural context as well as 
crosschecking what is reported in official documents and mentioned in personal 
interviews. As Merriam (1998: 94) noted, observations “provide a first hand encounter 
with the phenomenon of interest rather than a second hand account of the world obtained 
in an interview.”  
 Primary documents include laws, decrees, policies, constitutions and 
proclamations of federal and regional governments, particularly from TRS and SNNPRS.  
Statistical reports used for this study include the Central Statistical Authority (CSA) by 
the Ethiopian federal government, Educational Statistics Annual Abstracts (ESAA) by 
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the Ministry of Education (MOE), and Institute for Statistics (UIC) by United Nations 
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). In addition, background 
information is provided from each primary school observed, and a limited number of 
fiscal and budgetary reports are obtained from regional and local government Bureaus of 
Finance and Economic Development (BOFED), as well as schools.  
 Secondary sources are comprised of reports and studies done by the MOE, 
regional education Bureaus (REBs), the World Bank, USAID, and few other relevant 
literature pertaining to the concept and practices of decentralization, including books, 
journal articles, news papers, and magazines.   
 All the primary and secondary data obtained from multiple sources have been 
organized and triangulated throughout the analytical process to provide plausible 
explanations to the research questions addressed in this study. At the same time, I used 
the collected data to compare the implementation process of decentralization and its 
impacts on local governments provision of primary education in two regional states and 
between rural and urban settings.  
 
1.6 Limitations of Research Methodology 	   There are a few limitations in the methodology I employed in this research. 
During the research, I was aware of the potential threats to the study’s quality due to the 
issue of subjectivity or personal bias, given that I hail from Ethiopia. While familiarity to 
people’s natural environment and culture allows a more nuanced understanding of their 
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views and experiences, without a conscious effort of neutrality, it can also unduly 
influence the processes of analysis and conclusions.  
  The data for this study were collected using a non-randomized sampling of areas 
and key informants, which could present a challenge for selection bias. Key informants 
only included those who held government positions, experts in educational sector at the 
woreda level and service providers (school directors and teachers). Although PTA 
chairpersons were interviewed as representative of parents and the community, ordinary 
people at the local level and students were not directly interviewed. This was mainly 
because of the general reluctance I encountered from ordinary people and students to talk 
freely about topics related to government and government-sponsored programs. Other 
important stakeholders such as members of international donors and NGO’s have not 
been included as key informants. However, some of their views and perceptions as well 
as other foreign development partners have been obtained from secondary sources.    
 Many of the key informants that I interviewed were willing to discuss official 
statements and their understandings; however, they tended to be somewhat reserved when 
expressing their own personal views and opinions about decentralization reforms, 
particularly from political and public policy angles. This was partly because of the 
positions some informants held within the government, and partly due to the general 
uneasiness among people to discuss political issues publically10. On the contrary, I found 
most informants to be more forthcoming and open to discuss issues and problems related 
to education.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Ethiopian have a common saying in Amharic which translates as “keep politics and electricity at a 
distance.” 
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 While the two regional states and the four local governments are believed to 
represent a good variation in terms of demographic make-up (homogeneous vs. 
heterogeneous) and local settings (urban vs. rural), the selected sample was not 
representative of all the regional states and of the multitude of woredas and schools found 
in the country. Given the limitation of time and funding, as well as problems of 
accessibility, I chose a small sample size that would allow an in-depth and comparative 
assessment with a cautious generalization of the research findings across all local 
governments and schools in the country.  
 Furthermore, the scarcity of reliable and complete data, especially at the local 
government level, was an important constraint during the course of this research. Except 
the MOE, which has a long history of publishing annual educational statistics at the 
national levels, the system of documentation and record keeping at the regional, local 
government, and school levels is still poor. The absence of both archival and updated 
information about such elements as local government budgets, school finances, student 
achievement scores make it difficult to compare as well as to observe general patterns of 
the decentralization processes and their impacts.   
 
1.7 Summary and Organization of the Study 
 The research on decentralization demonstrates that the mere implementation of 
decentralization does not automatically lead to the purported benefits of decentralization, 
such as improved service delivery. The potential link between decentralization and 
service delivery is instead problematic given the process of political, fiscal and 
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administrative centralization that coexists with official devolution of these aspects of 
decentralization. As the process of education decentralization in Ethiopia clearly 
demonstrates, access to primary education has significantly expanded while quality of 
education has declined. To that end, this mixed message makes it difficult to make claims 
on the virtues of decentralization due to the complex and ambiguous nature of its 
outcomes. 
 The findings of this dissertation further underscore that the incomplete and 
conflicting nature of decentralization reforms continues to pose significant challenges on 
the effectiveness of these reforms. Similar to many Sub-Saharan African countries, 
important constraints to Ethiopia’s decentralization process include lack of democratic 
competition and citizens’ participation in local politics, top-down party control, weak 
fiscal autonomy and capacity, and inadequate human and institutional capacity in local 
governments. At the same time, these and similar constraints can equally be applied (with 
slight variations) across regions and localities represented in the sampled study areas.  
 The succeeding chapters of this dissertation are structured as follows. Chapter two 
presents the broader historical background of decentralization in Ethiopia within the 
context of decentralization efforts before the middle of the nineteenth century and the 
process of centralization that followed, ending with the decentralization reforms under 
the current government. Chapter three assesses the evolution of education 
decentralization beginning from the early establishment of education in the country to the 
current decentralized system.  
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 Chapter four and chapter five present the main findings of this dissertation, 
calling attention to the evidence that that the extent of political, administrative and fiscal 
decentralization in Ethiopia has been problematic and to the large extent incomplete, 
while its impacts on primary education service delivery have had mixed results. Lastly, 
chapter six makes concluding remarks on how centralizing structures and practices 
coupled with inadequate institutional and human capacity have created significant 
obstacles in achieving many of the purported benefits of decentralization reforms. There 
are important lessons and policy implications that can be inferred from the Ethiopian 
experience, as identified in this last chapter, including the role of a dominant party in 
power relations and accountability between levels of government, and the complicated 
relationship between decentralization and other related variables such as political 
stability, ethnic and cultural politics, local democratic processes, and economic 
development.   
 This study lays the foundation for further research that will identify the link 
between decentralization and service delivery as more complete and accurate data 
become available at the local levels. The process decentralization reforms remain 
ongoing in many countries in Africa and other developing world and this and similar 
studies can contribute not only our knowledge of individual countries, but as a result, 
allow meaningful comparisons across multiple countries.   
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CHAPTER 2 
 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF DECENTRALIZATION IN ETHIOPIA 
 
 For most of its long history, Ethiopia has had a decentralized system of 
government in which the head of state at the center co-existed with relatively autonomous 
regional and local nobilities (Assefa 2007: 16; Gebru 1991: 36; Solomon 2008: 11). 
Throughout the eighteenth century, the Ethiopian provincial or regional aristocracies 
(rases) were unable to establish their position as autonomous powers for an extended 
period of time, but neither were the emperors, who never fully managed to consolidate 
the imperial government (Perham 1996: 267). Attempts to centralize power began in the 
middle of the nineteenth century but were not intensely pursued until the regime of 
Emperor Haile Silassie (1930-1974) and his successor, the military dictatorship (1974-
1991). In pursuit of consolidating power, both regimes suppressed and marginalized 
various ethno-linguistic groups in the country. These policies eventually led the country 
into a devastating civil war that lasted for three decades beginning in the 1960s. 
Additionally, the same policies played a part in the failure of the federal experiment with 
Eritrea, which became an independent state in 1993.  
 Although decentralization reforms were introduced by the two previous regimes, 
they did not fundamentally change the government structure until 1991, when the 
Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) came to power. EPRDF 
drafted the 1995 Constitution of the country, which declared the federal and democratic 
nature of the Ethiopian state (Article 1) and guaranteed that both the federal government 
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and the ethnic-based regional governments would have legislative, executive and judicial 
powers of their own (Article 50: 1). The second phase of decentralization began in 2001-
2002 (1994 Ethiopian calendar),11 when regional states further devolved power and 
responsibilities to local government at the woreda level. 
 In the following sections, I detail the historical background of decentralization 
reforms in Ethiopia from the early Axumite Empire to the present EPRDF-led 
government of Ethiopia. Moreover, the historical evolution and current context of 
educational decentralization are examined in the last section of the chapter.  
 
2.1 Decentralization in Early Ethiopian History 
 The official history of the Ethiopian state goes back to the Axumite Kingdom, 
which was established in the first millennium BCE in the northern part of what is 
Ethiopia today.  With its political capital, Axum and its main commercial port, Adulis, 
the Axumite Empire emerged as the most powerful state between the Eastern Roman 
Empire and Persia (Pankhurst 1998: 33). At the height of its power, the Axumite Empire 
not only expanded its control over a vast area in northern Ethiopia, but it also maintained 
economic and cultural ties across the Red Sea with the Mediterranean world, India and 
Far East (Bahru 2001:8). Some historical evidence suggests that the Axumites ruled in a 
decentralized way by imposing tributes on newly subjugated peoples and kingdoms in 
exchange for military protection by the empire (Perham 1969: 22-25; Solomon 2008: 11). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Ethiopian calendar is seven years and eight months behind the Gregorian calendar. Ethiopian New Year 
starts on September 11 (September 12 in leap year) in a Gregorian calendar. The Ethiopian calendar has 
13th months where the first 12 months have 30 days of each, and the last (thirteenth) month has 5 days or 6 
days in a leap year (every four years).   
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The Axumites were also renowned for creating their own currency and written language, 
the Ge’ez script, as well as for their early adoption of Christianity. Additionally, they 
were impressive stonemasons, as illustrated in the various obelisks (stelae) and other 
monuments found in and around Axum (Perham, 1969).     
 The decline of Axumite power around the middle of the seventh century Common 
Era was caused in part by domestic rebellions, such as attacks by the Beja tribes from the 
north, and in part by the rise of Islam and the Arab renaissance that followed, which 
ended Axum’s dominance in the region (Bahru 2001: 8; Pankhurst 1998: 41). The various 
rulers that succeeded the Axumites, notably the Zagwe and the Solomonic dynasties, 
expanded the empire southwards by subjugating and assimilating the diverse ethnic and 
linguistic groups that would later constitute the Ethiopian state. However, until the late 
nineteenth century, no ruler was able to fully incorporate the newly obtained territories 
and its peoples into a centralized monarchy. Thus, most of the history of medieval 
Ethiopia and what followed was characterized by an endless struggle between the 
imperial throne at the center, and a number of powerful provincial nobilities effectively 
exercising decentralized powers at the outskirts (Assefa 2007: 16). This conflict between 
center and periphery was one of the factors that contributed to a constant shifting of the 
political seat of government to different parts of the empire, beginning from Axum in 
Tigray, to Lasta in Wello, then to Shewa, Gondar, and back to Tigray and finally resting 
in Addis Ababa, the current capital of Ethiopia (Ibid; Bairu 1994: 3). 
 In addition to the chronic conflict between central and regional powers, there was 
a significant challenge that came during sixteenth century by Muslim forces that 
	  	   46	  
originated from the southeastern region of the empire called Adal. Most importantly, the 
declared holy war and subsequent campaigns by one of the Muslim warriors, Ahmad ibn 
Ibrahim al Ghazi, better known as “Gragn” (“the left handed”) resulted in an immense 
devastation throughout the country (Perham 1969: 41-46; Solomon 2008: 13;). Although 
the Ethiopian and Portuguese armies eventually defeated the Muslim forces, historians 
would attest that the event changed the religious dynamics of the population for centuries 
to come (Ibid). Moreover, the aftermath of the Muslim incursion coincided with the 
northward migration of the Oromo ethnic group that also brought major changes to the 
shape of the country’s demography and its political geography (Bahru 2001: 9). 
 The Muslim wars and the Oromo expansion were followed by a long period of 
dynastic conflicts and political instability throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries. This resulted in further strengthening of the regional forces that dominated the 
power of the imperial throne (Tadesse 1972: 301). Until the middle of the nineteenth 
century, when Kasa Haylu was crowned Emperor Tewodros II and restored the power of 
the throne, the country was controlled by virtually independent regional nobilities who 
regularly fought against each other for supremacy (Bahru 2001: 11; Markakis 2011: 36). 
This period, which lasted for almost a century (1769-1855), was known in Ethiopian 
history as the Zemene Masafint  (“Era of the Princes”). 
 Despite serious attempts at reunification and centralization of the Ethiopian state, 
emperor Tewodros (1855-1868) ultimately failed to deal effectively with the religious 
and political rebellions against his reforms. At his death, the country still remained 
divided among rival regional lords. The next emperor who succeeded to the throne, 
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Yohannes IV (1872-1889), followed a less aggressive policy of unification than his 
predecessor. This was seen in his willingness to share power with his subordinates 
provided that they recognized his overall sovereignty as Neguse Negest (“king of kings”) 
and paid him occasional tributes (Bahru 2001: 43; Pankhurst 1998: 163). Although 
Yohannes was able to establish a loosely unified country, a series of struggles against 
foreign aggressions by Egyptians, Mahdists and Europeans seriously challenged his reign 
and resulted in his own death in the battlefield.  
 
2.2 The Rise of the Modern Ethiopian State 
 2.2.1 Menelik II (1889-1913)  	  
 Upon Yohannes’ death one of the powerful regional rulers, Menelik II, inherited 
the throne.  Menelik II continued the process of unification and modernization in a more 
rigorous and successful way than any of his predecessors. While Menelik’s successive 
military campaigns expanded the frontiers of his empire to the areas that later constituted 
the geographic and territorial boundaries of the modern Ethiopian state, he was also able 
to secure international recognition for the country’s sovereignty by establishing 
diplomatic relations with then major European powers, including Britain, France, Italy 
and Russia (Meheret 1998: 8).  
 Unlike his predecessors, Menelik made serious attempts to restrain the autonomy 
of regional powers and to further consolidate the central government. His policies 
included building a strong army, introduction of modern education, the use of currency, 
importation of technology, abolishment of slavery, imposition and collection of taxes by 
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the center as well as laying the foundation for Addis Ababa as a new political capital for 
the country (Solomon 2008: 16).  
 Furthermore, Menelik was credited with establishing the country’s first cabinet, 
which consisted of ministers who were appointed for justice, war, the interior, finance, 
trade and foreign affairs, agriculture, pen, i.e. of diplomatic correspondence, and the royal 
chronicle, public works, and the palace (Bahru 2001: 115; Pankhurst 1998: 203). These 
ministers played significant roles in creating relative stability in the country in the period 
following the death of Menelik, when the central government was weakened by the 
internal power struggles within the monarchy. These power struggles continued until Ras 
Tafari (later Haile Selassie) emerged as the prevailing sovereign to assume the imperial 
throne in 1930.  
 
2.2.2 Haile Selassie I (1930-1974) 
 During his long reign, both as regent (1916-1930) to Menelik II’s daughter, 
Empress Zewditu, and later as emperor (1930-1974), Haile Selassie was able to 
consolidate his personal rule and to centralize the state through a combination of political 
maneuvers, institutional reforms and application of force whenever deemed necessary 
(Kassahun 2009: 120). As a major move to set up a modern centralized state, Haile 
Selassie promulgated the first written constitution of the country in 1931. The 
Constitution legalized his absolute powers “in appointments and dismissals, the rendering 
of justice, the declaration and terminations of wars, and the granting of land and honors.” 
(Bahru 2001: 143). Thus, the Constitution clearly reflected the emperor’s control over 
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both central and provincial government and virtually eliminated any political position of 
the nobility other than the one directly given by the throne (Cohen and Koehn 1980: 7).  
 While the Constitution gave the emperor an upper hand over the traditional 
nobility and hereditary rulers, it was the enactment of Decree No. 1 of 1942 that 
established the broad outlines of a new system of local administration12 and defined the 
legal responsibilities of provincial and municipal officials (Clapham 1969: 35; Keller 
1988: 74). The system created by this decree and subsequent official proclamations 
created a complex set of provincial and local administrations as a way of de-
concentrating central ministries. However, these entities were far from autonomous and 
largely operated under the strict supervision of the Ministry of Interior and through a 
network of subordinate field offices staffed by central government appointees (Cohen and 
Koehn 1980: 8-9).  
 Although the administrative reforms of the 1940s were successful in further 
consolidating and strengthening the centralized bureaucracies, they were also the 
harbinger of increasing popular dissatisfaction with a lack of progress in local self-
administration and economic development. The Haile Selassie government had to 
respond to popular demands by making its first “real” attempt at decentralization in 1966 
when it submitted to the then imperial parliament the Awraja Local Self-Administrative 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 The decree, which is known as the Administrative Regulations Decree of 1942, established the original 
sub-national administrative divisions, which included the province (teklay gizat), the sub-province 
(awraja), the district (woreda), and the sub-district (miktel woreda) levels (Cohen and Koehn 1980:16). 
These local government arrangements have continually changed their numbers, names and boundaries 
throughout the country’s recent history.  
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Order No. 43 (Meheret 2002: 134).13 Despite being championed by a few officials in 
central government and the Ministry of the Interior, the reform was resisted by many of 
the provincial elites due to various vested economic interests. The parliament eventually 
failed to pass the local government finance bill that was necessary to implement the 
program (Cohen and Koehn 1980: 55-58). Moreover, this and other similar reforms, 
including the 1973 Awraja Self-Government Reform and the 1974 draft Constitution 
proposed by the imperial government few months before its departure, did not make any 
significant impact on the process of achieving the intended objectives such as rapid 
economic development and enhanced local participation through decentralization.     
 
2.3 The Military Dictatorship (1974-1991) 
 The Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC), popularly known as 
the Derg, assumed power after its successful coup against Haile Selassie in 1974. PMAC 
then launched a series of reforms aimed at addressing several popular demands, including 
efforts to overhaul the formal structures of the provincial administration and the 
establishment of local self-government through grass roots organizations. As the largest 
administrative jurisdictions, the imperial provinces (Teklay Gizat) were renamed regions 
(Kifle Hager) and the head of each region was called chief administrator (astedadari) 
instead of the imperial governor-general (Gedzi or enderasse). At the same time, the 
Peasant Associations (PAs) in rural areas and the Urban Dwellers Associations (UDAs or 
Kebeles) in urban areas were created as lower administrative units and given extensive 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Since 1968, the country was divided into 14 provinces (teklay ghizat), 103 sub provinces (awraja), 505 
districts (woreda), and 949 sub-districts (miktel). (Cohen and Koehn 1980:9). 
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responsibilities and authority to implement the military government’s policies at the 
regional and local levels.  
 The PAs and the UDAs emerged as an integral part of implementing the radical 
socialist policies of the Derg, including the nationalization of rural and urban land. These 
organizations initially enjoyed significant autonomy in carrying out various social, 
economic and judicial functions within their jurisdictions (Meheret 2007: 134).  
However, in the face of serious political and military conflicts confronting the Derg 
regime in the late 1970s,14 the new associations were stripped of their self-governance 
and administrative capacities; they largely became extended organs of the central state 
bureaucracy (Cohen and Koehn 1980: 302).  
 The Derg led by its most brutal dictator Mengistu Haile-Mariam, and backed by 
its newly established Marxist-Leninist vanguard party, the Worker’s Party of Ethiopia 
(WPE) in 1984, continued to pursue consolidation of power through authoritarian rule 
and violent repression. This in turn generated increased popular resistance and more 
intensified armed struggles in various parts of the country, especially in Tigray, Eritrea 
and the Ogaden regions where ethnic minorities put up strong resistance against the 
regime.15    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 One of the notable examples of these conflicts involves the Derg’s sponsored killing campaign of 1976-
78, known as the Red Terror, launched against those who were considered enemies of the regime, 
particularly members of the two opposition parties, the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Front (EPRP) and 
All Ethiopian Socialist Party (MEISON). This resulted in the imprisonment, torture and death of tens of 
thousands of Ethiopians, especially students and intellectuals in large towns through out the country.  
  
15 The major opposition groups include: the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), Oromo Liberation 
Front (OLF), Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), and Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party 
(EPRP). While the EPLF began in the 1960s after the failure of Eritrea’s federation with Ethiopia (1952-
62), the other liberation groups were formed in the 1970s.	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 In response to the worsening economic and political crises, and feeling compelled 
to address the “National Question”16 popularized by the Ethiopian Student Movement 
since the 1960s, the Derg proposed to make decentralization the centerpiece of its 1987 
Constitution. Entrusted to the newly established Institute for the Study of Ethiopian 
Nationalities (ISEN), the Constitution stated that the People’s Democratic Republic of 
Ethiopia (PDRE) is a unitary state “which shall ensure the equality of nationalities, 
combat chauvinism and narrow-minded nationalism and advance the equality, 
respectability and development of the languages of various nationalities…through equal 
participation in political, economic, social and cultural dimensions and through the 
realization of regional autonomy” (PDRE Constitution 1987, Article 2). The Constitution 
also established the National Assembly (shengo), the Council of State, and the Council of 
Ministers as major organs of central government (Articles 62-89), as well as two kinds of 
territorial jurisdictions at the regional government level, namely the administrative and 
autonomous regions (Article 59). These regional administrations were further divided 
into sub-provinces (awrajas), constituting a three-tier administrative hierarchy of the 
Ethiopian government.   
  Subsequent laws promulgated in 1987 defined the boundaries, duties and powers 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 The exact origin and development of students’ movement for self-determination of nationalities 
(“national question”) in the 1960s and afterwards is highly contested. But, the Derg’s Program of the 
National Democratic Revolution (PNDR) in 1976 stated that “The problem of nationalities can be resolved 
if each nationality is accorded the right to self-government. This means that each nationality will have 
regional autonomy to decide on matters concerning its internal affairs. A nationality within its environs has 
the right to determine the contents of its political, economic and social life, to use its own language and 
elect its own leaders and administrators to lead its internal organs (PMAC 1976: Part 2).  
 
	  	   53	  
of both the administrative and autonomous regions.17 Accordingly, the country was 
divided into twenty-four administrative regions and five autonomous regions18. As many 
scholars have noted, the granting of autonomous status to the five regions that were 
highly affected by ethnic insurgencies was driven more by political exigencies than a 
genuine commitment to decentralization (Clapham 1988; Kassahun 2009; Keller 1988; 
Meheret 2002). Likewise, although the Constitution was supposed to create regional 
administrations with their own independent shengos and executive committees, in reality 
“there was no meaningful political and ethnic autonomy” enjoyed by these local 
governments (Brietzke 1995: 20). Moreover, in order to execute their socio-economic 
and budgetary planning, as well as to manage their own budgets and revenues, the local 
units had to comply unconditionally with the laws, regulations, and decisions of the 
center, particularly the Council of State headed by the president of the republic (Kumera 
2007: 111).  Thus, decentralization and various forms of self-government stated in many 
of the government’s official papers, failed to fully materialize during the decade and half 
of the regime.   
 The Derg’s hasty and incomplete attempts at decentralization during its last days 
in power were insufficient to quiet the civil war that beset the country. Successive 
military advances made by liberation forces (led by the Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary 
Democratic Front [EPRDF]), resulted in the overthrow of the military regime in 1991. At 
the same time, EPLF took control of Eritrea and established a provisional government 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17  These laws include: Proclamation No. 14/1987, No. 15/1987, No. 16/1987, and No. 17/1987. 
	  
18 They were Assab, Dire Dawa, the Ogaden, Tigray and Eritrea (with a special autonomous status).  
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until referendum for independence was held. Following a United Nations’ supervised 
referendum it became a separate country in 1993.  
 The demise of the Derg brought new opportunities for Ethiopia to undertake a far-
reaching political and constitutional transformation within a framework of “ethnic 
federalism”. The next section therefore, explores the process of the current 
decentralization reforms during the period of the Transitional Government (TGE: 1991-
95) and after the enactment of the 1995 Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic 
of Ethiopia (FDRE).   
 
2.4 Decentralization Reforms under the EPRDF (Post-1991) 
 Soon after seizing power, the EPRDF began the process of dismantling the 
political structure of the Derg, and formed the TGE in collaboration with other political 
and ethnic groups (Kassahun 2009:127). The TGE then called for a National Conference 
of Peace and Democracy in July 1991 and approved a Transitional Period Charter (TPC) 
that served as an interim constitution until 1995. The Charter, among other things, laid 
down the legal framework that constituted state power and its devolution by recognizing 
the fundamental freedoms, equal rights and self-determination of all peoples as governing 
principles of political, economic and social life (TPC 1991: Preamble, par. 2). It also 
guaranteed the right of each “nation, nationality, and people”19 of Ethiopia to self-
government, which include the right to:  (a) preserve and develop its identity, culture, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Proclamation No. 7/1992 under Article 2(7), defines the term “Nation, Nationality or Peoples” to mean 
“a people living in the same geographical area and having a common language and a common 
psychological make up of identity.” The Central Statistics Authority identified about 80 ethnic groups in 
the country in 1994 (CSA 1996). 
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history and language; (b) self-administer its own defined territory and participate in the 
central government on the basis of fair and proper representation; (c) to exercise its rights 
to establish independence when the above mentioned rights are denied, abridged or 
abrogated (Ibid.: Article 2). 
 One of the most significant provisions of the Charter was the formation of the 
three-tiered (central, regional and woreda) administrative system with the corresponding 
delineation of authorities and powers devolved to each of these institutions. 
Subsequently, Proclamation No. 7 of 1992 (TGE 1992a: Articles 2,3) further elaborated 
the decentralization process by establishing national/regional self-governments based on 
ethno-linguistic criteria. Thus, the Proclamation instituted fourteen national/regional state 
governments out of the sixty-five identified nations, nationalities and peoples living in 
these regions. While forty-eight of the identified nationalities (or ethnic groups) were 
entitled to institute their own self-governments at woreda level and above, the remaining 
seventeen were considered minority nationalities and provided with legitimate 
representations in the woreda council.  The same law also provided the right for self-
government of any adjacent nations, nationalities and peoples to enter into agreements to 
establish a larger regional self-government within any of the fourteen classified regions 
as well as set up any intermediate units of self-government between the regional and 
woreda levels. As a result of this, five adjacent regions (regions 7, 8, 9,10 and 11) 
decided to form one large single region called the Southern Ethiopian Nations, 
Nationalities and Peoples Regional State (SNNPRS). This reduced the number of the 
national/regional self-governments established by the original proclamation from 
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fourteen to ten (and finally to nine).  
 Another important law regarding the decentralization process was Proclamation 
No. 33 of 1992 (TGE 1992b) that elaborated the legal basis for fiscal devolution of state 
resources. Proclamation No. 33 was itself based on the prior Proclamation No. 7 of 1992, 
which provided, among other things, the source of revenue for regional governments. 
Thus, in article 35 of this Proclamation (TGE 1992a), four sources of revenue are 
identified: a) revenue collected from taxes allocated to them; b) grants from the central 
government; c) domestic borrowing; and 4) other sources of income. Likewise, Articles 
4-7 of Proclamation No. 33/1992 (TGE 1992b) delineated the sharing of expenditure and 
revenue responsibilities between the federal government and the regions, as well as 
subsidies and grants provided by the federal government to the regions. The purpose of 
these intergovernmental subsidies/transfers, as stated in the same proclamation, was to 
enhance social services, promote economic development of regional governments and 
accelerate the development of previously neglected areas (TGE 1992b). Although 
government subsidies were allocated on ad hoc basis in the early transition period, 
beginning in 1994/95, the central government began to apply certain evolving criteria for 
subsidy allotment. These criteria included: population size, level of development and 
poverty, revenue raising efforts and service delivery outcomes (Tegegn and Kassahun 
2007: 19-23). 
 Through its Charter and series of proclamations, the TGE set in motion the 
decentralization reforms, especially by creating regional and local self-governments with 
distinct executive, legislative and judicial powers in all matters under their jurisdiction 
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and with the exception of those exclusively assigned to the central government. These 
changes represented a significant departure from the highly centralized and unitary form 
of state power that characterized the previous imperial and military regimes. However, 
the newly established national/regional self-governments lacked the legal sanction that 
would come later with the Federal Constitution and remained in many respects 
subordinate to the central government throughout the transition period.     
 Meanwhile, the introduction of the federal system on the basis of ethnic and 
cultural lines was a source of debate and uncertainty among many political groups and 
scholars in and outside the country. As Keller and Smith (2005:269) noted, “the new 
policy prompted protests among Ethiopian nationalists, both at home and abroad, who 
vigorously opposed policies they feared would lead to the balkanization of Ethiopia.” 
Among the Ethiopian scholars, for example, Walle Engedayehu (1993: 52) argued that 
the inter-ethnic division brought by this policy would potentially lead to disastrous 
consequences similar to those seen in Yugoslavia. Likewise, foreign observers and 
scholars expressed concerns with the new ethnic-based federal arrangements. For 
instance, Ottaway (1994: 47) forewarned that “by following the Soviet lead, the 
Ethiopian government has embarked on a path bound to lead either to increased 
repression or to mounting ethnic conflict and the eventual disintegration of the country.” 
Despite these and other similar sentiments, the transitional government continued with its 
form of decentralization and federalism that it considered as a viable solution for both 
past inequalities between the country’s ethnic groups and for providing an environment 
for democratic self-governance (TPC 1991). 
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 The TGE’s policy was further confirmed in 1995, when a new Constitution came 
into effect and declared officially to have established “a federal democratic state” (FDRE 
Constitution 1995: Article. 1). The new Republic was comprised of two distinct entities: 
the federal state and the regional state members (Article 50:1). Each entity was to have its 
own legislative, executive and judicial powers within its area of jurisdiction (Article 50: 
2). Thus, the Constitution established nine ethnically based regional states (kililoch; 
singular: kilil) and two autonomous cities (astedader akababiwoch; singular: astedader 
akababi) that include: Tigray, Amhara, Afar, Oromia, Somali, Southern Nations 
Nationalities and Peoples, Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambela, and Harrari regional states; 
Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa were named autonomous administrative areas (Article 47).20 
While the first five of these regions belonged to the particular ethnic group to which the 
name of the state refers, the remaining four regions are multi-ethnic and no particular 
group had dominance in the state. Table 2.1 shows the territorial sizes and population 
densities of the nine regional states, while Table 2.2 displays the composition of the 
major ethnic groups in the country.  	  
 











No. Of Kebeles 
Urban     Rural 
Oromia 27.16 36.7 297.9 20 278 546 6,484 
Amhara 17.21 23.3 154.8 11 139 348 3,074 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 The multi-ethnic city of Dire Dawa was not established constitutionally, but rather later through a federal 
proclamation. Although having its own administrative council chosen by its inhabitants, the city is directly 
accountable to the Federal executive office.  
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SNNP  15.04 20.4 113 14 145 270 3,666 
Somalia 4.44 6.0 279.3 9 54 - - 
Tigray 4.3 5.8 51.4  6 47 92 611 
Addis Ababa 2.74 3.7 .53 10 - 99 - 
Afar 1.41 1.9 96.7 5 30 49 338 
Benishangul 
Gumuz 
0.67 0.9 50.7 3 20 29 417 
Dire Dawa 0.34 0.5 1.5 1 1 9 32 
Gambella 0.31 0.4 29.8 3 12 17 211 
Harari 0.18 0.2 .33 1 1 19 17 
Special. 
Areas 
96,570 0.1 - - 4 - - 
Country Total 73,918,505 100 1,127 83 731 1,478 14,850 
                
Source: CSA 2008; CSA Atlas 2011: CSA Administrative Report 2012. 
 
Table 2.2 Compositions of Ethiopia’s Major Ethnic Groups 
Ethnic  
Group 
Oromo Amhara Somali Tigre Sidama 
Population 
(Millions) 
25.5 19.9 4.6 4.5 3.0 
Population 
(Percent) 





Gurage Wolaita Hadiya Afar Gamo 
Population 
(Millions) 
2.0 1.7 1.3 1.3 1.1 
Population 
(Percent) 
2.5 2.3 1.7 1.7 1.5 
 
Source: CSA 2008.  
 
 The most significant statement affirming the establishment of autonomous 
regional and local governments comes from Article 39 (3) of the Constitution, which 
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provides that every Nation, Nationality and People in Ethiopia has the right to a full 
measure of self-government which includes the right to establish institutions of 
government in the territory that it inhabits and to equitable representation in state and 
Federal governments. Similarly, the Constitution guarantees every ethno-linguistic group 
the right to speak, to write and develop its own language and promote and reserve its 
culture and history (Article 39: 2).   
 Articles 51 and 52 of the Constitution also pertain to the division of power 
between the federal government and the nine regional states. The central government is 
charged with national responsibilities such as defense, public security, foreign policy, 
inter-state and foreign commerce, currency and citizenship. The regional states are also 
empowered to perform such functions as enacting and executing their own state 
constitutions and laws, planning and implementing social, economic and development 
policies, employing and administering the state civil servants, and establishing and 
directing state security and police. Article 52 (1) of the Ethiopian Constitution further 
stipulates that “all powers not given expressly to the federal government alone or 
concurrently to the federal government and the states are reserved to the states.”21  
Although the Constitution requires regional states to create and transfer adequate 
decision-making power and control over resources to local governments (Article 50:4), 
devolution was limited to the zonal level (a step below the regional administration) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 In principle, this Article is similar to the Tenth Amendment of the United States Constitution or Article 
30 of the Basic Law of the German Constitution (Quoted in Assefa 2006:138).  
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during its first phase.22  
 Beginning in 2001/2, the four most populous regions (Amhara, Oromia, 
SNNPRS, and TRS) decided to transfer major responsibilities and resources to the 
woreda level. In these states, woreda became a legally sanctioned lower tier of 
government that was closest to the people and entrusted with significant responsibilities 
to plan, formulate and implement policies on economic development and social services. 
Below the woreda is the kebele administration (rural village group or urban dweller 
association), which has no constitutional authority of its own but functions as an extended 
arm of the woreda, from which it gets its directions and funds. The kebele administration 
consists of an elected council, executive committee and a social court. As presented in 
Figure 2.1, the current Ethiopian federal structure is five-tiered: federal, regional, zonal, 
woreda and kebele levels. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 The Zones are intermediate bodies between the regional and woreda administrations and tasked mainly 
with supporting, coordinating and supervisory roles. Zones have no autonomous legal administrative 
authority, except in SNNP regional state, where they have elected councils, administrative councils and the 
judiciary (SNNPR Revised Constitution 2001, Articles 80-89).	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 In the current decentralization policy woredas, in the form of both rural and urban 
local governments, are meant to play an important role in the country’s poverty reduction 
programs and achievement of the United Nations initiatives of EFA and MDGs. Most 
importantly, the Woreda-level decentralization program, which began in 2002, aims to 
designate legal standing and autonomy to local governments, as well as improve their 
financial and human resources through transfers of block grants and public employees 
from regional and zonal levels to woredas. 
 Despite on-going progress of implementation, the woreda level decentralization 
has been marked by challenges, particularly in relation to persistent centralizing 
tendencies in a top-down and hierarchical political structure as well as limited 
institutional and human capacities that are needed to provide the various social services 
entrusted to the local government, including basic education, health, water supply, small-
scale infrastructure and agriculture.  
 
  
	  	   64	  
CHAPTER 3 
THE EVOLUTION OF DECENTRALIZED EDUCATION IN ETHIOPIA 	  
 The history of organized education in Ethiopia goes back at least to the sixth 
century of the Christian era.  The Orthodox Church, with the cooperation of the country’s 
rulers, was the primary provider of education throughout the country (Teshome 
1979:viii). The churches and monasteries provided religious education that consisted of 
reading and writing as well as reciting certain biblical texts in Ge’ez, a classical language 
of the country (Pankhurst 1976: 305). The main purpose of education in these religious 
institutions was to prepare young people for ecclesiastical ministries as priests, monks 
and debteras (church scholars).  However, they also served as schools for training civil 
servants, such as judges, governors, scribes, treasurers, and general administrators 
(Teshome 1979: 10-11). In addition to Christian churches, at least since the eighteenth 
century, the Quranic schools also served as traditional institutions of education in 
Muslim-inhabited areas especially in the southern and southeastern parts of the country 
(Pankhurst 1976: 309-10).  
 The introduction of modern education in Ethiopia coincided with the 
establishment of centralized state authority, monetized economy and a permanent seat of 
power in Addis Ababa towards the end of the 19th century. Scholars generally believe that 
Emperor Menelik, in his Imperial Decree of 1905, mandated “universal” education by 
establishing the first legal foundation of modern education in Ethiopia (Paulos 1988:3 
75). In this decree, Menelik expressed his objective to introduce modern education as 
follows:   
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 “In other countries, not only do they learn, even more they make new things. 
 Therefore, from now on after reaching the age of six, boys and girls must be sent 
 to school. As for parents who would not send their children to school, when the 
 former die, their wealth, instead of reverting to their children, will be transferred 
 to the Government. My government will prepare the schools and teachers” 
 (Enbakom 1965: 11-12). 
 
 Although Menelik’s proclamation and his attempt to establish modern schools 
met with some resistance from the Orthodox Church, he eventually managed to open 
Ethiopia’s first government operated modern school, the Ecole Imperiale Menelik II 
School in 1908 in Addis Ababa (Mogus 2010: 29; Teshome 1979: 31). According to 
Tekeste (1990: 101), Menelik II School resembled a language institute rather a proper 
school, where in addition to Amharic, French, English, Italian and Arabic were the main 
subjects taught. During the same period, private schools, mostly run by foreign 
missionary societies, grew even faster than government-sponsored schools in the major 
provincial cities of the country (Pankhurst 1976; Tekeste 1990; Teshome 1979). These 
missionary organizations also sent many Ethiopian students abroad.  
 In this early development of the education system, public schools were financed 
and administered by the regional lords who had relative control over the political and 
economic affairs of their respective territories. However, with the coming to power of 
emperor Haile Selassie, a highly centralized education system was established and all 
schools had to be operated under the newly created Ministry of Education and Fine Arts. 
After liberation from the Fascist Italian invasion in the late 1940s,23 a series of laws (such 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23During the Italian Invasion, which lasted from 1936 to 1941, the education system was segregated 
between natives and Italians, and “all genuine education for the Ethiopian people (was) terminated” 
(Pankhurst 1955: 548). In 1946, the Ethiopian delegation to the Peace Conference in Paris also stated that 
“The education system suffered a terrible setback as a result of the Italian occupation when every attempt 
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as Order No. 3 of 1947) were promulgated for the purpose of bringing the administration 
supervision and guidance of all functions and control related to education, fine arts and 
religious and cultural instruction under the exclusive control of the imperial government 
(Ministry of Pen 1947). Although the Emperor’s Proclamation No. 94 of 1947 set out 
rules for the establishment of regional education boards in each province and authorized 
them to allocate all locally-levied education taxes for their own local schools (Paulos 
1988: 375), these provinces operated under the direct guidance and supervision of the 
central Board of Education.  
 During the 1950s and 1960s, it became clear that the imperial government had to 
rapidly expand educational opportunity beyond the few urban elites to the vast illiterate 
population throughout the country. As a result of the Point IV Educational Advisory 
Group from the United States, the Ministry of Education launched a ten-year plan for 
controlled expansion of education (Teshome 1979: 105-146). Despite some progress, the 
government’s own report of 1968/9 indicated that the increase in school enrollment was 
only limited to few urban areas, namely the province of Shewa, with the capital Addis 
Ababa, and Eritrea (then a newly integrated province). However, primary education was 
out of reach for most of the rural population that constituted approximately 90 percent of 
the Ethiopian population (Ibid). Similarly, the Education Sector Review (ESR) conducted 
in 1971/2 by a task force of 81 members24 identified significant challenges facing the 
education system of the period, including: the Western imported nature of the education 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
was made by the aggressors to stamp from the previously established system of education then on a firm 
footing.” (Quoted in Teshome 1979: 47).  
24 Of which 51 were Ethiopians (mostly drawn from Haile Silassie University) and 30 were foreign experts. 
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system, the inequitable distribution of educational opportunity, and the over-
centralization of educational administration (Fassil 1990: 68-69; Tekeste 1990: 8-9). 
Consequently, the ESR recommended 13 general objectives for future education 
development including:  -­‐ fostering a rational and scientific outlook on life,  -­‐ increasing the earning capacity of the individual by providing relevant skills 
and knowledge,  -­‐ providing scientific, technical and vocational education according to the needs 
of the Ethiopian society and community,  -­‐ “ethiopianizing” the content of education and promoting the national 
language, Amharic, as a medium of instruction at the higher levels,  -­‐ equalizing access to education among all parts of the country, and -­‐ providing universal access to education as rapidly as possible (Solomon 2008: 
49-50).    
 
 
 The Derg military regime that ousted the monarchy in 1974 did not significantly 
alter the centralizing policies of the preceding government in that the major 
responsibilities and authority for the planning, administration and maintaining of schools 
remained with the central Ministry of Education. However, as part of the Derg’s doctrine 
of Marxism and Leninism, a significant degree of power was delegated to the Peasant 
Associations and kebeles (urban dwellers’ associations) to oversee the general patterns of 
educational institutions in their respective areas and to make decisions in matters such as 
school construction, financing, staffing personnel as well as disciplining students and 
teachers who deviate from the newly established order (Paulos 1988: 376). At the same 
time, the Derg regime adopted an educational policy with the aim of systematically 
suppressing traditional institutions (mostly run by religious institutions) and challenging 
almost all forms of traditional cultural beliefs and practices that were considered negative 
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and anti-revolutionary (Mogus 2010: 35).   
 In line with its socialist ideology, the Derg issued a number of policies that 
significantly impacted public education in the country. One of the first major actions of 
the regime was the launching of the Development Through Cooperation Campaign 
(zemecha), whereby more than 60,000 students and teachers from secondary schools, 
colleges and universities were sent to the countryside to teach the rural population and 
carryout other development activities. Subsequently, the Derg’s Proclamation No. 54 of 
1975 nationalized all private primary and secondary schools, except those run by 
missionary and foreign communities. Proclamation No. 103 of 1976 empowered school 
committees (consisting of students, teachers, parents and local representatives) to 
administer and control the day-to day management of schools in accordance with the 
directives of the Ministry of Education (Fassil 1990: 75). This was also followed by 
different phases of mass literacy campaigns throughout the country, including efforts to 
recognize and use the various nationality languages.  
 By the mid-1980s, the government considered the education sector a great success 
as a result of the National Democratic Revolution Program (NDRP) of the Derg launched 
in 1976 and its efforts to “provide free education, step by step, to the broad masses and 
eradicate illiteracy” (PMAC 1976). According to government accounts (CSA 1987), the 
number of primary schools (grades 1-6) in the country more than doubled, rising from 
3,196 in 1974/75 to 7,900 in 1985/86, an average increase of 428 schools annually. 
Within the same time period, the number of junior secondary (grades 7 and 8) and senior 
secondary (9-12) schools increased from 507 to 964 and from 124 to 245 respectively. 
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The number of students enrolled in primary schools also tripled from about 957,300 to 
nearly 2,450,000 (39% female), while the primary teaching staff more than doubled from 
22, 851 to 50, 922.  As of 1985/86, the overall enrollment in the country’s primary, junior 
and senior schools was 3.1 million, up from 785,000 enrolled a decade earlier. However, 
this represented only 42 percent of the relevant age group in primary education (2.5 
million out of 6million), and 5.3 percent (292, 385 out of 5.5 million) of the relevant age 
group in secondary education. There were also significant variations between different 
regions of the country, ranging from 70 to 80 percent gross enrollment in primary 
education in some areas to single digits in others.   
  Despite significant improvements in enrollment, by the end of the 1980s the 
overall quality of education in the primary and secondary schools deteriorated to the level 
of a national crisis. Clapham (1988: 151) observed that the Derg’s revolution brought 
about  “a replacement of generally fairly high-quality instruction for a small number of 
people, by much lower-quality instruction for a much larger number.” Similarly, the 
Ministry of Education’s own Evaluation Committee of 1986 (MOE 1986) came out with 
its own findings underlining the major problems facing the general education system, 
including: poor school management, overcrowding in schools and classrooms (pupil-
teacher ratio reaching 65 to 1 for primary schools and 47 to1 for junior secondary 
schools), shortage of education materials, and lack of teacher’s competence (over 36 % of 
primary teachers and 42% in junior secondary schools lacking specialized training). 
During the last few years of the Derg regime, the delivery of education deteriorated 
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further due to the escalating civil war and famine.25 Given its preoccupation with these 
concerns, the government also no longer enforced policies that compelled rural families 
to send their children to school (Tekeste 1996: 45; USAID: 1992: 18).  
 
3.1 The Current Decentralized Education Policy and Administration 
 The EPRDF government that replaced the communist regime in 1991 introduced 
educational decentralization as part of its general political and economic reforms.  
Although the new government’s official Education and Training Policy (ETP) came into 
effect in 1994, there were a number of policies that had been initiated and became 
operational during the transitional period (1991-1994). For instance, Proclamation No. 41 
of 1993 (TGE 1993) established decentralized decision-making power and the proper 
relationship between the regional and central governments in the administration and 
management of education in the country. As a result, the power and responsibilities of the 
Ministry of Education were scaled down to matters such as formulating the country’s 
overall educational policy and strategies, supervising the implementation of national 
educational standards and deciding the educational curriculum at the secondary schools 
and higher education institutions. At the same time, the regional governments (in alliance 
with zones) were given responsibilities for all educational administration within their 
jurisdictions up to junior college level and the training as well as deployment of primary 
school teachers. Regions were also placed in charge of curriculum development for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 The net enrollment for primary school fell from 36% in 1985 to 27% in 1988, while the junior and 
secondary levels were 10% and 8% respectively. At the same time, the gross enrollment rate for primary 
level was 35% (with 31:22 male to female ratio) and 21% and 11% for junior and senior secondary levels 
respectively (MOE 1989; USAID 1992).   
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primary education, including the choice of medium of instruction and textbook provision. 
In recent years, the woreda tier of government has begun to assume responsibility for 
establishing and administrating general education (primary, secondary and adult 
education), and vocational schools. Figure 3.1 below depicts the new decentralized 
structure of primary education.  
 
Figure 3.1 Decentralized Structure of Primary School Administration 	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Source: UNICEF/World Bank 2009. 
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decentralization a centerpiece of both its educational policy and Education Sector 
Strategy (ESS) of 1994. According to article 3.8.2 of the education policy, “Education 
management will be decentralized to create the necessary conditions to expand, enrich 
and improve the relevance, quality, accessibility and equity of education and training” 
(TGE 1994: 29-30). The implementation of decentralization was further stipulated in the 
policy to culminate to the lowest (school) level assuring that “Educational institutions 
will be autonomous in their internal administration and in the designing and 
implementing of education and training programs, with an overall coordination and 
democratic leadership by boards or committees, consisting of members of the community 
(society), development and research institutions, teachers and students” (Ibid.: 30). 
Similarly, the 2002 Directives for Education Management, Organization, Public 
Participation, and Finance, popularly known as the “Blue Book,” advocates “the creation 
of a situation where the community will exercise full control over the school through its 
active participation in school administration, budget allocation, and implementation 
(MOE 2002: Preamble).  
 The structure of the formal education system was also reshaped from the previous 
6-2-4 model (primary 1-6 grades, junior secondary 7 and 8 grades and senior secondary 
9-12 grades) with national examination given on the completion of each level, to the 
current 8-2-2 model (primary 1-8 grades, general secondary 9 and 10 grades, senior 
secondary 11 and 12 grades), with national examinations only at the end of grades 10 and 
12. Early Childhood education (kindergarten) in Ethiopia has been operated mostly by 
non-governmental organizations such as communities, faith-based organizations and 
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private institutions. Only recently has the government recognized the importance of pre-
primary education for achieving universal education and made some efforts to expand the 
traditional kindergarten program (for ages 4-6).  The government has also introduced new 
programs such as the “O” class (for children of age 5-6 who do not have access to 
kindergarten) and “Child to Child” (a “learning through playing” program led by 5 or 6 
grade older siblings or neighbors). At the same time, non-formal education (also known 
as Alternative Basic Education) for children and adults who do not fit the traditional 
primary age groups has been established throughout the country in recent years.  
 The regular general education (8 years of primary education plus 2 years of 
secondary education) is designed to prepare students for further education and training 
before entering into the work force, while the second cycle of secondary education 
(grades 11 and 12) directs them to studies at the university level. After completing 
general education and depending on their performance in the national exam, students can 
also pursue a Technical and Vocational Training (TVET), which forms a parallel path to 
the second cycle of secondary education. The TVET program lasts from one year to three 
years, including the possibility of joining the undergraduate degree (as 2nd year student) 
after completing three years of training.26 Higher education consists of three to six years 
for undergraduate programs and an additional two to four years for postgraduate studies. 
Figure 3.2 below portrays the current structure of formal and non-formal education in 
Ethiopia, including different types of qualifying examinations that influence students’ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 The TVET qualification standards are evolving in recent years and as of 2011, the Ministry of Education 
chart shows five levels of technical and vocational education opportunities for those who complete 10 
grade level or quit before completing 10 grade, as well as students who are not able to pass the 12 grade 
qualifying exam (MOE 2012). 
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education and training options.   
Figure 3.2 The Structure of the Ethiopian Education System 
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 Since 1996/97, the Education Sector Development Program (ESDP) became a 
new plan of action within the general policy framework of the ETP and has been 
implemented in phases of five years. Recently, the ESDP III (2005/06-2009/10) was 
incorporated into the government’s socio economic strategy known as the national Plan 
of Accelerated and Sustainable Development to End Poverty (PASDEP).  Its objectives 
were:  
 (a)  to increase educational opportunities at primary level, including non- 
                        formal education, in order to achieve universal primary education by   
                        the year 2014/15;  
 (b)  to improve the quality of primary and secondary education;  
 (c)  to address equity issues by narrowing the gender gap in education, as   
                        well as the differences among regions and between rural and urban  
                        communities;  
 (d)  to provide relevant and demand driven education and training that  
                        correspond to the needs of economic and social sectors for    
                        employment and self-employment by reorienting and re-focusing the   
                        existing TVET system (MOE 2006: 16).  
 
 
 These objectives were also integrated with the government’s commitments to 
achieve the EFA targets and MDGs, as well as supported by international organizations, 
such as Unites States Agency for International Development (USAID), World Bank, 
United Nations Educational, Social and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), United 
Nation’s Development Program (UNDP), Swedish International Development Authority 
(SIDA), and many others.  
 Although many of the objectives laid down in ESDP are still in the early stages of 
implementation, as of 2010 remarkable progress has been made toward achieving 
universal access to primary education in the country. As discussed later in this study, the 
ESDP target of raising primary enrollment from 3.7 million in 1996/97 to 7 million in 
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2001/02 was surpassed by more than a million, while during ESDP II and ESDP III 
enrollment reached 13.5 million in 2005/06 and 15.8 million in 2009/10 respectively 
(MOE 2011; World Bank 2005). This progress was also reflected in the Gross Enrollment 
Rate (GER) for the first cycle of primary school reaching 124 percent (128.8% male and 
119.1% female) and the Net enrollment Rate (NER) for the same level scoring 91.8 
percent (94.0% male and 89.4% female) in 2010/11.  However, for the second cycle of 
primary education (5-8 grades), less than half of the relevant group (with NER 47.3%) 
was enrolled in in 2010/11 (Ibid.). Meanwhile, as Table 3.1 shows, the current ESDP IV 
phase which began in 2010/11 aims to increase the NER for the first cycle of primary 
education to 95 percent and for the second cycle primary education to 80 percent, with 
the total target of NER enrollment for primary education (1-8 grades) to 97 percent by 
2014/15. 
 
Table 3.1 Progress Toward ESDP IV Enrollment Targets 
Percentage 	  
Grades 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2014/15 (targets) 
NER 1-4 88.7 86.6 91.8 95.0 
NER 5-8 46.0 46.4 47.3 80.0 
NER 1-8 83.0 82.1 85.3 97.0 
NER 9-10 38.1 39.1 38.4 62.0 
NER 11-12 6.0 7.0 8.1 9.5 
 
Source: Josh and Verspoor 2013:30; MOE 2010; 2011. 
 
 The fiscal background and trends in education sector will be dealt with in a later 
chapter. However, it suffices to say here that since decentralization was launched in the 
mid-1990s there has been a steady increase both in real government expenditure and total 
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spending as percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). For instance, public education 
expenditure almost tripled between 1999/00 and 2005/06 in real terms, rising from 3.1 
percent to 5.9 percent of GDP (Garcia and Rajkumar 2008: 2-4). Likewise, government 
education expenditure as a percentage of total government expenditure increased from 
15.7 percent in 1995/6 to 23.6 percent in 2009/10. However, according to the country’s 
recent Education Public Expenditure Review (Ravishankar et al. 2010, quoted in Joshi 
and Verspoor 2013: 28), these aggregate figures mask considerable regional variations 
with large regions, such as Amhara, Oromia, and the Southern SNNPRS taking a lion’s 
share of government overall spending on education. Moreover, government education 
expenditure has not kept pace with enrollment increases27 and most of education spending 
was allocated to the recurrent budget (i.e. salaries for teachers and education officials) 
with little capital or operating expenses allocated to regions, at least before 2009/10 
(Ibid.: 29). 
 One of the crucial changes with the implementation of woreda decentralization is 
that many regions began to transfer block grants to woredas following certain criteria 
similar to the ones used by the federal governments, but with some modifications of their 
own. As a result, woredas, with the support of the Kebele Education and Training Board 
(KETB) and Parent Teacher Associations (PTAs), became the principal agency tasked 
with planning and allocation of budgets for the provision basic education. Although 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 For instance, regional governments’ (excluding Addis Ababa) real education spending for primary and 
secondary education was 79 percent higher in 2004/5 than in 1997/1998. However, given the 127 percent 
increase in primary enrollment and 134 percent increase in secondary enrollment, the increase was 
insufficient to maintain pupil-teacher or pupil section (the number of students per section) ratios, both of 
which rose (World Bank 2007: 31).    
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woredas and municipalities have been consistently allocating the largest share of their 
budgets to education (about 45%, as compared to about 18% to agriculture and 13% to 
health), they are far from achieving the fiscal autonomy and capacity needed for 
decentralized management of education (MOE 2006: 41-50).  
  Despite significant progress in expanding the educational system at all levels, the 
corresponding deterioration in the quality of education has been a major concern for the 
national government, various NGOs and other stakeholders. For instance, according the 
World Bank study in 2004, the Ethiopian education system was under stress due to 
factors such as the deterioration in pedagogical (classroom) conditions as reflected in 
high levels of pupil-teacher ratios amounting to 65:1 in government primary schools and 
52:1 in secondary schools, as well as in large section sizes at both levels averaging about 
75 and 82 students per section, respectively (World Bank 2005: xxiv). However, as 
indicated in chapter five of this study, trends since 2005 have shown steady 
improvements both in class and section sizes. Similarly, there have been moderate 
improvements in regard to efficiency indicators of quality of education in recent years (a 
topic discussed also in chapter 5). However a high drop-out rate of 28 percent in grade 1, 
an average national primary education repetition rate of almost 5 percent (though an 
improvement from earlier figures), as well as a survival rate of less than 40 percent to 
grade 5 and a mere 49 percent of primary education completion rate are considered to be 
far from the targets formulated in the country’s latest ESDP IV phase (Joshi and 
Verspoor 2013:34; MOE 2010). 
 The declining quality in the country’s education can also be gleaned from the 
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National Learning Assessments (NLA) and national examination results conducted by the 
recently reestablished National Education Assessment and Examination Agency 
(NEAEA). While the NLA has been administered since 2000 at four-year intervals for the 
sample of students at grades 4 and 8 (grades 10 and 12 assessments began in 2009), 
national examinations are administered every year at the conclusion of grades 10 and 12. 
For example, according to the second and third NLAs in 2003/04 and 2007/08 (NEAEA: 
2004; 2008), a large number of students in primary education were not achieving the 
curriculum objectives of their grade levels. These assessments were based on the 
minimum learning competencies in key subjects of grade 4 (reading in the language of 
instruction, English, mathematics and environmental science), and grade 8 (English, 
mathematics, chemistry, biology and physics). The overall percentage of students who 
scored more than the 50 percent achievement level averaged 48.5 percent in 2004 and 
40.9 percent in 2008 in the grade 4 samples, and 39.7 percent in 2004 and 35.6 in 2008 in 
grade 8 samples. (Likewise, the national mean scores of 36% and 47.8% for grades 10 
and 12 respectively in 2009 were also below the 50% achievement level set by the 
ministry). In both studies, boys scored on average higher than girls in composite as well 
as in all subjects. Furthermore, the sample studies demonstrated that there were 
significant disparities in student achievements across all regions. Disparities were 
influenced by many correlated factors such as student background, teachers’ 
characteristics and practices, school structure and management, instructional support and 
material, and the language of instruction. 
 Another important component of quality improvement in primary education 
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focused on enhancing teachers’ levels of qualification, which had suffered with the rapid 
enrollment expansion, especially in rural areas. For example, in 2004/5, 97.1 percent of 
teachers in the first cycle primary school (1-4) were certified to teach according to the 
minimum national qualification standard,28 while 54.8 percent and 40.6 percent were 
qualified to teach the second cycle primary (5-8) and secondary (9-12) schools 
respectively (MOE 2005). These national averages hid wide variations among regions, 
ranging from 15 percent uncertified primary cycle teachers in Addis Ababa and Gambela 
to 62 percent in Harari and 96 percent in Somali (MOE 2006:108). With the recent 
introduction of a new policy of qualification for the first cycle primary (1-4),29 the 
number of qualified teachers in the first cycle primary school decreased to 30.4 percent 
(MOE 2012). However, there have been a steady growth over the same period in regard 
to certified second cycle primary teachers, reaching to 90.8 percent in 2011/12 (Ibid.).   
 In recent years, government and non-government agencies have initiated various 
programs with the objective of improving the quality of education, especially in the 
context of decentralized education system. Since 2009, for instance, the General 
Education Quality Improvement Package (GEQIP) has been the primary nation-wide 
strategy to address the weaknesses that plague education in Ethiopia. The program is 
supported by a group of development partners through pooled funding arrangements, as 
well as numerous foreign agencies linked to the program through their own specific 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 According to official policy, teachers assigned to grade 1-4 should be certified from Teachers Training 
Institutes (TTI); those assigned to grades 5-8, should possess a certification from Teachers Training 
Colleges (TTC); and those assigned to grades 9-12, should have a university degree.  
 
29 In 2008/9 a new policy was launched in which a teacher is required to get a 3-year diploma from one of 
the TTCs to be qualified to teach in the first cycle primary school.  
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projects.30 In its first phase, GEQIP’s initiative covered key components of quality 
improvement, including: -­‐ curriculum reform and implementation,  -­‐ development and provision of new textbooks and teacher’s guides,  -­‐ strengthening teachers’ in-service and pre-service professional development,  -­‐ building capacity in planning, budgeting, management and administration at 
all levels of government,  -­‐ improving the Education Management Information System (EMIS), and  -­‐ development of program coordination, including monitoring and evaluation 
activities (MOE 2008).  
 
 Particularly important in this program has been the process of increasing 
administrative, management and monitoring/evaluation capacities and community 
participation at the local government level (woredas and municipalities) in order to 
effectively implement the proposed reforms. The recent assessment by the MOE (2013) 
claimed that the first phase of GEQUIP has been relatively successful in building 
capacities to support equitable and inclusive quality education at the federal, regional and 
school levels, whereas there was limited progress in woredas, especially in the emerging 
regions. Likewise, the assessment acknowledged the need for stronger communication 
with school communities and the general public in order to enhance the scope of school-
community linkages (Ibid). As the capacity building efforts are strengthened and 
sustained at the local level, the country aims to fully implement its ambitious plans aimed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Development partners (DPs) include: African Development Bank, EC, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, UK, UNESCO, UNICEF, USA, WFP and the World Bank. Four DPs provide 
support through Protection of Basic Services Project (PBS); six DPs supported the implementation of the 
Teacher Development Program (TDP) using a pooled funding mechanism, and 12 DPs provide their 
support solely through projects (MOE 2008: 3).  
	  
	  	   82	  
at deepening decentralization at the school level.   
 
 3.2 The Current Language Policy in Education 
 At the center of recent decentralization reforms in Ethiopia is the use of local 
languages as a medium of instruction in primary education. Until the current government 
came to power, Amharic was the only language permitted at the elementary school level, 
while English was used at the junior high level and above. Both in the imperial and 
socialist governments that preceded the current government, the use of Amharic was well 
established in government and education systems. For emperor Haile Silassie, making 
Amharic the national language was critical to consolidating central power and promoting 
the bureaucratic efficiency that he desired (Smith 2008: 217). The socialist government 
that came after 1974 officially encouraged the use of other Ethiopian languages and 
decided to use approximately fifteen ethnic languages to conduct its literacy campaigns in 
the late 1970s. However, Amharic remained a dominant language in primary education, 
as well as in all levels of public administration.    
 Recognizing the ethno-linguistic diversity of the country, the Ethiopian 
Constitution (FDRE 1995, Article 5) states: “All Ethiopian languages shall enjoy equal 
state recognition; Amharic shall be the working language of the Federal Government; and 
Members of the Federation may by law determine their respective working languages.“ 
Likewise, the Ethiopian education policy (ETP) outlines the general guidelines on the use 
of languages as medium of instruction as follows:  
• Cognizant of the pedagogical advantages of the child in learning in mother 
	  	   83	  
tongue and the rights of nationalities to promote the use of their languages, 
primary education will be given in Nationality languages; 
• Making the necessary preparation, nations and nationalities can learn in 
their own language or can choose from among those selected on the basis 
of national and countrywide distribution; 
• The language of teacher training for kindergarten and primary education 
will be the nationality language used in the area; 
• Amharic shall be taught as a language of countrywide communication; 
• English will be the medium of instruction for secondary and higher 
education; 
• Pupils can choose and learn at least one nationality languages and one 
foreign language for cultural and international relations; and  
• English will be taught as a subject starting from grade one. 
 
 Within the current decentralized system of education, regions, and in some cases 
zones and woredas, determine what indigenous languages should be used in their schools 
and government institutions. There are also variations among regions as to whether the 
mother tongue should be used for the first cycle of primary education or the entire cycle 
of primary education. For instance, in TRS, Amhara, Oromia and Addis Ababa, local 
languages are used throughout the entire cycle of primary education, whereas in 
SNNPRS, they are used only in the first cycle. In other states such as Afar, the language 
of instruction for primary school is officially Afarigna, but Amharic has been used due to 
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the absence of qualified teachers and available written materials in Afarigna (Keller and 
Smith 2005: 286).  
 Similar variations also exist in the use of English as a medium of instruction. 
English is taught as a subject starting from first grade and as a medium of instruction in 
secondary and higher education in all regions of Ethiopia. However, regions can 
determine their own policies in regards to using English as a medium of instruction in 
primary school. For instance, in SNNPRS and Gambella, English is a medium of 
instruction starting from the second cycle of primary school (grade 5), while in Addis 
Ababa, Afar and Benishangul-Gumuz it begins in grade 7. In others, such as in Amhara 
and Harari regions, English is partially used as a medium of instruction in grades 7 and 8 
to teach science and mathematics.  
 Despite these differences in the timing of implementation and practice of using 
local languages, Mogus (2010:39) noted that there are certain general criteria that often 
guide the process of selecting which language should be used. Among the multitude of 
languages spoken throughout the country, priority is given to those that: are 
demographically and political important languages; the nationalities that have the 
necessary human power and financial capabilities; and the initiative and pressure from 
the population of a given nationality language group.   
 To that end, the implementation of the language policy in education has not been 
without its own challenges, as the use local language is a highly sensitive political and 
cultural issue for a large segment of the population. As Smith (2008:224) pointed out “the 
economic costs of the multilingual policy in education is substantial and contributed to 
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the overall growth in regional disparities, without necessarily lessening the political 
conflict over ethnicity.” Although conflicts related to language use have so far been 
limited to few instances,31 regions have the heavy burden of reconciling the demands of 
both the major nationalities as well as linguistic minorities represented within their 
jurisdictions. Yet, the adoption of local languages in both ethnically homogenous and 
multiethnic regional states required significant shifting of limited resources and 
additional investment in the rewriting of the entire curricula to new languages, finding 
and training experts and teachers in these languages, standardizing the use of nationality 
languages, and providing supplemental reading materials and resources.  
 Thus far, there are no systematic assessments of the language policy and its 
effects on the quality of education throughout the country. Some preliminary evidence 
indicates that language development has not been up to par with expectations. For 
instance, a recent Early Grade Reading Assessment (EGRA) conducted by MOE and 
USAID (USAID/Ethiopia 2010) reveals that at least 80 percent of students sampled in 
grades 2 and 3 were not reading at the expected oral fluency rate in their mother tongue, 
with rural regions and rural girls consistently performing below their counterparts in 
urban areas. The results also showed significant variations among regions.  For example, 
the percentage of students who could not read a single word of a simple story in grade 2 
ranged from 27.7 percent in Amhara (not far from TRS of 29.7%) to 69.2 percent in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 For instance, the 1999 political conflict in SNNPRS surrounding the failed attempt to create one common 
new language (wagagoda) out of the four ethnic languages of Walaita, Gamo, Gofa and Dawro has led to 
not only their separation into three separate zones (Gamo-Gofa becoming one Zone), but also resulted in 
the death of about 10 persons, hundreds injured, as many as 1000 people arrested during the protest, and 
million worth of school books and property were destroyed (Abbink 2012: 606; Keller and Smith 
2005:285).  
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SNNPRS. The situation in urban regions of Addis Ababa and Harari were modestly better 
than the others, where, respectively, 10.1 percent and 17.9 percent of grade 2 students 
were unable to read as expected. 
 In sum, the education sector in Ethiopia has undergone significant changes 
throughout the country’s long history. Until the 1990s, the education system was highly 
centralized, with regional and local governments being subordinate branches of the 
Ministry of Education. In the past two decades, the EPRDF government embarked on 
educational decentralization that involved the devolution of responsibilities and resources 
to subnational governments in order to manage the education system (except higher 
education), including the use of indigenous languages as a medium of instruction in 
primary schools.  
 To date, as this study reveals, the implementation of education decentralization in 
Ethiopia has shown mixed outcomes. Despite dramatic increase in access to primary 
education, decentralization has had limited impact on the quality and efficiency of 
education, At the same time, the language policy in education has been praised as “the 
most progressive policy in Sub-Saharan Africa with respect to mother tongue instruction” 
(USAID/Ethiopia 2010). However, its future success in improving quality of education 
will depend largely on the country’s continued investment in language development, 
standardization and assessment.  
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CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH FINDINGS: EXTENT OF DECENTRALIZATION 
 
 The findings of this study suggest that Ethiopia’s decentralization presents a 
complex and contradictory picture of the nature and consequences of decentralization. On 
one hand, it exhibits a substantial process of devolution of political power to elected local 
governments backed by legal authority, fiscal transfer, and administrative authority. On 
the other hand, the dominant role of the ruling party, lack of local participation beyond 
voting, fiscal dependency of local governments on central subsidies, and limited local 
administrative autonomy and capacity, all continue to promote concentration of power on 
national and regional governments. While existing literature on decentralization informs 
us about the complex (multi-dimensional) and often incomplete nature of implementation 
(e.g. Devarajan, Khemani, and Shah 2009; Litvack and Seddon 1999), it does not tell us 
what the appropriate mix of decentralization and centralization should be in order to 
make sure those purported advantages of decentralization be a reality. This is also further 
complicated by the fact that the design and implementation of decentralization reforms 
vary across countries.   
 Although decentralization reforms have often been driven by political factors such 
as promoting democratization, resolving conflicts and empowering local citizens, there is 
a general consensus that decentralization also involves economic and administrative 
objectives (Agrawal and Ribot 1999; Boex and Yilmaz 2010; Crook and Manor 1998; 
Crook and Sverrisson 2001; Conyers 2000; Mawhood 1983; Olowu 2001; Ribot 2002; 
World Bank 2000). Thus, the framework used in this study takes into consideration the 
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three main dimensions of decentralization (i.e., political, administrative and fiscal) and 
some critical indicators that can be used as proxies (or intermediate variables) for each 
type. This framework is believed to offer a more holistic and multifaceted understanding 
of the nature of decentralization reform and its relationship to the provision of local 
services rather than choosing only one dimension of decentralization as a proxy for the 
overall process. In Ethiopia and few other developing countries, decentralization reforms 
involved the devolution of all the three dimensions at once and over a short period of 
time (the so-called “big-bang” approach). Observing the interaction and 
interconnectedness of these dimensions can give us a better picture of the decentralization 
process as a whole. However, to date no specific method or analytical framework exists 
that can fully account for all the elements affecting the process of decentralization in the 
provision of local service delivery.  
 In the following sections, I first present the profile of sample local governments 
used in this study and precede to a detailed analysis of the three dimensions of 
decentralization.     
4.1 Description of Sample Study Areas: Regions and Woredas 
4.1.1 Tigray Regional State (TRS) 
 The TRS is one of the nine regional states of Ethiopia located at the northern tip 
of the country. It borders Eritrea in the north, the Republic of Sudan in the west and the 
Amhara and Afar Regional States in the south and east, respectively. TRS has five 
administrative zones (excluding Mekelle, the capital), consisting of 47 woredas and 703 
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tabias (sub-districts). Other major cities, besides the capital, include Adwa, Aksum, Abiy 
Adhi, Adigrat, Humera, Maychew, and Zalambessa.  
 An area about 51,000 square kilometers, Tigray had a population of about 5 
million in 2011/12 (4.3 million, 2007 Census), with approximately 83 percent of which 
live in rural areas. The large majority of the inhabitants speak Tigrigna, a Semitic 
language and the working language of the state. There are also small minority groups that 
speak other languages, including Saho, Agaw/Amharic, Afar and Kunama. More than 95 
percent of TRS population is considered Orthodox Christians, approximately 4.1 percent 
Muslims and around 0.4 percent Catholic Christians.     
 According to the Ethiopian government portal, about 85 percent of the region’s 
populations are considered farmers who grow teff (eragrostis tef, native staple grain), 
wheat and barley as main crops and other agricultural products such as flaxseeds, pulses, 
sesame, beans, lentils, onions and potatoes. Besides agriculture, the region claims to have 
more than 12 million livestock, including cattle, sheep, goats and pack (working) 
animals. The TRS is also known as one of the richest mineral sources of the country, with 
significant exploration of gold, copper, iron ore, zinc, lead, granite and limestone, to only 
mention a few.  
 The climate of the region is classified as 39 percent kola (semi-arid), 49 percent 
woyna dega (warm temperate) and 12 percent dega (temperate). The average rainfall is 
estimated to be between 200 to 1600 mm per year. Although most of TRS is known to be 
fertile land, deforestation, erosion and overgrazing left some parts of the region with dry 
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treeless plains, hills and plateaus (government portal). Droughts are common occurrences 
in the region.  
 According to its Education Statistics Annual Abstract (ESAA), TRS had a total of 
1,006,973 students (576,549 in first cycle and 430,424 in second cycle) enrolled in 1,995 
government and non-government primary schools. It also had 23,089 primary school 
teachers (12,421 first cycle and 10,668 second cycle) as of 2011/12. In addition, Tigray 
currently has two Colleges of Teacher Education (CTEs) - one in Abbiyi Adi and the 
other in Adwa.  
 
4.1.2 Mekelle City Administration 
 Mekelle is the capital city of TRS and the sixth largest city in the country. 
Located about 780 kilometers from Addis Ababa, it was first established as an urban 
center and a seat of government during the reign of Emperor Yohannes IV in the 1860s. 
Since then, it is one of the main cultural, economic and political centers of northern 
Ethiopia.   
 Among Mekelle’s most recognized features are the castle of Emperor Yohannes 
IV and the Monument of the Martyrs (Hawelti Sema’etat), which commemorates the 
struggle against the previous military regime (the Derg).   
 Mekelle functions both as a city and woreda administration. The city is further 
expanded in recent years by incorporating adjacent towns and villages, such as Quiha and 
Aynalem. As a result, Mekelle is now covers an area about 109 square kilometer. At 
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about 2,200 meters above sea level and an average temperature between 11 and 28 degree 
centigrade, Mekelle enjoys a temperate climate all year aground.  
 Mekelle is also becoming a major industrial and commercial center, with a 
growing number of business institutions and government and non-government offices. 
The main economic activities include agriculture and agro-processing productions, 
including fruit and vegetables, honey, and livestock based agro-processing. The city also 
provides a resting place and transportation to a large number of historical churches and 
monasteries in the region. Mekelle University, first founded as a school of Economics in 
1987, is one of the major higher institutions in the country. The university currently has 
seven colleges and eight institutes and more than 31,000 students enrolled in various 
programs.  
 As of 2012, Mekelle had 56 primary schools with an enrollment of 58,423 
students (44,924 in government and 13,499 in private). It also had a total of 1,075 
primary school teachers (495 first cycle, 581 second cycle).  
 
4.1.3 Seharti Samre Woreda 
 Seharte Samre is one of the eight rural woredas in Southern Zone of Tigray that 
has 23 tabias or kebeles, of which two are urban. It is bordered with Alaje woreda and 
the Amhara Region in the south and the Dengua Tembien and Abergele woredas in the 
north.  It is also shares borders with Hintalo Wajirat and Enderta woredas in the east and 
northeast, respectively.  The main city of the woreda is called Samre and located about 
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57 km from Mekelle, the regional capital. Another small town called Gijet was an 
administrative center for Seharti, before Seharti joined with Samre as one woreda.  
Most people in Samre work in Agriculture, but water and electricity is very scarce. Many 
people have to travel long distances to fetch water from public wells. The annual rainfall 
is estimated to be between 350 to 700 mm. There are only a few ways to get from 
Mekelle to Samre using public transportation, and the available all-weather roads are full 
of curves and steep hills, which make traveling quite difficult and at times dangerous.  
 The public offices in Samre have few utilities and materials compared to those in 
Mekelle. Government offices in Samre town and woreda have received and purchased 
few computers, cars and motorbikes in recent years. There are also various non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) that are engaged in a number of public service 
projects in Samre. Among the notable ones is the Relief Society of Tigray (REST), a 
local NGO with significant development programs and activities (e.g. education, health, 
water, and natural resource management) in Samre and beyond.  
 Samre woreda had 26,929 students (16, 818 first cycle and 10,111 second cycle) 
enrolled in its 42 primary schools in 2011/12. It has also two secondary (9-12 grades) 
schools with a total enrollment of 2,194 students and 97 teachers.    
 
4.1.4 Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples Regional State (SNNPRS)  	  
 SNNPRS is located in the southern and southwestern parts of Ethiopia. It is the 
third largest region, occupying more than 10 percent of the country’s land area (or about 
112, 000 square kilometer). SNNPRS borders Kenya in the south, Sudan in the 
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southwest, as well as two of Ethiopian regions, Gambella in northwest and Oromia in the 
north and east directions. As of 2012, SNNPRS population is estimated to be about 17 
million (15,042,531 in 2007 census), of which more than 90 percent of them lived in rural 
areas.  
 SNNPR is the most diverse state in the country, consisting of about 56 ethnic 
groups representing distinct geographic, cultural, and social identities. Among the largest 
of these are the Sidama, Wolaita, Hadiya, Gurage, Gamo, Kefficho, Silte and Kembata 
ethnic groups. The working language of the state is Amharic, although zones and special 
woredas may determine their own respective languages. According to the 2007 census, 
55.5 percent of the population are identified as Protestant Christians, 19.9 percent 
Orthodox Christians, 14.1 percent Muslims, 6.6 percent as those following traditional 
religions, 2.4 percent Catholics and 1.5 percent follow other religious affiliations.   
 SNNPRS was established as an amalgamation of five regions during the transition 
period of the new government in the early 1990s. The state is currently divided into 13 
zones  (sub-divided into 126 woredas) and 8 special woredas. Unlike other regions, the 
Zones and special woredas in SNNPRS are separate administrational hierarchies next to 
the regional government. The woredas are also sub-divided into 3,929 rural kebeles. In 
regard to urban areas, there are 22 town administrations (including Howassa, the capital) 
and 180 certified towns with municipal city status having a total of 355 urban kebeles.   
 The Region is believed to have relatively fertile lands representing all of the main 
environmental features of the country. But, according to the government portal, 56 
percent of the total area of the region is estimated to be under 1,500 meters elevation, 
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which is characterized as very hot lowlands (kola), while the rest is found in the 
temperate climatic zone.  The average annual rainfall of the State ranges between 400 to 
2200mm.  The region also has vast water resources, including the Rift Valley lakes (e.g. 
Awassa, Chamo, Ziway, Abaya) and river basins (e.g. Omo, Wabi, Genale, Bilate).  
 Agriculture is the mainstay of the region, with coffee being the main cash crop in 
the region. Other main agricultural products include maize, sorghum, enset (also known 
as “false banana”), teff, pulse, wheat and potatoes. Other important cash crop is chat 
(catha edulis), a popular stimulant drug leaf used in many parts of Ethiopia and the Horn 
of Africa. The region is also rich in natural resources and minerals as well as a large 
variety of wild animals and livestock.  
 SNNPRS had 3, 847,521 (2,524,314 first cycle and 1,323,207 second cycle) 
students enrolled in 5,445 government and non-government primary schools in 2011/12. 
There were also 720 Alternative Basic Education Centers (ABECs) and 4 CTEs located 
in Arba Minch, Bonga, Hawassa, and Hossana.   
 
4.1.5 Hawassa City Administration 
 Hawassa (formerly called “Awassa”) was established by the direct order of 
emperor Haile Silassie in the early 1960s with the aim of creating a tourist city along the 
southern edges of the country. First promoted as a capital of Sidamo district in 1968, it 
became the capital city of SNNPRS and a seat for Sidama Zone since 1995. Hawassa is 
located near Lake Hawassa (from which its name is derived) in the northwest, it borders 
the Oromia Region (Shashemene) in the north, Wondogenet and Malga woredas in the 
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east and Shebedino and Hawassa Zuria woredas in the south. The city is about 275 km 
south of Addis Ababa and connected via a major international highway that stretches to 
Kenya and beyond.   
 With a total area of 157.2 square km (of which 50 square km is inhabited by city 
residents), Howassa city administration has a population of about 329,000 (259,803 in 
2007 census) in 2011/12, according to the Central Statistical Agency (CSA) of Ethiopia. 
The city’s climate is mainly warm and humid (woyna dega) and the temperature varies in 
the range of 5˚C in winter and 34˚C in summer. The city gets 933.4mm average annual 
rainfalls during the seasons of kiremit (June to September) and belg (March to May). 
 Howassa is one of the fastest growing cities in the country with remarkable 
economic and infrastructure activities, including asphalt road (including cobble stone 
pavement) constructions in and around the city. Although most of people’s income in the 
city and surrounding areas depends on agriculture, there are a number of industry 
plantations located in the city, such as textile, horticulture, fishing, cement, beverages and 
other agro-industry products (e.g. sisal thread, flour, edible oil). Howassa has also an 
open market where twice a week where people sell and buy a variety of cereal crops, 
vegetables, fruits, spices, animal products and the like. In addition, tourism is a major 
source of revenue for the city.  
 The city is divided administratively into 8 sub-cities and 32 kebeles. Since 
2002/03, Howassa city was elevated as a self-administrating municipality through State 
Proclamation (No. 51, 2002 SNNPRS) and has been led by an elected city council and a 
Mayor.    
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 In 2011/12, Howassa city administration had 80, 916 students enrolled in 102 
primary schools (64 first and second cycle, 1 second cycle only and 37 first cycle only). 
The city had also 3 government owned and 22 private colleges. Howassa University is 
one the major higher institutions in the country with more than 31,000 students currently 
registered in various programs. First established in 1999 by merging three colleges in 
Southern Ethiopia, Hawassa University has shown rapid expansion and upgrading of its 
academic programs and research facilities in recent years.     
 
4.1.6 Aleta Wendo Woreda 
  Aleta Wendo Woreda is one of the ten woredas in the Sidama zone of SNNPRS. 
It is about 60 km from Howassa, the regional capital. The Woreda has 27 kebeles and its 
administrative town is also called Aleta Wendo. It shares borders with Dara and Hulla 
woredas in the south and southeast and Dale woreda in the north. The total area of the 
Woreda is estimated to be 278 square km (27,823 hectares).  
 Most people in Aleta Wendo are subsistence farmers. Coffee production is the 
major source of income for a substantial number of the population. The woreda has 57 
coffee washing stations as of 2012, of which 23 are owned by cooperatives, and 34 are 
private. Chat is also another important cash crop in the area. The main staple is kocho 
(prepared-enset), supplemented by the production of other food crops (e.g. maize, wheat, 
sorghum, yam, sweet potatoes), haricot bean, fruits and vegetables. In addition, livestock, 
especially cattle, is an important commodity and a measure of wealth among many of the 
people in the region. 
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 Situated between 1,710 and 2,640 above sea level, Aleta Wendo has an average 
temperature between 15 to 20˚C and its mean annual rainfall fluctuates between 1,200 
and 1,600 mm. Despite rich resources in water and land (as well as labor), there is a 
shortage of clean drinking water and food, especially in some lowland areas. This is 
partly due to population pressure and partly underutilization of natural resources. The 
region is also highly dependent on the production of coffee, which is often exposed to 
high price fluctuations in the global market.   
 According to SNNPRS Statistical Abstract, in 2011/12, the woreda has a total of 
41, 508 students enrolled in 38 primary schools, including 17 primary first and second 
cycles (grades 1-8) and 3 primary first cycle only (1-4) schools. There were also 733 
primary teachers in the same year.   
 
4.2 Political Decentralization 
 Political decentralization generally refers to a wide-ranging transfer of decision-
making authority and responsibilities from central governments to subnational and lower 
levels of governments. This usually entails the existence and functioning of at least four 
components: (1) institutional arrangements for separation of power among executive, 
legislative, and judicial bodies; (2) election laws and the electoral systems; (3) party 
systems and political party laws; (4) and local participation and accountability 
mechanisms (Boex and Yilmaz 2010: 14). In the following subsections, I explore most of 
these elements in the context of Ethiopian decentralization and decentralized education 
service delivery.  
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4.2.1 Legal and Institutional Settings 
 In Ethiopia, the legal basis for decentralization at the regional level was first 
established in a Transitional Period Charter immediately following the new government 
in 1991, and later cemented with the federal Constitution of 1995 (Article 39 and Article 
52). However, the legal status of local government at the sub-regional level was left for 
regional states to decide through the formulation and ratification of their own 
constitutions (Art. 50: 4 1995).  
 According to the second section of Article 50 (4) of the federal Constitution, the 
purpose behind the establishment and granting of “adequate power” to the lowest units of 
government is “to enable the People to participate directly in the administration of such 
units.” As Zemelak and Yonathan (2012: 94) pointed out, “By imposing on the regional 
state an obligation to transfer adequate powers to local government, the constitution is 
mandating the establishment of not mere administrative local authority, but an 
autonomous local government.” However, this was not the case during the early stages of 
decentralization, when local governments were treated as mere administrative agents of 
the regional governments (Ibid.: 98). Similarly, the World Bank Woreda Study conducted 
between 1999 and 2000, concluded that the decentralization process was impeded by 
regional governments’ heavy reliance on “systems of administrative and social hierarchy 
vis-à-vis woredas in the delivery of essential services.” (World Bank 2001: i). It 
continued by stating that the system in place was “one characterized by administrative 
deconcentration, not the devolution of powers to elected bodies provided for in the 
federal and regional constitutions.” (Ibid.).   
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 Beginning in 2001, as a result of a crisis within the ruling party (EPRDF)32 which 
culminated in a policy “renewal” (“tehadiso”) (Vaughan and Tronvoll 2003: 121; Watson 
and Lissane 2005: v), the four most populous regional states in the country decided to 
revise their constitutions to devolve more decision-making power and responsibilities to 
the woreda administrative units. For instance, section 1 and 2 of Article 72 of the revised 
Constitution of the Tigray regional government (TRS Constitution 2001) declares that 
each woreda will have sufficient power to plan, determine and implement its own 
economic development and social services within its own administration, as well as to 
execute laws and policies issued by the regional government.  
 In addition to the constitutional amendment, TRS later enacted a statue (TRS, 
Proclamation No. 99/2006), which further laid out the competence of the woreda 
administration. Thus, Proclamation No. 99 presents specific objectives of woreda 
decentralization including: building institutional capacity of local governments to 
discharge their newly assigned responsibilities in serving local citizens, granting legal 
rights to woredas to collect and mobilize local resources, and providing the woreda 
government with the direction of creating a more accountable and participatory civil 
society, including NGOs and other development partners at the grass-root level. 
 At the same time, these regional states also enacted statutes to restructure the roles 
and functions of urban or municipal administrative systems, which are considered 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 While disagreements over the handling of the conflict with Eritrea were one of the causes of the party 
crisis, many suggest more important factors as catalysts. For instance, Vaughan and Tronvoll (2003:121) 
noted that the primary reason was “the break up of trust and consequent power struggle, between leaders of 
two groups whose day to day interaction was no longer close enough to sanction and overcome 
divergence.” Like wise, Markakis (2011:274) wrote: “The root cause undoubtedly was the unraveling of 
the traditional TPLF collegiate system of leadership, and the increasing autonomy of Meles Zenawi.”	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equivalent to the woreda jurisdictions. However, as a creation of regional statutes and 
mostly functioning under the responsibilities of the regional councils, city administrations 
were deprived of legal, administrative and fiscal autonomy until recently. In the new state 
legislations, city administrations are currently assigned to perform both state and 
municipal functions. State functions, which include provision of education, health, trade, 
manufacturing, and agriculture services, are funded by regional transfers, whereas 
municipal functions which include preparation and implementation of development plans, 
management of urban land, solid waste, water sewage, and drainage services, provision 
of markets, local roads and bridges, street lighting, fire protection and other 
miscellaneous services, are self-financed.   
 Although most of the country’s state constitutions and statues grant woredas and 
municipalities legal recognition to exercise important functions of local development and 
delivery of basic sectors (e.g. primary education, primary health, agriculture extension, 
and water supply), they state clearly that all these functions are determined by the 
hierarchical and political authority of the regional states. The Constitution of the TRS, for 
example, expressly states that the “woreda shall be a body subordinate to the regional 
government” (TRS Constitution 2001, Art. 72: 2). Furthermore, similar to other 
constitutions, the TRS makes the chief administrators of woredas and mayors of 
municipalities accountable to the regional governments in addition to their accountability 
to councils of woredas and municipalities (Ibid.: Art. 82: 1).  
 Unlike TRS and other regions, the SNNPRS Constitution grants autonomy and 
higher authority to the zonal (and Special Woreda) administrations over the woredas. 
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While zones are made up of several woredas, special woredas are autonomous entities 
with equal status as zones. In the multi-ethnic SNNPRS, the existence of zones as local 
governments with elected representatives and executive committees serves a special 
function in safeguarding the rights of the various “nations, nationalities and peoples” for 
self-rule at the local level.33 For this reason, the revised Constitution of the SNNPRS 
makes clear the dual accountability of the woreda administration: upwardly to the higher 
regional and zonal levels and downwardly to its own electorate. As section 2 of article 91 
states: “Without prejudice to the powers and rights to develop its own region and 
determine its own internal affairs, (the woreda) shall be a subordinate to the Regional 
State and Zone” (SNNPRS Constitution 2001).  
 Revised state constitutions have also recently recognized the legal status of the 
kebele (neighborhood associations) as the lowest hierarchical and administrative unit of 
their governance structure. A sub-division of the woreda, the kebele (tabia in Tigrinya) 
does not receive direct financial transfer from the regional government and has limited 
discretionary power over its budgets. However, it is an important level of local 
government where grass-root community participation and mobilization take place, and 
people get basic services. The kebele is usually composed of an elected council (300 
members after 2005), an executive committee of five to seven citizens, a social court of 
three judges, and other social, economic/ development and security stuff stationed at the 
kebele. The chief-administrator who is elected from among the members of the kebele 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Although zones function generally as intermediate administrative agencies between regions and woredas 
in most of the regions in Ethiopia, nationality zones and Special Woredas have been established only in 
Afar, Amhara, Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambela and SNNP regions.  
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council, and other representatives from schools, development agents, and women and 
youth associations usually constitute the kebele executive committee. It is a subordinate 
body that implements laws, regulations and directives enacted by the higher units of 
government. The executive committee is also accountable not only to its chief-
administrator and kebele council, but also to the woreda or municipal administration. 
  With some variations among states, the kebele is also divided into sub-kebeles or 
villages (300-400 households), and further down to mengistawi buden or government 
teams (30-50 households), and limat buden or development groups (10-15 households). 
The sub-kebele units are termed differently from one region to the next (e.g. kantas and 
ketenas in SNNPRS and gotts and garre in Oromia region).   
 As in both the TRS and SNNPRS Constitutions, there is no detailed list of woreda 
or kebele competences that pertains to what kind of social services and economic 
development activities each of these levels of government is supposed to plan and 
implement, nor the revenue base needed to accomplish the assigned functions. Although 
the above two states formulated statues listing what expenditure assignments woredas are 
responsible for, the only revenue resources that are mentioned in their constitutions are 
taxes from agricultural income and land use fees, leaving other tax sources at the 
discretion of the regional authorities. As I discuss later under fiscal decentralization, this 
limited revenue raising power of local governments render them heavily dependent on 
intergovernmental transfers from central and regional governments, which are mostly 
used to cover salary and other administrative expenditures. The situation with city 
administrations is slightly different from the rural woredas since they tend to possess a 
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higher degree of autonomy for managing their municipal functions, including greater 
opportunities to generate and keep their own revenues. 
 The legal and policy frameworks for woreda decision-making power regarding 
basic services, particularly the education sector is also part of the general mandates of 
regional governments not only to implement national policies and directives, but also to 
grant “adequate power” to the lowest units of government. Since the start of the 1994 
Education and Training Policy (ETP) and followed by a series of medium term Education 
Sector Development Programs (ESDP), decentralized management of education has been 
the centerpiece of the government’s political and developmental priorities. For instance, 
the five-year plan of ESDP III (2005/06-2009/10) recognized the need to give additional 
responsibility for woredas to administer primary, secondary and technical and vocational 
schools within their jurisdictions (MOE 2005). The plan also urged woredas to devise 
and implement plans based on national standards, region’s educational plan and local 
community needs, as well as increase accountability in providing effective and efficient 
education service by broadening participation of communities and improving school 
management and transparency (MOE 2005). Furthermore, the most recent ESDP IV 
(2010) also recognizes the importance of decentralizing education services down to the 
school level by improving school level management and decision-making (through 
various capacity-building programs) on issues such as the nomination of teachers and 
other support staff and, the assignment of key leadership such as school principals (MOE 
2010: 69). 
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 Besides the successive ESDP plans, the Ministry of Education’s Guidelines for 
Organization of Education Management, Community Participation and Education 
Finance, issued in 2002, outline the general institutional and administrative roles and 
responsibilities of each level of government in the management of the education system. 
Accordingly, regional governments through their Education Bureaus (REBs) have the 
responsibility and power to make their own educational laws and regulations pertaining 
to the roles of sub-regional education authorities. In principle, the Woreda Education 
Offices (WEOs), supported by the kebeles with their Education and Training Boards 
(KETBs), and the schools with school directors and Parent-Teacher Associations (PTAs) 
are the primary institutions for administrating and monitoring the education system at the 
local level. However, as it will be discussed in later sections, the woreda educational 
system faces various limitations and challenges, particularly related to capacity and 
resources to implement the legal framework outlined in the official national and regional 
documents. Furthermore, decentralized management at the school level is still in its early 
stages of implementation throughout the country, while the levels of grassroots 
participations through the PTAs and KETBs have shown incremental progress in recent 
years with wide variations across regions, districts and schools.     
 
4.2.2 Party Politics and Local Governments 
 While the legal and institutional settings of decentralized management of basic 
services at the woreda and municipal levels have been established through revised 
constitutions and statues of both TRS and SNNPRS, the de facto exercise of these 
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provisions is far from evident among local governments and schools observed for this 
study. One of the well-known and widely reported aspect of Ethiopia’s political system is 
the centralizing structure and dominant roles of the ruling party, the EPRDF, in curtailing 
a more pluralistic and democratic decision-making process at all levels of government 
(Aalen 2002; Assefa 2006; Keller 2002; Meheret 2002; Merera 2007; Paulos 2007; 
Pausewang et al. 2002; Teferi 2008; Vaughan and Tronvoll 2003; Yilmaz and Venugopal 
2008; to only mention a few). For instance, a lack of real political competition at the local 
government level is reflected in the fact that almost all of the woreda chief 
administrators, city mayors and higher officials at the education sector interviewed for 
this study were appointees of the ruling party and its affiliates. This is also in line with 
the fact that the ruling party has been declared a winner in all previous elections (save the 
2005 general election) by sweeping nearly all seats in woreda councils and regional and 
federal parliaments (elections are discussed in the next section).  
 The dominant position of the ruling party is also exemplified by the uniformity of 
official positions and policy directions among officials interviewed at the regional and 
local levels regarding issues such as decentralization, capacity building, grass-root 
empowerment and service delivery. Most of the woreda representatives have recognized 
the changes in recent woreda-level decentralization that endowed them with greater 
responsibilities and more resources (particularly in the form of block-grants) that, among 
other things, contributed to the expansion of locally based services. Nevertheless, at the 
same time, they acknowledged the fact that their authorities and mandates are often 
subordinate to federal and regional priorities and policy frameworks, which guide most of 
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their plans and activities. In his “rapid assessment” of decentralization, Meheret (2007: 
89) made similar observations about single party dominance of the woreda government. 
On the positive side, Meheret argued that, “the government has strong leverage at the 
local level to ensure the effective implementation of party/government programs and 
policies,” but, on the negative side, it runs “the danger of encouraging upward 
accountability to regional and federal policies at the cost of community needs and 
concerns.”   
 Another important component of upward-accountability in the top-down party 
management and discipline is the practice of gimgema (self-criticism or evaluation). 
Gimgema meetings take place periodically (or at anytime deemed necessary) as a way of 
assessing party performance and ensuring accountability of party members to party 
ideology and priorities. According to Aalen (2002: 87), gimgema was originally initiated 
by the TPLF during the armed struggles again the Derg regime to evaluate the mistakes 
and progresses of their military strategies. However, as Aalen noted, this later became 
mainly a mechanism for the ruling party to maintain its control in the regions all the way 
down to the kebele level. While proponents argue that gimgema should be a routine part 
of public administration to monitor public servants and deal with allegations of 
corruption, opponents view it as a method of purging party members and state officials 
suspected of being actual or potential dissidents (Assefa 2006: 162). As Meheret (2002: 
141) pointed out, as compared to the early years of EPRDF rule, gimgema sessions have 
been less frequent and their significance has diminished in recent years for reasons that 
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are not clear; nevertheless, they continued to represent a strong hand of central authority 
over local autonomy.  
 Party politics also play an important role at the kebele and sub-kebele levels, 
where local people have their first point of contact with state/government and have access 
to various public services that government provides, including arbitration of disputes 
through social courts, birth and marriage certificates and identification cards, licenses, 
food aids, distribution of lands, low-cost housing, agricultural inputs (including seeds and 
fertilizers), and other social services.34 Thus, these broad and essential kebele provisions 
give a massive amount of power to kebele officials over local constituents in a system 
where, according to many observers, the line between state and ruling party is usually 
blurred or non-existent (Aalen and Tronvoll 2009; Human Rights Watch 2010; Lefort 
2007; Markakis 2011).  
 In recent years, as Vaughan (2011: 633) noted, a number of changes in the 
structures of the local government were introduced which cemented the connections 
between the ruling party, state and people at the local level. One example of this was the 
creation of the kebele managers (yesira askiadge or yesira halafi, in Amharic), who are 
appointed, assigned and paid by international donors at the woreda level to enhance the 
capacity of service delivery (Ibid). According to Lefort (2010: 446-7), these managers are 
entrusted with the mission of relieving the kebele cabinet members from secretarial tasks, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 A World Bank’s Institutional and Governance Review (IGR 2006:8) cites a survey called Participatory 
Poverty Assessment in 2005, in which people asked to rank (by ubiquity, importance, and effectiveness) 
the relevance of different local institutions (70 are provided in the survey) and the kebele consistently 
ranked in the top five in both rural and urban settings – and often in the top three – irrespective of the 
dimension being considered (whereas, schools generally were rated as the most important local institutions 
in both urban and rural settings).  
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mediating between local officials and the community to “implement good governance,” 
and supervising development activities in the kebele. Thus, these kebele managers are 
seen not only as an element of “upward accountability” that characterize the strong 
commitment of the ruing party to expand local government capacities and service 
delivery, but they also reflect the “concomitance and continuity of hierarchical intra-
governmental relations and practices that undermine the very principle of 
decentralization” (Emmenegger et al. 2012: 738).  
 In addition to the existence of enhanced bureaucratic hierarchy through the kebele 
manager, there are also other recent examples that illustrate the enormous power of the 
ruling party over local administration throughout the country. For instance, Aalen and 
Tronvoll (2009: 198) pointed out that during the 2005 election period and after, new local 
structures under the kebele, such as the aforementioned mengistawi budin and lemmat-
buden were established with the official aim of making service delivery at the local level 
more efficient and mobilizing people for development work. However, as these same 
authors observed, the above institutions have also “assumed some of the controlling 
functions of the kebele (Ibid.). Likewise, the sharp increase of the ruling party 
membership during the run-up to the 2008 woreda and kebele elections – an increase 
from 760, 000 in 2005 to more than 4 million members in just three years; as well as the 
vastly expanded number of seats on woreda and kebele councils (where only the EPRDF 
was able to enter candidates in all constituencies), all indicate a “more or less totalitarian 
control” of the ruling party over the majority of the Ethiopian population (Ibid.: 203).  
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Like the kebele and sub-kebele leaders, frontline service providers such as principals and 
head teachers of primary schools are also most likely to be appointees of the ruling party 
versus independent or opposition party members. A school director or principal is also 
one of the seven (or more) members of the KETB, which has the administrator of the 
kebele as its chairperson.  
 Despite strong party linkages down to the school administration, there is currently 
little or no devolution of key decision-making power to school level. The PTAs also have 
limited roles in school management so far, although, they have recently taken on some 
responsibilities such as encouraging parents to send their kids to schools (particularly 
girls), mobilizing the community for contribution (in cash, labor and material) and 
attending to discipline and attendance issues. Since 2005, the government has recognized 
the weakness in management and implementation capacity at the school level as one of 
the main impediments for achieving access, equity and quality in primary education 
(MOE 2005: 29; Workneh 2012: 7). This was also one of the central issues in recent 
policy documents in which the government emphasized the further devolution of 
decision-making down to the school level by improving school-level management and 
administration through capacity-building programs (MOE 2010: 14, 69).  
 
4.2.3 Elections and Accountability 
 Political decentralization not only involves transferring decision-making power 
and autonomy to subnational and local governments through legal and constitutional 
means, it also implies the existence of some kind of accountability mechanisms by which 
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local government would be accountable to higher levels of government (upward 
accountability), as well as to citizens (downward accountability) (Kaiser 2006; World 
Bank 2003; Yilmaz et al. 2008). Despite their limitations, regularly scheduled elections 
remain the principal method of downward accountability (Blair 2000; Crook and 
Sverrisson 2001; Schroeder 2004). In the context of service delivery, elections are 
indirect means of holding frontline service providers (woreda education offices, school 
directors and teachers) accountable. Whereas, local citizens can also have a more direct 
influence on providers in places where they have the discretion and the ability to 
participate in decision- making, use better information to monitor the actions of providers 
and enforce compliance (Garcia and Rajkumar 2008: 10; World Bank 2003: 6-7). 
 Since Ethiopia’s adoption of multi-party political system, periodic elections have 
taken place every five years (1995, 2000, 2005, 2010)35 at the national and regional 
levels, while local elections (woreda and kebele) have so far been held in 1998, 2001 and 
2008. According to the Constitution of FDRE (Article 56), the country follows the “first-
past-the post”(or “simple plurality“) electoral system in which the winning party takes all 
the council seats allocated through the election. Candidates for both regional and woreda 
elections can either run as independents or as party members; and as the Amended 
Electoral Law (Proclamation No. 535/2007) states: “a candidate who received more votes 
than other candidates within the constituency shall be declared the winner” (Article 25). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35	  Transitional elections were also held in 1992 and 1994.	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 In addition to general and local elections, the Proclamation also mentions the 
existence of other three types of elections: by-election, re-election and referendum.36 
Although a detailed analysis of elections in post-woreda decentralization is beyond the 
purview of this study, it is important to provide a brief synopsis of the recent elections in 
order to understand the extent to which citizens can use elections to hold their leaders 
accountable. As mentioned previously, in the vast majority of the country’s elections, 
particularly at the local level, the capacity of citizens to exercise accountability through 
voting mechanisms has been limited by the dominant position of the ruling party as well 
as the weakness and division of the main opposition parties and their coalitions. Before 
the 2000 national and regional elections, most of the major opposition parties boycotted 
the elections, citing reasons such as a lack of level field for competition, intimidation and 
harassment by the ruling party, and lack of impartiality and autonomy by the national 
electoral authority, currently known as the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia (NEBE).  
 Despite the fact that a number of opposition parties and independent candidates 
participated in the 2000 general and 2001 local elections, the EPRDF and its affiliated 
parties managed to win more than 90 percent of seats in regional assemblies and local 
councils.37 While the Ethiopian government and the US Department of State (2003) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 According to the Proclamation: “By-election” refers to elections conducted to fill in vacant seats of 
members whose mandates are terminated due to recall or any other reason; “Re-election” means an election 
to be conducted according to the decision of the Board or where candidates get equal votes and becomes 
impossible to determine the winner; and Referendum is defined as a system of voting conducted when 
decided to assess public interest and to know the decision of the public (truncated version of articles 7,.8, 
and 9). 
	  
37 The four formally affiliated EPRDF parties are: Tigray Peoples’ Liberation Front (TPLF), Amhara 
National Democratic Movement (ANDM), Oromo Peoples’ Democratic Organization (OPDO), and 
Southern Ethiopia Peoples’ Democratic Movement (SEPDM); and other EPRDF-allied parties include: 
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declared these elections generally fair and free in most places, according to various 
domestic and international observers, they were marred by a host of election irregularities 
and violence, including unequal access to state resources and the media, biased election 
officials, vote rigging, lack of transparent procedures, harassment and unlawful detention 
of opposition party supporters, and other human rights abuses (EHRCO 2001; HRW 
World Reports 2001-3; Pausewang et al. 2002; USDOS 2003;). Furthermore, Dessalegn 
and Meheret (2004) observed that as of late 2004, there were very few opposition 
political parties in the country; of those, they mostly operated in urban areas, and they 
proved to be largely ineffective in challenging the dominant EPRDF and in offering 
alternative to the electorate.  
 Unlike previous elections, the May 2005 general elections initially represented a 
significant step towards real democratization and meaningful multi-party competition. In 
the words of Clapham (2005), they “have taken on the characteristics of ‘founding 
elections,’ such as those of 1994 in South Africa, or of the 1950s or early 1960s in most 
of the continent… On the whole, the elections were conducted with the level of fairness 
and openness unprecedented in Ethiopian history.” In similar fashion, others, such as the 
European Union-Election Observation Mission (EU-EOM, 2005) and the Carter Center 
(2005) reported of the historic opening of democratic space reflected in the pre-election 
campaigning, public debates and mobilization of supporters by all the contending parties, 
as well as a generally peaceful voting process and high turnout of voters (about 90% 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Somali People’s Democratic Party (SPDP), Benishangul Gumuz People’s Democratic Unity Front 
(BGPDUF), Afar National Democratic Party (ANDP), Gambela People’s Democratic Front (GPDF), 
Harari National League (HNL), and Argoba People’s Democratic Movement (APDM).  
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according to NEBE) on election day. Thus, voters across many parts of Ethiopia had for 
the first time been provided with a choice between the ruling party and the two large 
coalition opposition parties38, as well as various independent parties and candidates.  
 Despite the unprecedented opening of political space observed in pre-election 
period, the disputes over vote counting and the violence and turmoil that ensued after the 
2005 election have undermined, if not completely reversed, most of the political progress 
and democratic gains achieved to date. According to the EU-EOM (2005) report:  
 The counting and aggregating process were marred by irregular practices, 
 confusion and a lack of transparency. Subsequent complaints and appeals 
 mechanisms did not provide an effective remedy. The human rights situation  
 rapidly deteriorated in the post-election day period when dozens were killed  
 by the police and thousands were arrested. Overall, therefore, the elections  
 fell short of international principles for genuine democratic elections. 
 
 
 The 2005 election period was thus considered a mere democratic interlude or a 
simple “liberalization intermezzo” (Aalen and Tronvoll 2009: 195; Lefort 2010: 436) that 
was followed by a more extensive repressive measures by the government (Aalen and 
Tronvoll 2009; Abbink 2006; Clapham 2009; Lefort 2010) and a rapid deterioration in 
state-society relations (Smith 2007: 5). In the aftermath of the election, even the 
opposition parties that made significant electoral advances, winning 31% percent of the 
total parliamentary seats (including all seats but one in Addis Ababa city council and 
significant footings in other regional assemblies [NEBE 2005]), began to experience 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 The two prominent opposition coalitions were: the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD, also 
known as Kinijit), composed of the All Ethiopia Unity Party (AEUP), United Ethiopia Democratic Party-
Medhin (UEDP-MEDHIN), the Ethiopian Democratic League (EDL), and Rainbow Ethiopian: Movement 
for Democracy and Social Justice (RE: MDSJ, also known as Kestedammena); and the United Ethiopian 
Democratic Forces (UEDF, known as Hibret), which includes the All Amhara People’s Organization 
(AAPO), Ethiopian Democratic Unity Party (EDUP), Ethiopian Social Democratic Federal Party (ESDFP), 
the Oromo National Congress (ONC), and the Southern Ethiopia People’s Democratic Coalition (SEPDC).  
	  	   114	  
fragmentation within their leaderships. This was partly due to the widely reported 
crackdown by the government security forces39 and partly to the decision of one of the 
main opposition parties, notably the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD),40 to 
boycott the federal parliament as a way of denying legitimacy to the electoral process. 
Moreover, for those who decided to take their seats in the parliament, the new 
parliamentary rules introduced by EPRDF, requiring a 51 percent majority necessary to 
place an agenda item for debate (rather than the 20 signatures previously required) further 
confirmed the opposition’s belief that the ruling regime would never allow it to play a 
meaningful role (Lyons 2006: 4; Merera 201: 672).  
 After the violent aftermath of the 2005 elections, the relationship between 
international donors and the Ethiopian government became contentious, resulting in the 
decision of the EU and the World Bank to suspend all Direct Budget Support (DBS) to 
the government. However, within six months, the international Donor Assistance Group 
(DAG) resumed aid flows under a new program called the Protection of Basic Services 
(PBS) that funneled cash directly to regional and woreda governments rather than the 
central government’s budget (HRW 2010). This new transfer scheme was also intended 
to be in line with the central government’s decentralization program that, among other 
things, aimed to promote and deepen transparency and accountability in service delivery 
(World Bank 2006: 2).      	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Such as by the Washingon Post (24 July 2005); Amnesty International (2005); and Human Rights Watch 
(2005). 
 
40 Some of the CUD party members split from the party and created a new party called Unity and 
Democracy Party (CUDP) and did take their seats when Parliament opened in September 2005 (Smith 
2007: 8). According to Professor Merera (2011:672), despite CUD ‘s declaration to boycott parliament, 
some 90% of the 173 elected opposition members took up their seats.  
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 In contrast to the 2005 elections, the 2008 local (woreda and kebele) and the 2010 
general elections were mostly peaceful but noncompetitive. The ruling party’s increased 
mass mobilization and expansion of membership was crucial in its landslide victories in 
both elections (over 99 percent of all seats) across the country. According to NEBE 
(2008), the EPRDF coalition won more than 3.5 million seats of the 3.6 million contested 
seats in 2008 local elections, while the remaining seats going mostly to other EPRDF-
allied parties (See Table 4.1 for 2010 results). The opposition parties that boycotted or 
withdrew from the 2008 elections criticized the ruling party for harassment, intimidation 
and other human rights violations; international human rights organizations also voiced 
criticism. After its field research to the run-up to the 2008 elections, the Human Rights 
Watch (2008: 1) documented systemic patterns of repression and abuse that have 
“rendered the elections meaningless in many areas.” However, many of Ethiopia’s 
international donors remained largely silent on publically criticizing the election 
processes and outcomes. As Aalen and Tronvoll (2009: 204) noted, “by not supporting or 
deploying observers, the donor community could justifiably keep quiet in the aftermath 
of the elections as they supposedly did not have any ‘substantial’ and ‘independent’ 
observations to pass judgment.”  
Table 4.1 Official Results of the May 2010 General Elections*  
Ruling and Allied Parties  Opposition/Independent Parties 
Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (EPRDF) 
499  Ethiopian Federal Democratic Unity 
Forum (MEDREK)** 
1 
Somali People’s Democratic Party 
(SPDP)  
24  Independent 1 
Benishangul-Gumuz People’s 
Democratic Party (BGPDP) 
9    
Afar National Democratic Party 8    
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(ANDP) 
Gambela People’s Democratic 
Movement (GPDM) 
3    
Argoba People’s Democratic 
Organization (APDO) 
1    
Harari National League (HNL) 1    
Total Seats 545   2 
Percentage of Total Seats 96.6%   3.4% 
 
Source: NEBE 2010. * Voter turn out was 93.4 (of the registered voters). ** The Medrek coalition was 
originally composed of six parties, namely United Ethiopia Democratic Forces (UEDF), Oromo Federalist 
Democratic Movement (OFDM), Somali Democratic Alliance Forces (SDAF), ARENA Tigray, and two 
independent candidates – Dr. Negasso Gidada (former president of Ethiopia) and Siye Abreha (former 
Defense minister). In 2009, Medrek was joined by Unity for Democracy and Justice Party (UDJ).  
 
 
 Despite the signing of the Electoral Code of Conduct for Political Parties 
(ECCPP) by the EPRDF and three opposition parties41 in October 2009, most of the 
concerns of the previous elections resurfaced during the 2010-election cycle. The main 
opposition coalition, the Forum for Democratic Dialogue (Medrek) walked out in the 
early negotiations and refused to sign the ECCPP, alleging that it didn’t deal with the 
fundamental issues at stake (EU-EOM 2010: 6; HRW 2010: 20). Although Medrek 
ultimately decided to participate in the elections and garnered a single seat in the federal 
parliament, these elections were considered to have falling short of “international 
standards” both by the United States and the European Union (VOA 2010). Moreover, 
the Human Rights Watch (2010) and Freedom House (2010), as well as several scholars 
(Aalen and Tronvoll 2009; Hagmann and Abbink 2011; Merera 2011;) criticized the 
government for “constricting political space” through a series of new laws that came out 
prior to the 2010 elections. Among these laws are those pertaining to elections (HPR 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 They were: The All Ethiopian Unity Party [AEUP], the Ethiopian Democratic Party [EDP], and the 
Coalition for Unity and Democracy Party [CUD]. Most other parties signed also the ECCPP in later time.  
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532/2007), political parties (HPR 573/2008), the media (HPR 590/2008a), anti-terrorism 
(HPR 652/2009), and civil societies (HPR 621/2009a).  
 In looking forward to the next general election in May 2015, there is great 
uncertainty about the future of democratic competition and representation, as opposition 
leaders continue to doubt that they will be provided with a level playing field ahead of the 
elections (Tronvoll 2010). While some anticipate a new challenge for the future stability 
of the ruling party after the recent and sudden death of Meles Zenawi, its leader and the 
nations’ prime minister for 21 years, others, such as the Crisis Group (2012: 11) contend 
that there are no political forces that seem to have the capacity to pose a real threat to the 
monopoly of the ruling party, at least in the short term.  
 
4.2.4 Citizens’ Participation and Service Providers 
 The exercise of voting appears to be an ineffective, albeit important, mechanism 
of local accountability in a country with a weak system of democratic competition and 
highly centralized party structure as is the case in Ethiopia. However, in many parts of 
the country, there has been a growing trend of citizens’ participation in other more direct 
ways. For instance, increased “community participation”42 has been an integral part of 
recent government’s decentralization policies and efforts, particularly in the education 
sector. One of the key aims of the MOE’s ESDP and associated Guideline of 2002 is to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Participation can be defined in different ways depending on the context. Here it means the process 
through which the different stakeholders, including individual citizens, community associations, local 
government representatives and frontline service providers “influence and share control over development 
initiatives and the decisions and resources which affect them” (World Bank 1996:xi). For educational 
development, in particular, Shaeffer (1994) provides the most widely used scale of community 
participation.  
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strengthen the community to participate in school management and administration and 
create a sense of ownership (MOE 2005). The massive increase in school enrollment and 
expansion of primary education in the last decade or so have also been partly attributed to 
community efforts, especially through PTA’s, KETB’s and Alternative Basic Education 
(ABE) centers.  
 Despite official statements indicating improvements, the degree of citizen and 
community engagements in education management and oversight has still been minimal 
and limited mainly to financial and in-kind contributions for school construction. In most 
of the schools visited for this study, parent and community contributions in cash 
(excluding labor and material resources) usually amounted to less than 10 percent of their 
overall budget. However, these contributions are considered to be significant given the 
general low-income levels among the people, especially in rural areas. Many woreda 
officials, school directors, teachers and PTA leaders also mentioned poverty as one of the 
major causes for lack of citizens’ participation. People are stretched beyond their limits, 
as they have to contribute to various sectors and development activities in their localities. 
Still, to the extent that these contributions are voluntary, they are believed to help 
increase a sense of ownership among local citizens who would likely hold their public 
officials and frontline providers accountable to their performances.  
 Aside from monetary and material contributions, the strength of local community 
participation in school decision-making process through established institutions, such as 
PTA’s and School Management Committee (SMC) is still weak and varies from place 
and place. In most cases, it is the KETB, led by the kebele chairperson, who is a political 
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appointee and accountable to the kebele council, which has higher authority over the 
management of schools within its jurisdiction. Although KETB includes representatives 
from parents and teachers, as well as other stakeholders (school principals who often 
serve as secretaries of the board and members of women and youth associations), many 
see it still as a “top-down” implementing body of the woreda government with limited 
knowledge and skills on school management and oversight. Unlike the KETB, the PTA is 
closer to the school level but currently lack adequate capacity and resources to take 
greater decision-making power and responsibilities in school affairs.  
 Still, in most of the schools visited, the capacities of the PTA have been slowly 
increasing in recent years, partly as a government mandate and party as a result of more 
and more parents becoming conscious of the importance of schooling to their children 
and consequently wanting to take part in monitoring frontline providers. The PTA 
members, elected at the parent-teachers’ assembly for three-year term and usually 
including respected members of the community, are mostly credited with mobilizing 
parents to take a more active role in their children education. PTA members are also 
involved in other activities, including school planning and budgeting, employing 
additional school staff (guards, cleaning workers, librarians, or even teachers), 
monitoring of students’ and teacher’s absenteeism, addressing discipline issues, 
providing better school environment for girls, supporting students’ clubs and activities 
(related to HIV/AIDs, harassment, children rights, sports and the like) and helping 
students with various needs and difficulties.  
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 As the roles of PTA members and other parents in school operation and oversight 
are expanding, there is no consensus among stakeholders as to what level parents should 
be involved in regarding classroom learning and teaching, as well as evaluations of 
school directors and teachers. Many of the principals, vice-principals and teachers 
interviewed were quick to express their reservation about the capacities (in terms of 
knowledge, training and time) of parents and other community members and to suggest 
that these functions should be left to the education experts, school department heads, 
principals and higher woreda education officers. On the contrary, others argued for the 
greater role of parents in monitoring the “quality” of education their children are getting 
by taking such responsibilities as regularly observing schools and classrooms, having 
more inputs in personnel management, and actively participating in school meetings and 
PTA assemblies. Despite the general reluctance of giving overall school management 
authorities to parents/communities in the current PTA structure, most agree on the need 
of enhanced relationship and accountability between schools, local communities and 
governments to reverse the declining quality of education in the country.   
 In addition, several donors and NGOs are currently involved in promoting various 
forms of “social accountability”43 mechanisms with the aim of inter alia, strengthening 
partnerships between schools, communities and government. For instance, the USAID-
funded Basic Education Strategic Objective (BESO), initiated in mid-1990s in SNNPRS 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 According to Samuel et al. (2010:1), “social accountability is understood as the process and approach by 
which ordinary citizens, who are the users of public basic services, (a) voice their needs, preferences and 
demands for improved and effective public basic services delivery and policies; and (b) hold policy-makers 
and service providers accountable for weak or non-performance.” 	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and TRS and later expanded to other states, has been working to improve the 
effectiveness of community participation and school governance through the training of 
PTA and other community stakeholders in over 6,900 communities to date (USAID 
2010). Similarly, the social accountability component of PBS has been involved in 
strengthening the capacities of citizens and “civil society organizations” (CSOs) to hold 
service providers accountable using various tools such as Community Score Cards 
(CSC), Citizens’ Report Card (CRC) and Participatory Budgeting (PB) (PBS 2009). 
 Although these and other social accountability mechanisms are not yet well 
institutionalized and have limited coverage throughout the country, there has been some 
indication of their usefulness in monitoring the quality of local services and the level of 
citizens’ access to information.  
 
4.3 Administrative Decentralization 
 While political decentralization requires that local politicians and service 
providers are responsive and accountable to the local citizens and communities, 
administrative decentralization primarily involves the distribution of roles and 
responsibilities for allocating and providing public services among national and sub-
national governments within legally recognized separate jurisdictions. The 
implementation of administrative decentralization also entails a number of steps that go 
simultaneously with delineating responsibilities, including assigning sources of revenue 
commensurate with those responsibilities and creating capacity to discharge the newly 
assigned functions (Yusuf et al. 2000). Thus, in the context of this study, the extent of 
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administrative decentralization can be explored in two factors that are at the core of 
devolved administrative functions: the degree of clarity in the legally transferred woreda 
responsibilities in regard to the management of personnel, and the issues of local capacity 
to deliver basic services.  
 
4.3.1 Roles and Functions of Local Governments 
 Since the initiation of woreda decentralization, the power and responsibilities of 
the woreda administration have been recognized in state constitutions throughout 
Ethiopia. As mentioned previously, within the five-tiered federal government, the woreda 
constitutes the lowest administrative unit with discretionary power over its own budget, 
albeit subordinate to the regional governments. Many of the key informants at the 
regional and woreda level acknowledged that there has been still a moderate degree of 
intervention by the regional governments on the affairs of the local administrations; 
however, they claimed that it would be a matter of time before the woreda could become 
a more autonomous governing unit. As woredas continue to grow in capacities and 
resources to plan and execute their own socio-economic development, it is believed that 
regional states will likely play only supporting and monitoring roles. This seems 
particularly true in the education sector, where woredas and woreda education offices 
have increasingly shown progress in capacities and have been characterized as “the nexus 
of decentralization” in the Ethiopian administration (Engel, 2011: 18).   
 In regard to governing structure, the woreda administration is similar to that of the 
regional state. It has its own elected council (consisted of representatives from each 
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kebele in the woreda), executive committee (otherwise known as the cabinet), sectoral 
offices, and a woreda court. This structure is also followed by city/municipal 
administrations as well. Thus, a municipality has a mayor, a mayoral executive 
committee (cabinet), a manager of municipal services, an elected city council, a 
municipal judicial body, and a municipal court. Moreover, as the case with woredas, 
several sectoral offices have been established to plan and manage the day-to-day 
bureaucracies within the city administrations. Figure 4.1 shows the standard model for 
woreda administration under decentralization. 	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Source: Hadingham 2003. * Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Desk 	  
 
 Since 2001, the specific responsibilities of the woreda and kebele governments 
have been delineated further in revised state constitutions, with few variations across 
regions. According to the TRS and SNNPRS constitutions (in Art.75 and Art. 93 
respectively), the main duties and responsibilities of the woreda council usually include 
the power to:  
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(a)  Approve the social services and economic development administrative plans,  
       programs and budget; 
(b)  Follow up the timely undertaking of the basic agricultural development activities,  
      with special attention to protecting natural resources; 
(c)  Create the favorable condition and mobilize the local people for development  
       activities; 
(d)  Issue the timely collection of land tax, agriculture income tax, agricultural 
 products sales tax and other taxes and payments; 
(e)  Point out income resources other than those allocated and administered by the 
 region; and  
(f)  Issue directives to ensure the peace and security of the woreda.   
 
Likewise, the two regions, in articles 105 and 87 of their respective constitutions outlined 
the powers and duties of the kebele council, among which are:  
(a)  Implementing the plans and directives issued by woreda administration; 
(b)  Issuing directives on local matters in consistent to the laws and regulations 
 enacted by its superior bodies; 
(c)  Preparing guidelines for implementation of the socio-economic and administrative  
     programs and plans, as well as other plans beneficial to the people of the kebele; 
(d)  Initiating and coordinating people for development activities; and  
(e)  Ensuring the maintenance of peace, security and order in the kebele. 
 
  The woreda decentralization reform has also created a new hierarchical structure 
of managing public services, particularly in the education sector. The Regional Education 
Bureau (REB) has the highest hierarchy of power in overall educational management 
next to the Federal Ministry of Education (MOE). Below the REB, Zonal Education 
Offices (ZEOs) usually provide technical support and supervision to woredas (save the 
SNNPRS where they perform some of the functions assigned to regions). The Woreda 
Educational Office (WEO) is administratively subordinate to the woreda council and at 
the same time professionally and technically answerable to the REB (MOE 2006:40). The 
WEO has also higher decision-making power over the KETBs, whereas at the school 
level, the PTA’s or SMC’s are in principle the main agents for overall school operations.  
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 The duties and responsibilities of each level of government in the education sector 
have also been established beginning with the formulation of the Education and Training 
Policy (ETP) in 1994 and subsequent policy documents, such as the Education Sector 
Development programs (ESEPs).  In recent years, a major exercise has been undertaken 
in clarifying the functional assignments at all levels of government, especially within the 
context of woreda decentralization. With some variations across regions, Table 4.2 
sketches the divisions of authorities and functions of the three levels of educational 
administration.  
 
Table 4.2 Responsibilities Assigned to Different Levels of Government for Education 
Area of  
Responsibility 







Initiates and establishes 
national education policy 
Implement national policy 
and formulate regional 
policy 




Sets educational and 
training standards 
Set standards for primary 
and secondary education 






examinations (Grades 10 
and 12) 
Implement national 
examinations and prepare 
regional examinations 
(Grades 4 and 8) 
Implement and supervise 





Sets curriculum for 
secondary and tertiary 
education; assists in 
preparation of other 
school curricula 
Prepare, evaluate and 
revise curriculum for 








Sets standards for 
teachers’ training and 
development; assigns post 
secondary teachers to 
regions 
Train primary school 
teachers and deploy 
teachers to woredas from 
regional institutions 
Hire, pay and deploy 
primary school teachers; 
make decisions on 






Provides block grants up 
to secondary education 
and cost-sharing at higher 
levels of education; 
develops a textbook and 
learning materials policies 
Receive grants from 
federal government and 
use revenue from own 
taxes, fees and other 
sources; provide 
textbooks for secondary 
schools and assess their 
Receive grants from 
regional governments and 
use revenues from own 
taxes, fees and other 
sources; print and 
distribute primary school 
textbooks; monitor and 
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qualities; prepare and 
decide on designs of 
education infrastructure 






Establishes, expands and 
accredits higher education 
institutions 
Establish and administer 
second cycle of secondary 
education (grades 11-12), 
technical and vocational 
schools, teacher training 
institutions and medium-
level colleges; license the 
establishment of private 
schools 
Establish and administer 
primary school (grades 1-
8), and first cycle of 
secondary school (grades 
9-10), and adult 
education; assist and 
monitor Education and 
Training Boards (ETBs) 
and PTAs 
 
Source: MOE 2006; 2002; World Bank 1998.   
 
 
 As indicated above, the main responsibility for the recruitment and management 
of personnel for primary education has been assigned to the woreda administration, but in 
most cases, the regional bureau and the ruling political party play crucial roles in this 
matter. Human resource management is not only divided between the different levels of 
government, but it also has many overlapping responsibilities between them, posing a 
difficulty to clearly ascertain who does what. In most cases, the woreda has assumed the 
power to recruit, employ, fire, and promote primary school teachers within the legal 
provisions of the regional Civil Service Bureau (CSB). However, the regional 
administration is responsible for their instructional content (school curriculum), training 
and compensation, as well as appointing, monitoring and building the capacities of 
woreda and school administrative staffs.  
 The problem of capacity (a point that is later discussed in the next section), in 
terms of finding qualified personnel to fill all the posts has been an enduring one. As 
many in the woreda offices indicated, the increased woreda responsibilities have brought 
a higher demand for qualified personnel in all areas of the education sector. It also 
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appeared that woreda competences have been improving, given the majority of qualified 
officers who now occupy the visited education offices. This was partly due to 
government and donor efforts for civil service reforms and broader capacity building 
programs that have been underway for many years. However, as many studies indicated 
(Garcia and Rajkuamar 2008; GTZ-Selam 2005; Mussa 2005; Oulai et al. 2011), there 
still remain many factors that are impeding the efforts to reduce staff shortages such as 
low salary, unattractive working environment (heavy work load, inadequate resources), 
remoteness of location (lack of amenities and opportunities), lack of employee benefits 
and job promotion, demand outside the civil service, and the difficulty of finding 
appropriate candidates for vacant jobs.   
 The issue of scarcity is also compounded by the problem of high turnover in 
woreda and school-level administration staff across the country. For instance, most of the 
key informants in woreda and school administrations had only been at their current 
positions for less than three years; teachers’ turnover tends to be even higher. The recent 
assessment by the USAID in their Basic Education Program (USAID-BEP 2007) 
indicated that 50.9 percent of the trained woreda officers from the sample areas had left 
their post in the woreda education bureaus. The frequency and high level staff turnover is 
believed to have negative implications for sustainable capacities due to loss of 
institutional memory and trained personnel. The MOE’s (2010a) own report has 
acknowledged the seriousness of turnover in woreda and cluster education centers and 
suggested that this was primarily due to reshuffling, transfer and promotion, and not the 
result of “market forces”. In contrast, others have suggested other factors associated with 
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the problem of frequent staff-turnover, including dissatisfaction with the criteria used for 
appointment and promotion, poor leadership, and lack of support and guidance from 
higher administrative bodies.   
 
4.3.2 Woreda and School-Level Capacity44 
 Besides the need for political and fiscal autonomy and accountability that are key 
components to improving local service delivery, local governments usually face problems 
of administrative capacity particularly related to professional training and skills. One of 
most frequently reported problems among woreda officials, school directors and teachers 
is the lack of qualified people to fill-in many of the new decentralized functions, as well 
as insufficient training opportunities for both administrative staff and teachers. This is 
also related to the general weak capacity of human resource management (also connected 
to the effects of inadequate budget) of woreda administration in managerial, planning and 
supervision of basic services including education.   
 As alluded to in previous section, although the large majority of the woreda 
administrative officials hold diploma or degree qualifications, their appointment to their 
current positions have been highly influenced by party loyalty and ethnic identity. As a 
result, they require significant investment in training and technical assistance by the 
central government.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 According to Morgan (1998: 2), capacity can be generally defined as “the organizational and technical 
abilities, relationships and values that enable countries, organizations, groups and individuals at any level 
of society to carry out functions and achieve their development objectives over time.” The MOE (2006a: 1) 
adopted a rather broad definition of “capacity” through which an organization or an education system does 
a number of things, such as relate internally and to other elements of the public sector, organize itself in a 
coherent manner, to have time and space to experiment, to possess a shared vision, to be seen as 
accountable to and legitimate in the eyes of those it serves.  
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  Following the woreda decentralization, and particularly with the creation of the 
Ministry of Capacity Building (MOCB) in 2002, relative improvements have been 
evident in terms of the availability of administrative and technical personnel at the local 
government and school levels. However, the capacity building office have become 
another top-down centralized system under which all planning, personnel, and finance 
have been organized in a pool system to provide service for the capacity building office, 
resulting in the reduction of the woreda education staff (Tesfaye 2008:9). Likewise, the 
MOE (2006a: 56), in its earlier evaluation expressed similar sentiments in stating that the 
woreda capacity building efforts have largely failed “either to motivate competent 
employees or to retain the required numbers of trained and skilled personnel.” The MOE 
also pointed out the main lesson emerging from the capacity efforts, including the high 
cost of the major “systematic” training programs affecting the education sector, the 
difficulty for established structures to emulate or implement in future without substantial 
financial and technical support, and the aforementioned problem of staff turnover among 
trainees (Ibid., 57). Furthermore, Watson (2005:20) concluded that because of its novelty, 
the impact of the MOCB has been limited thus far to the preparation of the major Public 
Sector Capacity Building Support Program (PSCAP), which was expected to have 
indirect impact on education service delivery. 
 According to MOCB (2004), PSCAP has been implemented in all major sectors 
and levels of government with the aim of improving the scale, efficiency and 
responsiveness of public service delivery, empowering citizens to participate more 
effectively in shaping their own development, and promoting good governance and 
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accountability. Despite a lack of “third-party” assessment of their impacts, PSCAP’s 
various activities are believed to have improved the government’s capacity to deliver 
efficient, responsive and transparent services, as well as increased citizens’ participation 
and satisfaction with services (Elsa 2012:2). According to the 2010/11 Woreda and City 
Benchmarking Survey, 88 percent local governments were providing basic services 
compared to only 25 percent in 2005, and at the same time, the overall citizens’ 
satisfaction with primary education delivery increased from 84 percent to 94 percent 
(Ibid).  
 As an integral part of the PSCAP, the regional and woreda education offices were 
also restructured following the implementation of a program called Business Process 
Reengineering (BPR).45 According to Tesfaye and Atakilt (2011: 13-14), BPR was 
designed primarily “to create an organizational structure that is efficient, effective and 
flexible, and to address the coordination problems related to differentiation, excessive 
formalization, and centralization-versus-decentralization.”  
 Although a detailed analysis of BPR’s impact is beyond the scope of this study, 
two obvious changes observed were the physical re-design of many public offices to 
make them more business friendly and transparent, and the reduction of red tape and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 According to the MOE (2007:41), “BPR is about change management and will necessitate fundamental 
changes to existing processes and the creation of new ones. Reengineering will bring about comprehensive 
changes not only to processes but also to management structures, people, regulations, information 
management etc. Developing a more service-oriented and outcome focused approach is a key aspect. BPR 
will involve the development of strategic plans for institutions/offices at all levels of the sector and will 
likely involve restructuring and reorganization.”  
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other unproductive practices. Yet, BPR has not changed some of the common complaints, 
such as the difficulty of finding public officials and administrators at their work places 
(particularly given the countless meetings and workshops they have to attend in a regular 
basis) and the slow pace of responsiveness to citizens’ needs. As to the general 
effectiveness of BPR, Tesfaye and Atkilt (Ibid., vi) concluded that, despite the variation 
among the four case-study organizations they examined46, they found promising results 
with these organizations in meeting their BPR objectives, such as improved efficiency, 
mission effectiveness, transparency and minimizing corruption. Similarly, Elsa (2012) at 
the World Bank attested also to some of BPR’s accomplishments, which included 
simplifying previously cumbersome work processes, setting service delivery standards, 
creating one-stop shops for related services, and establishing complain handling 
mechanisms in 404 regional and over 19,600 district offices throughout the country.  
 Building administrative capacity at the school level usually requires strengthening 
the training of those who take responsibilities in leadership and management posts, 
especially school principals, vice-principals and PTA officials. As to the training and 
assignment of school administrators, the REB and the WEO divide and coordinate the 
responsibilities between them. While the WEO is responsible for assigning principals 
(and teachers and other school personnel), the REB provides them with trainings in both 
pre-service and in-service forms. However, as many teachers and some of the principals 
pointed out, the training opportunities have been limited and the selection process needs 
to be expanded and made more transparent. In its previous evaluation, the MOE (2006: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 They are Ethiopian Revenue and Customs Authority (ERCA), Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs 
(MoLSA), Commerical Bank of Ethiopia (CBA), and Development Bank of Ethiopia (DBE).  
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43) acknowledged the problem of appointing principals without due consultation with 
local stakeholders, with possible negative consequences, including non-acceptability of 
the newly appointed incumbents, and lack of adequate preparations and trainings. It is 
evident that some of the interviewed principals and vice-principals have taken courses on 
educational leadership and management from Addis Ababa University and regional 
universities, but still a large number of others are yet to benefit from the training 
programs.  
 Given the increasing demands for building the capacities of school administrators 
and supervisors, the MOE has developed several initiatives such as the Leadership and 
Management Program (LAMP), which offers part-time and full-time university courses 
in planning and management leading to a diploma and beyond. According to MOE 2012 
reports (cited in DFID 2012: 7), 4,400 primary and secondary supervisors and directors 
have undertaken short term training through the LAMP, which moderately exceeds the 
target of 4,000 set for 2012. However, these courses have been criticized for being “too 
theoretical and lacking trainers who have the techniques to transmit skills, not simply 
information” (Joshi and Verspoor 2013: 135).  
 Moreover, since 2010, the need for more training opportunities have been 
highlighted through the latest ESDP, through which the MOE upgraded the qualification 
of school directors and supervisors, from certificate to diploma for first cycle primary 
grade (1-4), from diploma to degrees for second cycle primary school (5-8) and from 
degree to master level for secondary school (9-12). As Table 4.3 shows, the large 
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majority of principals and vice principals in the visited schools had college degrees as of 
2011/12 and of those who did not, many were in the process of obtaining one.  
 
Table 4.3 Educational Qualifications of Administrative Staff at Sampled Primary Schools 
 
Source: Field Data 2011/12.  
 
 As decentralization deepens further to the school level, PTA leaders and other 
representatives of the local community, either in the form of School Board (SB) or 
School Development Committee (SDC), may need some kind of training that would 
enable them to better participate in school management and oversight. As indicated 
earlier, while PTAs’ (in collaboration with KETB) mobilization efforts in the majority of 
the school visited have strengthened the relationship between schools and the local 
community, their abilities to understand and take part in school planning, financing, and 
monitoring have been minimal. Donor supported programs such as BESO and General 




















Mekelle A. Yohannes 1 - 1 1 1 2 3 
 Adi Haki 2 1 3 - - - 3 
 Ayder 1 2 3 - - - 3 
Samre Samre 2 - 2 - - - 2 
 Gijet 2 - 2 - - - 2 
 Kisanet 2 - 2 - - - 2 
Hawassa Tabor  2 1 3 1 - 1 4 
 Gebeya Dar 2 1 3 - - - 3 
 Hayk   2*   1* 3 - - - 3 
Aleta W. Shaicha  1 1 2 2 - 2 4 
 Gidewo 3    1* 4 - - - 4 
 Runja Wicho - - - 2 1 3 3 
 Total (All) 20 8 28 6 2 8 36 
*Unable to verify degree certification.   
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capacities at the school and community levels. In order for them to be meaningful and 
sustainable though, they may need to be expanded further, with the goal of enhancing 
peoples’ sense of ownership over these programs.  
 
4.4 Fiscal Decentralization 
 In addition to the political and administrative dimensions, decentralization 
reforms usually entail the transfer of fiscal or financial decision-making power and 
resources from central to lower levels of governments. Fiscal decentralization has also 
been at the core of Ethiopian decentralization reforms, and reflected in the federal and 
regional constitutions, proclamations and policy documents. The specific objectives of 
fiscal decentralization mentioned in the respective constitutions include the need to: a) 
devolve fiscal decision-making power to lower tiers of government, b) enable regional 
and woreda governments/administrations to provide standard services in accordance to 
their functional assignments, c) narrow the horizontal fiscal gap and ensure horizontal 
equalization, and d) promote efficiency in the allocation of financial resources (World 
Bank 2010: 14).   
 As is the case in many other decentralization processes, the extent of fiscal 
decentralization can be examined by looking at four factors that constitute the fiscal 
arrangements between different tiers of government, namely expenditure responsibilities, 
revenue sources, intergovernmental transfers and subnational borrowing (Litvack and 
Seddon 1999). In the next two sections, I examine the above three arrangements and 
practices to determine the degree of fiscal autonomy exercised by local governments to 
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deliver services, and the mechanisms of fiscal accountability available at the local and 
school levels.  
 
4.4.1 Legal Framework and Fiscal Autonomy  
 In the case of Ethiopian fiscal decentralization, the expenditure responsibilities 
and revenue sources between the central government and regional governments are 
defined in the federal Constitution. Article 52 of the Constitution and article 47 of revised 
TRS and SNNPRS Constitutions stated the powers and functions of regional 
governments include, inter alia, the authority to raise local revenues through taxes and 
duties reserved to each governments and administer their own budgets; formulate and 
execute economic, social and development plans; and administer land and other natural 
resources in accordance with federal laws. Similarly, regions have rights to grant similar 
powers and functions to local governments, as they deem necessary, through their 
legislations.  
 Although regional constitutions say little about expenditure and revenue 
assignments of lower levels of government, article 93 of SNNPRS Constitution gives 
power to woreda council to “insure the timely collection of land tax, agriculture income 
tax, agricultural products sales tax and other taxes and payments.” In recent years, some 
of the major regions, such as TRS and SNNPRS, have enacted proclamations spelling out 
some of the expenditure responsibilities of the different tiers of governments. But 
according to some observers, they are still lacking in specifics (Yilmaz and Venugopal 
2011: 453). 
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4.4.2 Expenditure Assignment  
 The expenditure responsibilities of sub-national governments are connected to 
their functional roles and duties discussed in the previous section. As Garcia and 
Rajkumar (2008:27) noted, since devolution of expenditure responsibilities began with 
the 1993/94 big push, involving the transferring of 45 percent of the overall government 
budget to the regions, regional spending has been growing at an annual average of 13 
percent. Likewise, the regional recurrent budget tripled during the decade after the big 
push from 2.3 billion to 7.9 billion and now accounts for 72 percent of the regional 
budget (Ibid.). This reveals that the regional governments (and local governments) bear 
greater burden of decentralized services, while the federal government still accounts for a 
large portion of the total expenditure. This is due primarily to the fact that large capital 
investment projects are carried out through federal agencies such as the Ethiopian Road 
Transport Authority, the Ministry of Defense, and the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development (Solomon 2008: 161).  
 According to a World Bank study (2010: 32), the share of the regional recurrent 
expenditure in general government recurrent expenditure (the combined federal and 
regional governments) rose also from 45 percent in 2003 to 62 percent in 2009, while the 
share of total regional expenditure to general government expenditure remained relatively 
constant at 40 percent during the same time. However, with regions performing federally 
delegated programs (e.g., Food Security, Public Sector Capacity Program, Productive 
Safety Net) that are only shown in the federal budget and financed through Special 
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Purpose Grants (SPG), the regionally executed spending would be close to 50 percent of 
total in 2009 (Ibid.: x).   
Table 4.4 Shares of Regional Expenditures in Total Government Expenditures (%)  
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Recurrent 45.2 43.1 48.0 54.1 56.6 61.6 62.1 
Capital 30.0 28.1 22.1 21.3 19.9 24.3 27.8 
 
Source: World Bank 2010. 
 
 As Table 4.4 lays out, the regional share of capital expenditure in the general 
government budget also follows similar patterns; regional spending has been growing in 
recent years from about 22 percent in 2005 to 28 percent in 2009, but with significant 
variations among regions, especially if Addis Ababa (known for its large urban projects) 
is included (Ibid.: 33). Similar to the trends in recurrent expenditure, regional capital 
spending on social services in the form of schools and hospitals accounted for the highest 
portion (40%) of total capital expenditure in 2009, followed by administrative/general 
services and economic services with 37 and 23 percent respectively (Ibid.).  
 Among social services, education, especially primary education, has taken the 
lion’s share of regional recurrent expenditure with an Average Annual Growth Rate 
(AAGR) of about 21 percent from 2005 to 2010 for both SNNPRS and TRS  (Tables 4.5 
and 4.6). This growth has been facilitated by significant external resources channeled to 
regions (and woredas) as additional federal grants on budget (reaching birr 1.8 billion in 
2008/9 or 27% of the total education budget), under the PBS program (MOE 2010b: 10). 
Like wise, due to significant dependency of regional capital budget on donor funding 
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(i.e., outside of treasury sources), the regional capital spending is more unpredictable than 
the recurrent spending, which is dominated by wages and salaries (Garcia and Rajkumar 
2008: 35).   
   
Table 4.5 Share of Education Budget out of the Total Regional Budget, SNNPRS 	  
Year  Region Budget  
Education Budget  Education  
Budget Share Recurrent  Capital  Total  
2005/6 1,710,600,000 517,897,200 89,765,500 607,662,700 35.52% 
2006/7 2,157,022,500 627,740,772 68,549,562 696,290,334 32.28% 
2007/8 3,084,302,742 787,568,041 81,894,284 869,462,325 28.19% 
2008/9 3,992,690,000 1,033,322,224 152,578,128 1,185,900,352 29.70% 
2009/10 5,013,710,445 1,108,799,349 175,626,306 1,284,425,655 25.62% 
2010/11 6,001,500,000 1,301,486,359 147,473,347 1,448,959,706 24.14% 
AAGR  28.76% 20.51% 16.24% 19.39% - 
 
Source: Data Collected from SNNPRS BOFED. 
 
 
Table 4.6 Share of Education Budget out of the Total Regional Budget, TRS  	  
Year  Region Budget  
Education Budget  Education  
Budget Share  Recurrent  Capital  Total  
2005/06 869,663,399 261,666,630 77,259,874 338,926,504 38.97% 
2006/07 1,026,068,986 335,367,633 59,787,053 395,154,686 38.51% 
2007/08 1,467,288,821 441,303,408 68,600,508 509,903,916 34.75% 
2008/09 1,961,837,462 476,890,652 44,072,879 520,963,531 26.55% 
2009/10 2,277,441,640 566,332,477 51,832,622 618,165,099 27.14% 
2010/11 3,119,256,349 744,639,259 81,472,141 826,111,400 26.48% 
AAGR  29.55% 23.61% 6.23% 20.02% - 
 
Source: Data Collected from TRS BOFED. 
 
 Despite a lack of detailed local governments’ expenditure responsibilities in 
regional constitutions and decrees, the proportion of public expenditure exercised by 
woredas have been growing since 2002 when regions began to make unconditional block 
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grant allocations to woredas. Prior to that “woredas developed budgets under close 
supervision of their zones, and would receive line-by-line detailed budgets from which 
they could not deviate to any significant degree. They had very little prior knowledge 
about the overall size of their budgets or of detailed line items” (Frank and Tassew 2005: 
27). Yet, as Figure 4.2 below demonstrates, the share of woreda expenditures in total 
regional expenditures averaged approximately 60 percent from 2003 to 2008 for the 
major four regions together, but with notable differences among regions (for instance, it 
accounted 52% for TRS and 77% for SNNPRS in 2003/4). Moreover, the decline in the 
woredas’ share in the combined regional budgets by about 5 percentage points from 
2006/7 to 2007/8 is believed to be the consequence of increased budget allocation to 
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Figure 4.2 Share of Woreda Expenditure in Regional Budget of Four Main Decentralized 
Regions (Amhara, Oromia, SNNPRS, and TRS) Combined 	  
 
Source: The World Bank 2009.  
 
 Figure 4.3 below shows, education budget also takes the lion’s share of woreda 
recurrent budget throughout the country. This reflects the high priority that education 
occupies at local and higher levels of governments. However, as previously mentioned, 
the financial discretion of local governments is constrained by limited financial resources 
available outside of the budget allocated for salaries and wages. For instance, according 
to the report by the MOE (2006), Mekelle City Administration spent 95.8 percent of its 
recurrent budget on salaries in 2005/6, while Seharti Samre woreda spent even more, 
amounting to 97.3 percent. Similarly, the World Bank (cited in UNICEF 2012: 63) 
reported that Woredas spent on average about 94 percent of their recurrent education 
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proportion of the budget going to wages, little is left for capital or non-salary recurrent 
expenditures such as in teaching materials and classroom equipment which are 
considered to be essential components of quality education (ibid.). The lack of capital 
investment also puts a heavy burden on community contributions to complement the 
budget shortfalls, particularly in poorer and rural woredas and schools.    
 
Figure 4.3 Share of Education in Woreda Recurrent Expenditure 
 
 
Source: MOE 2010b 
 
4.4.3 Divisions of Revenue Sources 
 In the Ethiopian system of fiscal decentralization, revenue assignments are 
divided between the central, regional and joint categories. Proclamation No. 33 of the 
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Constitution stipulate the revenue raising responsibilities of both the federal and regional 
governments; whereas the source of woreda revenues are determined by regional 
legislations. Article 52 of the Constitution confers to states (regions) all powers not 
exclusively given to the federal government alone or concurrently with the states.  
However, this so-called “residual law” of states does not seem to apply as far as taxation 
is concerned. Instead, Article 99 of the Constitution states that: “The House of Federation 
and the House of Peoples’ Representatives shall, in a joint session, determine by a two-
thirds majority vote on the exercise of powers of taxation which have not been 
specifically provided for in the Constitution.” In addition, Article 62 of the Constitution 
empowers the House of Federation (HOF) to determine the divisions of revenues derived 
from joint federal and regional tax sources and the subsidies (transfers) that the federal 
government provides to the regions. Based on the Federal Constitution, Table 4.7 outlines 
the major sources of revenues for central and regional governments. 
 
Table 4.7 Revenue Authority of Central and Regional Governments 	  
Central Government Regional Government   Concurrent 
 
  Custom duties, taxes and other 
charges on imports and exports 
 
  Income taxes on employees of the 
central government and international 
organizations 
 
  Personal income tax, profit, sales and 
excise taxes on enterprises owned by 
the central government 
 
  Taxes collected from national lottery 
and other games of chance 
 
  Income taxes collected from 
employees of the regional government 
and of private enterprises 
 
  Fees on land use 
 
  Taxes collected from incomes of 
private farmers and farmers incorporated 
in associations 
 















  Taxes on 
incomes from 
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  Taxes collected on income from air, 
rail and water transport activities 
 
  Taxes collected from rent of houses 
and properties owned by the central 
government 
 
  Fees and charges on licenses and 
services issued and rendered by central 
government 
 
  Taxes on central monopolies and 
stamp duties 
 
  Taxes on income from water transport 
services  
 
  Taxes from rent of houses and 
properties owned by regional 
government  
 
  Profit tax, income tax, and sales and 
excise taxes collected from enterprises 
owned by regional government 
 
  Income taxes derived from mining 
activities, royalties and land rentals 
 
  Fees and charges on use of forest 
resources, licenses and services issued 
and rendered by regional government 
 
large scale mining 
and all petroleum 
and gas operations 
and royalties 
 
Source: FDRE Constitution 1995 
 
 Although a considerable scope of expenditure assignments have been 
decentralized to regions and woredas, the revenue (tax) base of Ethiopia’s sub-national 
governments is considered to be much narrower and weak compared to the central 
government (Eshetu 1994; Meheret 2007; Solomon 2008; USAID 2010). This often leads 
to a mismatch (gap) between the revenue capacity of lower levels of governments and 
their expenditure responsibilities, or what commonly referred to as “vertical imbalance” 
in fiscal arrangements. The intergovernmental fiscal transfers (discussed in the next 
section) from the central government to regions and from regions to woredas are 
designed to lessen this vertical imbalance as well as the disparities in revenue generating 
capacities between the different subnational governments (i.e. “horizontal imbalance”) in 
the country.  
 The inability of most regions to raise sufficient revenue to meet their expenditure 
needs, and therefore heavy reliance on central transfers, is believed to have a negative 
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effect on the fiscal autonomy of subnational governments as well as on the delivery of 
basic services (USAID 2010; World Bank 2010). In the current estimates, regional 
governments are able to cover on average less than 20 percent of their expenditure from 
their own revenues; this means that more than 80 percent of the regional budget is 
covered by Federal Block Grant (FBG) transfers (Table 4.8). Woredas are even more 
dependent on regional subsidy for their expenditure needs, accounting on average over 80 
to 90 percent of their budgets (Meheret 2007; Tegegne 2009). In most regions, the 
revenues collected by the woredas are being offset from the total regional subsidy, while 
municipalities (such as Mekelle and Hawassa) retain all of their own revenues.  
Table 4.8 Allocations of Revenue Sources Between Levels of Government  
  
 
Source: The World Bank 2013; MOFED 2010.  
 
 In regard to horizontal fiscal imbalance, there are also significant variations 
among states according to their level of development, expenditure needs, and capacities 
to generate their own revenues. For example, according to a report by the House Of 
Federation (HOF 2007), in 2006/7, TRS generated 194. 9 million birr out of 695.7 
million birr (28% of the total expenditure) from its own revenue, while SNNPRS own 
revenue was 262.8 million birr (16.2%) of the total expenditure. The horizontal 
 
 
Tier of Government 
Revenue  % 
2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 Average 
Central 77.5 79.9 81.6 79.9 
Regional  12.4 7.5 6.2 8.3 
Woreda 10.2 12.6 12.3 11.8 
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imbalance becomes even more pronounced when adding into the mix the least developed 
regions, such as Gambella and Somali, with much weaker capacities to cover their 
expenditure needs out of own revenues (accounting only to 7.9 and 6.1% respectively).  
 In recent years, the main regions of Ethiopia have been drafting revenue sharing 
mechanisms with their woredas, which take into consideration the differences in 
capacities and needs that exist among them. Woredas have also been given more 
incentives in expanding their tax bases and left to keep at least part of their revenues and 
surpluses (if any) without adversely affecting their regular transfers from regions or any 
other funding they receive from non-treasury sources.   
 The sources of revenues for general education come mainly from government 
block grants (and school grants since 2009) provided through woredas to schools, as well 
as community contributions and donor funding. While school fees have been abolished 
for primary and secondary schools since the late 1990s, cost-sharing mechanisms have 
been established for financing upper secondary (preparatory) and higher levels of 
education. As mentioned previously, the degree of community contributions varies from 
schools to schools, but on average these contributions constitute between 10 percent and 
20 percent of woreda budget (Garcia and Rajkumar 2008). The contributions usually 
cover the shortfalls on school capital budgets, and are often used for building 
constructions and school materials. In addition, the MOE (2006: 30) indicated that private 
investment in primary schools has been growing considerably in recent years (accounting 
about 4.8 percent of the total revenue in 2004/5), reducing the financial burden from the 
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government and allowing the government to expand education to the most needy areas 
and groups. 	  
4.4.4 Intergovernmental Transfers: Bridging the Fiscal Gap 
 In Ethiopia, intergovernmental transfers or otherwise known as “block grants” are 
the principal ways of dealing with fiscal imbalance and regional disparities, as well as the 
major source of financing for basic social services. According to Article 7 (2) of 
Proclamation No. 33 of 1992 (TGE 1992b), transfers include the following objectives:  
a)  promoting social services and economic development of the national/regional 
 governments,  
b)  accelerating the development of the neglected and forgotten areas,  
c)  narrowing down the gap in per capita income between regions,  
d)  supporting projects that help control negative externalities,  
e)  encouraging foreign currency earning projects and,  
f)  undertaking other projects of national interest.  
 
 Likewise, Article 89 (2) of the Federal Constitution mandates the government 
(central or regional) to “ensure that all Ethiopians get equal opportunities to improve their 
economic conditions and to promote equitable distribution of wealth among them.” 
Moreover, No. 4 of the same article obliges governments “to provide special assistance to 
Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples least advantaged in economic and social 
development.”    
 Intergovernmental transfers (IGT) generally take the form of general purpose 
(unconditional) grants and specific purpose (conditional) grants. General purpose grants 
are often used as block grants “to provide broad support in a general area of sub national 
expenditures (e.g. education) while allowing recipients discretion in allocating the funds 
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among specific uses” (Shah 2007: 25). Specific purpose grants, on the other hand, “are 
given to fulfill the goals of national priorities which otherwise could not be attained by 
other tiers of government due to spillover effects and that encourage performance 
improvement” (World Bank 2010: 22). Unlike block grants, specific purpose grants do 
not allow subnational governments discretion on allocating funds to activities or sectors 
other than those prioritized by the central government. 
 Currently, transfers from the federal government to Ethiopia’s ten regions 
(excluding Addis Ababa, which is self-sufficient) occur through block grants and specific 
purpose grants, while regional transfers to woredas take place through block grants. Since 
the mid-1990s, the federal block grants to regions have been transferred based on 
prearranged formula and determined by the HOF. The details of the transfer formula have 
been modified several times in the last fifteen years in order to make them “more 
efficient and equitable” (MOFED 2009:8). Before the recent changes in 2007 and again 
in 2009, the grant distribution formula generally followed what is known as “the basic 
need approach” or the “three parameter” block grant (World Bank 2007; 2010). For 
instance, from 2003/04 to 2006/7, the formula took into consideration population size 
(65%), level of development or expenditure needs variables (25%) and revenue 
generating capacity and output performance (10%) of each region (Solomon 2008:19).  
 Although most of the formula used before 2007 attempted to address both the 
expenditure needs and revenue generating capacities of regional governments, the 
relative weight assigned to each of these categories has been a point of contention and 
criticism. According to the World Bank (2009: 16), some of the concerns include: (i) the 
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subjective nature of the variables used and the weights assigned to them in all the above 
three parameters, (ii) the priorities given to capital needs without adequate attention to 
recurrent expenditure, and (iii) the use of actual rather than potential revenue. In addition, 
the lack of update data needed to measure most of the variables in the above three 
parameters was believed to be one of the major problem as well.  
 The 2007 and 2009 grant formulas were thought to have made improvements by 
addressing some of the shortcomings of the previous formulas, such as using the most 
recent data available, giving more emphasis on the principle of fiscal equalization (i.e. 
per capita calculation for both expenditure needs and revenue capacities), and the 
“neutrality” of regions’ tax generating efforts (MOFED 2009: 9). Both of these recent 
formulas were found to be instrumental in narrowing some of the fiscal imbalances 
among regions while at the same time making the grant amounts more predictable. The 
2009 formula additionally made sure that the so-called emerging regional governments 
(Afar, Somali, Benishangul-Gumuz, and Gambella) would catch up in development with 
the rest of the regions by reserving special percentage points as additional shares out of 
the total distribution pool (Abiy 2009; HOF 2009).  
 Since the woreda decentralization, regions have started to transfer block grants to 
local governments adopting similar formulas used by the federal government with some 
minor changes. For instance, regions such as Oromia and SNNPRS have employed the 
“unit cost” (“needs based-performance oriented”) approach to make block grant transfers 
to woredas (and zones) where the expenditure needs of each woreda were estimated by 
sectoral allocations, including education, health, agriculture, water, roads and 
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administrative costs (MOFED 2009: 9). In SNNPRS, this was also supported by a 
“performance agreement” signed by the region, zones and woredas. However, Latham 
(2012: 84-5) observed that one of the downsides to the unit cost approach was that it 
required an extensive amount of data that each woreda is expected to deliver so that the 
regions could use them to calculate and determine their allocation of block grants. He 
continued to point out that, after all, the woreda representatives do not exercise much 
discretion given that their budget is generally based on the amount disbursed in the 
previous year and there is little flexibility in the percentage of allocation that can be made 
across different sectors (Ibid.).  
 Similar to the federal subsidy to regions, the share of regional budgets transferred 
to woredas varies across regions, ranging from 52 to 81 percent in 2005/6, according to 
Garcia and Rajkumar (2008: 24).  Regions also differ on the extent in which they offset 
their transfers when woredas receive funds from aid donors or from own revenues 
(Yilmaz and Venugopal 2011; World Bank 2007). As previously noted, despite the full 
discretionary power of the woredas to spend block grants according to their own 
priorities and needs, their fiscal autonomy has been compromised by a heavy reliance on 
regional states and ad hoc special purpose grants and a limited scope to undertake capital 
expenditure which usually consisted of not more than 100, 000 birr (SIDA 2005; USAID 
2010).  
 In regard to sub-woreda finance, each Woreda council determines the overall 
budget through the Woreda Finance and Economic Development (WOFED) offices. As 
similar to other sectors, schools get block grants from the WOFED with the help of 
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KETBs and PTAs. According to the MOE’s 2002 Guidelines and the 2003 document on 
Financial, Technical, and Vocational Education and Training in Ethiopia, the proposed 
block grants from woredas to each school for non-salary running cost were determined as 
follows (Table 4.9).  
 
Table 4.9 Recommended Non-salary Recurrent Costs Per Pupil   
Grade Running Cost Per Student (annually) 
1-4 10 Birr 
5-8 15 Birr 
9-10 20 Birr 
11-12 50 Birr 
10+1 62 Birr 
10+2 84 Birr 
 
Source: MOE 2006.  
 
 In addition to block grants and community contributions, schools have been 
receiving school grants from the World Bank (on behalf of pooled donor partners) as part 
of GEQIP program. Launched in 2009/10, GEQIP has been providing additional financial 
resources to increase the non-salary recurrent expenditure at the school level (including 
ABE centers) so as to improve the overall quality of education in the country. According 
to the MOE’s (2012) Annual Review, the schools grant allocation for primary schools in 
2011/2 was 42. 50 birr per pupil and 55 birr at secondary level (a total of $65 million 
compared to $48.9 million the previous year). As the case in many of the observed 
schools, school grants are much higher than block grants, and the actual amount of both 
grants varied slightly (with inflation taken into account) from the general recommended 
costs or what the World Bank has indicated above. While dependence on external 
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funding for school grants often posed a challenge for education planners in regard to its 
long-term sustainability, there is some evidence pointing to an increase in additional 
government funding in educational block grants leveraged by school grants (MOE 2010: 
14). 
 
4.5 Budget Planning, Utilization and Reporting 
 The degree of fiscal autonomy local governments have to plan and allocate their 
budgets has an important bearing on how they are held accountable both by higher levels 
of governments and by their local constituents. For instance, the accountability of local 
governments to their constituencies can be enhanced if local governments are able to 
raise their own revenues through tax instruments (including the right to adjust tax rates) 
rather than relying on central transfers or bailouts that soften the budget constraints 
(Ahmad et al. 2005: 7). At the same time, designing and implementing IGT that is 
formula-based can influence the accountability of local governments for service delivery, 
particularly by providing predictability and encouraging own revenue properties of such 
fiscal flows (Ibid.).  
 Ethiopia’s legal framework for fiscal accountability of each level of government 
is stated in the various articles of the Federal Constitution (e.g. Article 51 and 52) as well 
as other policy documents, such as the government’s Civil Service Reform Program 
(CSRP) in 1996 and the Service Delivery Policy (SDP) adopted by the council of 
ministers in 2001. The SDP, for instance, emphasizes transparency and accountability in 
all spending agencies and institutions of government and the introduction of management 
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practices that enable service users to have full and accurate understanding of day-to-day 
operations and performances of these institutions (MOFED 2009: 6). Furthermore, since 
the start of decentralization reforms, the finance and economic offices in each levels of 
government are entrusted for the management as well as reporting and oversight of 
budgets within their jurisdictions.  
 As previously mentioned, the limited revenue base of sub-national governments 
and the large percentage of block grants used to cover recurrent expenditure usually leave 
little room for exercising fiscal flexibility and accountability. In the majority of the 
woredas visited, representatives spoke about not only the constant shortages of funding at 
the local level, but also the lack of personnel who understand the budgeting process, 
financial accounting and procurement matters. But, the same representatives also claimed 
that in almost all regional and woreda offices, and schools, inspection and auditing have 
been done on semi-annual or quarterly basis by the higher level authorities. The REB 
usually sends inspectors (or auditors) to WEO and the WEO inspects the offices at the 
kebele and school levels. In addition, budget reports are posted in many public offices 
and schools for people to see, although most ordinary people may not comprehend how 
the overall budget works and are unlikely to probe their policy makers and service 
providers for possible irregularities or misuse of funds.  
 The recent Woreda and City Government Benchmarking Surveys (WCBS), 
conducted by the government’s Ministry of Capacity Building and other collaborators 
(MCB 2010), revealed that the majority of local governments appeared to be making few 
improvements in the delivery of information on a number of items, including their 
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budgets (19% of citizens had this information in 2010, compared to 13% of them two 
years earlier), 47 strategic plans (22% compared to 17%), and decisions taken by the local 
council (18% compared to 10%). At the same time, the proportion of citizens who had 
information about council agenda was virtually unchanged (14% compared to 15%). The 
survey also indicated that further qualitative research is required to sort out the 
discrepancies between what woreda representatives claimed to have done in the Supply 
Side Survey (nearly all of them said they have disseminated this information) and the fact 
that less than a quarter of citizens knew their woreda budget.  
 In order to ameliorate the public’s difficulty in grasping the often-complex 
budgetary information and service delivery issues, the Ethiopian government has been 
undertaking various Financial Transparency and Accountability (FTA) mechanisms, such 
as the Budget Literacy Training (BLT) initiative. According the FTA Implementation 
Assessment Report (cited in World Bank 2013a: 20), BLT has been delivered for more 
than 230, 000 citizens throughout the country in all woredas and city administrations.  
 In addition to enhancing public access to fiscal information, several pilot projects 
have also been undertaken by government and donor initiatives with the aim of 
strengthening the sharing of information between regional and local government offices 
(and between local governments and schools). These included providing training for local 
civil servants in participatory planning and budgeting, bookkeeping and reporting, 
establishing internal and external auditing systems, developing benchmarks for service 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 The proportion of citizens who were aware of their woreda budget for TRS has improved from 14 
percent in 2008 to 25 percent in 2010, while the changes for SNNPRS were from 7 percent to 13 percent 
during the same time frame. However, the results for Oromia state, which showed an increase from 8 
percent to 100 percent, was appeared suspect by the survey analysts.    
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performances, and expanding the use of Information and Communication Technologies 
(ICT’s). 
 With regard to ICT, the MOFED offices at regional and woreda levels are 
currently using the Integrated Budget and Expenditure (IBEX) management system to 
disclose regional and local level budgets and service delivery information, and the 
WoredaNet, another government network, is operational in 600 woredas, according to the 
World Bank Report (2013a).  However, access to computers and Internet services 
(including lack of reliable electricity) remains a major problem in many of the visited 
local government offices and rural primary schools. For instance, the majority of WEOs 
have begun transferring financial and other data through electronic sources in recent 
years, though many of the primary schools still record this information by hand. This has 
often impeded these institutions from providing accurate and complete information on 
financial and other matters. Nevertheless, most of the interviewed government officials at 
the regional and local levels acknowledged the need for continued investment in ICT as 
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CHAPTER 5 	  
RESEARCH FINDINGS: IMPACTS OF DECENTRALIZATION 	  
 This chapter identifies and examines the potential impacts of decentralized 
primary education services on education outcomes in Ethiopia. As is similar to the 
empirical evidence presented in the introduction, the findings of this research suggest 
mixed effects of education decentralization on educational improvements. However, the 
Ethiopian case also presents an additional complexity associated with the ambiguous 
process of decentralization itself. This, in turn, poses a further challenge in identifying 
whether educational decentralization or something else may have impacted educational 
outcomes. Notwithstanding the problem related to disentangling the independent effects 
of decentralization, this study found that after the introduction of decentralized 
management of education by local governments in Ethiopia, there has been remarkable 
progress in expanding access and equitable primary education while significant problems 
remain in areas of efficiency and quality of education.  
 In the last two decades, the education sector in Ethiopia has undergone impressive 
expansion in formal schools, alternative basic education programs, and non-formal and 
adult education. The government of Ethiopia has long recognized that basic education 
through the decentralization of service delivery is an integral part of the nation’s 
accelerated and sustainable socio-economic development. They have also affirmed that 
this process is central to achieve other internationally agreed upon objectives such as the 
EFA targets, first endorsed in Jomtien Declaration in 1990.     
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 Benefiting from the increasing rate of economic growth and a peace dividend,48 in 
the last fifteen years, the government, with the support of development partners invested 
heavily in improving access to education. This included, among other things: reducing 
the opportunity cost of education (such as abolishing school fees), establishing the use of 
mother tongue as medium of instruction, increasing capital expenditure, hiring and 
training thousands of teachers and administrators, fostering community involvement and 
most importantly integrating previously marginalized groups, such as the rural poor, girls, 
and pastoral communities (Engel 2011: 4).  
 As previously mentioned, despite significant progress in the expansion of 
educational opportunities, this study also reveals significant challenges in key areas of the 
sector, including gender and regional inequalities, limited educational efficiency and 
weak student achievement results. The further devolution of educational responsibilities 
to the local government and school levels is expected to improve many of these 
challenges mentioned above. At the same time, it is crucial that the national and regional 
governments maintain their roles in setting education and training policies and standards 
and ensure their proper implementations at all levels of administration. 
 In the following sections, I assess decentralized education outcomes using 
common indicators of access, equity, efficiency, and quality of education that are also 
used by UNESCO and Ethiopia’s MOE. I assess the four local governments described in 
the previous chapter in order to compare and identify common patterns since the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 With the exception of the Ethio-Eritrean conflict of 1998-2000. 
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implementation of woreda decentralization in 2002 (and the years before whenever data 
are available).   
 
5.1 Educational Access and Equity  
 Ethiopia has made dramatic improvements in educational access and equity in 
recent years. Emerging from over fifteen years of civil war in 1991 and having had one of 
the lowest enrollment rates in the world (nearly two thirds of school age children were 
out of primary schools in the 1990s), Ethiopia is now well situated to reach universal 
primary education by 2015. The following three sub-sections investigate common 
indicators of educational access and equity.  
5.1.1 Gross and Net Enrollment Rates 
 When Ethiopia first launched its five-year Education Sector Development 
Program (ESDP) in 1997/98, the target was to increase the overall Gross Enrolment Ratio 
(GER) from 30 percent to 50 percent or to raise primary enrollment from 3.7 million 
(1995/96 target year) to 7 million (MOE 2005). By the end of ESDP I in 2001/02, the 
target was surpassed as enrollment reached 8.1 million, representing an average 
enrollment growth rate of 12.8 percent (Ibid). The growth trend continued during 
successive ESDPs, with annual average enrollment growth rate of 11.7 percent between 
2002/03 and 2004/05, and 8 percent between 2004/05-2008/09, reaching15.8 million 
enrollments in primary education in 2009/10 (MOE/ESAA 2013). Consequently, when 
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the latest ESDP IV began in 2010/11, the GER at the national level was 96.4 percent, 
which showed a 3 percent increase from the previous year (Figure 5.1).   
 
Figure 5.1 The Gross Enrollment Rate (GER): Primary Education (Grades 1-8) 
 
 
                 
Source: MOE/Education Statistics Annual Abstracts (ESAA) 1995-2013 
 
 
 As shown in Figure 5.2 below, the Net Enrollment Rate (NER), a more refined 
indicator of school and enrollment coverage, has also been increasing steadily, but it still 
remains lower than the GER since it excludes over-aged and under-age children. 
According to the most recent Ministry of Education (MOE) data, the NER in 2012/13 
stood at 85.9. This is an increase of 0.5 percent from the previous year where the NER 
totaled 85.4% and was 2.9 percentage points higher than in 2008/09 when it reached 
83%. At the same time, compared to the mid - and late - 1990s, the national NER 
Average Annual Growth Rate (AAGR) remained lower in recent years (under 2 percent 
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2005/06), indicating that the primary age structure is approaching the appropriate age 
(Engel 2011: 7). But, given a large number of late entrants as well as grade repeaters in 
primary schools, it may still take some time and a more sustained efforts to reach an NER 
of 100 percent.  
Figure 5.2 The Net Enrollment Rate (NER): Primary Education (Grades 1-8) 
 
  
             
Source: MOE/ESAA 1995-2013    
 
 At the same time, as Table 5.2 demonstrates, there are discrepancies in accounting 
for NER, since it is theoretically impossible to have more than a 100 percent for NER. In 
acknowledging the problem of inconsistencies between the census (population of school 
age) and enrollment data, the MOE has focused on improving capacity to collect “timely 
and systemic data” from all institutions and schools in the country and consequently 
enhance the general quality and reliability of the national Education Management 
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also hides large regional and woreda variations (Table 5.1). For instance, children from 
emerging or disadvantaged regions, such as Afar and Somali, and the remote woredas 
still face many obstacles to accessing primary education although they and other similar 
regions such as Benishangul Gumuz and Gambella have made substantial progress in 
recent years.  
 




  Grades   1-4 5-8 1-8 
Woredas / Zones Year Boys  Girls  Boys  Girls  Total 
Hawassa  2008/09 141.20 153.30 109.90 115.60 129.30 
  2009/10 122.10 130.60 98.30 100.80 112.40 
  2010/11 134.40 152.20 114.00 118.30 129.20 
  2011/12 128.30 142.90 111.80 121.20 125.70 
  2012/13 128.10 146.20 113.10 121.90 127.00 
Mekelle 2008/09 127.53 122.14 124.00 123.87 124.32 
  2009/10 108.03 99.57 107.78 107.77 105.82 
  2010/11 114.34 102.61 109.50 103.38 107.25 
  2011/12 134.00 121.16 130.57 116.71 125.24 
  2012/13 130.97 117.39 118.36 106.68 117.83 
Sidama  2008/09 145.20 135.30 74.50 52.60 104.70 
  2009/10 128.10 122.90 73.00 57.90 97.70 
  2010/11 131.20 123.70 74.40 60.90 99.70 
  2011/12 129.10 124.70 72.40 65.80 100.10 
  2012/13 132.20 126.60 68.90 63.10 100.00 
Seharti Samre 2008/09 112.25 122.72 44.85 56.84 85.71 
  2009/10 102.79 112.60 51.70 65.67 84.51 
  2010/11 107.08 109.74 59.11 74.84 88.80 
  2011/12 107.30 109.35 64.16 81.83 91.59 
  2012/13 110.78 109.70 81.18 101.96 94.82 
 
 Source: SNNPRS and TRS ESAA 2009-2013 
 *Sidama zone is used instead of Aleta Wendo woreda since the local data is not available. Aleta   
 Wendo woreda is situated within Sidama zone. Note that total 1-8 GER and NER are derived   
 from enrollment numbers and do not reflect average of GER and NER from Grades 1-4 and 5-8   
 respectively.    
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Grades 1-4 5-8 1-8 
Woredas / Zones Year Boys Girls Boys Girls Total 
Hawassa 2008/09 89.00 87.60 66.50 70.20 101.20* 
 
2009/10 80.20 82.20 67.70 69.70 95.30 
 
2010/11 88.40 88.50 71.90 76.50 101.80 
 
2011/12 90.80 93.70 75.00 79.40 101.70 
 
2012/13 92.50 95.60 76.30 79.80 102.00 
Mekelle 2008/09 97.67 95.99 86.73 88.88 99.32 
 
2009/10 86.87 81.90 81.53 80.60 88.81 
 
2010/11 88.80 84.51 76.26 75.18 87.37 
 
2011/12 107.99 101.82 90.20 85.46 102.94 
 
2012/13 101.71 105.16 87.18 82.41 100.46 
Sidama 2008/09 107.70 101.10 51.50 38.20 94.40 
 
2009/10 96.80 92.40 53.40 44.20 88.40 
 
2010/11 104.40 97.40 56.20 47.40 91.40 
 
2011/12 105.70 101.00 56.00 52.10 92.40 
 
2012/13 111.40 105.90 54.80 51.20 93.10 
Seharti Samre 2008/09 93.76 104.91 50.00 62.30 79.86 
 
2009/10 86.69 98.94 41.59 55.68 79.49 
 
2010/11 90.16 95.09 48.18 64.49 83.97 
 
2011/12 87.76 93.64 51.37 67.75 85.10 
 
2012/13 100.82 103.23 61.75 77.17 91.03 
 
Source: SNNPRS and TRS ESAA 2009-2013. *According to SNNPRS education abstract (2010/11), 
the reason for NER more than 100 percent “may either be an inevitable error in population projection,  
age-heaping on the part of children or inter-regional migration.” Mekelle, Sidama and Seharti Samre  
also reported NER exceeding 100 percent. 
 
 
 A wide disparity between the enrollment rates between the first cycle (Grades 1-
4) and second cycle (Grades 5-8) of primary education can also be observed both in the 
national and subnational levels. At the national level, for instance, the NER in 2008/9 
was 88.7 percent in first cycle and only 44 percent in the second cycle. Over the same 
year, the NER for TRS and SNNPRS in the first cycle were 103 percent and 95.5 percent 
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respectively, while they scored 68.5 percent and 48.0 percent in the second cycle of 
primary school. As the table above also indicates, the NER scores at the local levels 
follow similar patterns with the national and regional scores. For example, between 2009 
and 2013, the average NER for the Sidama zone was 129.9 for the first cycle and 66.4 
percent for second cycle, while for Seharte Samre woreda, they were 102.6 and 68.2 
percent respectively.  
 
5.1.2 Number of Schools 
 The rapid expansion of enrollment in primary education was also accompanied by 
the increase in the construction of schools throughout the country. According to the MOE 
data shown in Figure 5.3 below, the number of schools in operation increased by about 
22 percent from 1995/96 to 2000/01 and about 71 percent from 2001/02 to 2006/07. Even 
the most recent years have seen a rapid growth of more than 30 percent from 23, 354 
schools in 2007/08 to 30, 534 schools in 2012/13. The vast majority of these new primary 
schools (more than 80% of them) have been built in rural areas. In many of the woredas 
visited, kids can find a primary school (or Alternative Basic Education [ABE] center) 
within three to five kilometer distance and the gap between the rural and urban areas has 
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Source: MOE/ESAA 1996-2013 
 
 
5.1.3 Gender Parity and Rural/Urban Ratio   
 In addition to improvements in expanding enrollment and primary schools, the 
government has given greater attention to educational equity in recent years, particularly 
with regards to gender and rural/urban disparities. Subsequent ESDPs have promoted 
educational access to women and girls, and enhanced awareness of girls’ education in 
local communities (MOE 2005). While the construction of more primary schools reduced 
the distance to schooling for girls and boys, there were also other initiatives introduced 
by the government that contributed to the progress in girls’ participation. These include: 
making schools friendlier for girls by constructing separate bathroom facilities for boys 
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establishing girls clubs; and providing tutorial, guidance, and counseling services 
especially for female students (Ibid). Thus, as a result of the aforementioned initiatives 
and other undertakings, girls’ enrollment has dramatically improved in the last two 
decades or so reaching 92.4 percent GER in 2012/13 (92.9 % in 2011/12 and 93.3% in 
2010/11). Compared to GER for boys in the same year (98.2 percent) and the previous 
two years with 97.9% and 99.5% respectively, there still remained significant gaps. Yet, 
the decrease in gender gaps are even more significant when looking at the long-term 
changes, such as differences of more than 50 percent in 1994/95 (31.7 % for boys and 
20.4 %for girls) to about 40 percent in 2001/02  (71.7% and 51.2% for boys and girls 
respectively) and to about 7 percent difference in 2008/9 (97.6% for boys and 90.7% for 
girls).  
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 As Figure 5.4 above demonstrates, the Gender Parity Index (GPI), which shows 
the ratio of female to male GER49 in primary education, has risen from 0.7 in 1999 to 
0.84 in 2005/06 and from 0.87 in 2006/07 to 0.94 in 2012/13. Five out of eleven regional 
states in the country now score over the national average in GPI and among them Tigray, 
Afar, Amhara, Somali and Addis Ababa have already reached gender parity (more than 
0.97). Yet, some states such as SNNPRS, Harari and Benishangul Gumuz have a long 
ways to go in narrowing the gender gap in primary education.  
 The gap between urban and rural areas - another proxy for equity in educational 
access - has also narrowed significantly in primary education as more and more schools 
have been built and ABE centers established across the rural landscape (where more than 
80% of Ethiopians live). Other factors, such as school fee abolition, the school feeding 
program, the increase in educational spending, new curriculum developments (including 
the use of mother tongue), increased community participation, and redeployment, training 
and hiring of a large number of primary teachers may have also complemented the 
process of rural expansion. As Figure 5.5 below shows, the disparities between urban and 
rural enrollment have been rapidly closing; 85.5 percent of primary enrollment (regular, 
evening and ABE) in 2009/10 was accounted for by rural areas while 19.5 percent was 
accounted for by urban. However, the situation is reverse in the secondary (9-10) 
education, with urban enrollment at 88.8 percent and rural enrollment at 11.2 percent 
(MOE/ESAA 2010).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 The value of GPI = 1 signifies a situation of equality, while GPI = 0 indicates highest disparity. 
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 Figure 5.5 also highlights that among those who enrolled in primary school, the 
proportion of girls was lower than boys both in urban and rural areas. At the same time, 
as is true with GPI patterns, the gender gap appears to be closing more in the urban than 
the rural setting.  
 




Source: MOE/ESAA 2000-2013. 
 
 
5.2 Efficiency in Primary Education  
 With the massive expansion of enrollment in recent years, the efficient use of 
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government. Although efficiency and quality concerns are highly interrelated, internal 
efficiency (“output efficiency”) 50 of educational system can usually be measured by 
looking at four important indicators: Pupil-Teacher Ratio (PTR), Pupil-Section Ratio 
(PSR), student dropout and repetition rates. While the national aggregate levels of these 
indicators may reflect the general direction of educational efficiency, the lower levels at 
the woreda and school levels (depending on available and reliable data) can show a better 
picture of variations within the country.  
 
5.2.1 Pupil-Teacher and Pupil-Section Ratios (PTR and PSR) 
 Generally speaking, lower PTR is considered a better outcome, since students in 
small class have a better opportunities to interact with each other and receive individual 
support from their teachers, thereby improving the quality/efficiency of student’s learning 
(MOE/ESAA 2013). On the other hand, very low PTR may indicate inefficiency through 
under-utilization of teachers (Ibid). The MOE’s minimum national standard for PTR is 
currently set for 50 for primary and 40 for secondary school levels. 
 
Table 5.3 PTR and PSR (National, TRS and SNNPRS) 
 
Region TRS SNNPRS National 
Ratio PTR PSR PTR PSR PTR PSR  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Internal efficiency can be defined as “… the ability (of the education system) to educate the greatest 
number of students who have entered the system in a given year, in the shortest time and with the least use 
of financial resources…” (IIEP/UNESCO 1994:4). Whereas, external efficiency of an education system is 
about the private and social benefit derived from investment from education (Psacharopoulos and Patrinos 
2002).  
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1995/96 47 56 49 65 37 53 
1998/99 55 62 59 72 51 63 
2001/02 69 65 66 80 63 73 
2004/05 48 54 67 74 66 69 
2007/08 46 46 71 73 57 62 
2010/11 42 45 59 67 51 57 
2012/13 41 41 54 59 50 54 
 
Source: MOE/ESAA 1996-2013 
 
 
 As shown in Table 5.3 above, there have been two patterns in PTR at the national 
level. The first indicates a steady increase from 37:1 in 1995/06 to 66:1 in 2004/05, and 
the second displays a decreasing trend from 66:1 in 2004/5 to 50:1 in 2012/13. Although 
a major recruitment and training of teachers happened immediately after woreda 
decentralization, these efforts have not kept pace with the massive increase in enrollment. 
In most of the schools visited, teachers criticized the increasing overutilization of 
teachers marked by heavy teaching loads and large class sizes they are assigned to teach 
that are far from optimal learning environments.  
 
Table 5.4 PTR and PSR Sampled Local Governments 
 
Local 
Govt.  Hawassa  Mekelle Sidama S. Samre 
Ratio PTR PSR PTR PSR PTR PSR PTR PSR 
Grades 1-4 5-8 1-4 5-8 1-4 5-8 1-4 5-8 1-4 5-8 1-4 5-8 1-4 5-8 1-4 5-8 
2008/09 52 50 61 70 37 44 42 53 85 88 77 83 49 42 47 46 
2009/10 37 40 53 58 40 47 40 49 65 65 68 76 36 32 44 47 
2010/11 44 41 53 58 35 35 40 49 65 59 69 68 48 45 44 47 
2011/12 37 38 49 57 57 52 41 47 65 50 69 67 48 46 47 48 
2012/13 38 36 50 56 58 44 41 44 68 44 69 61 43 43 38 43 
 
Source: TRS/ESAA and SNNPRS/ESAA 2009-2013 
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 Unlike the national levels, the PTR at the local levels (Table 5.4) does not show 
any distinguishable patterns, as some areas scored higher than the national average (e.g. 
Mekelle and S. Samre in TRS and Hawassa in SNNPRS) and others below it (e.g. Sidama 
among the sample areas and other zones/woredas in SNNPRS and in other regional 
states, such as Somalia and Oromia). This implies that regions and sub-regional entities 
are at different levels of efficiency when utilizing their teachers both at the first cycle and 
second cycle primary schools. The national figure showed promising trends in recent 
years reaching the minimum acceptable standard in 2012/13.  
 The PSR (also known as Student Section Ratio [SSR]) – another efficiency 
indicator – has also shown improvements in the last decade and a half both at the national 
and regional levels, although with regional and local differences. In Ethiopia, there are 
numerous double-shift schools (about 26.5 percent at the primary level in 2010/11, 
according to MOE) where classrooms are shared among groups of students who sit and 
move from class to class together to attend instructions. Therefore, a “class” is not quite 
the same as a “classroom” and PSR is not equivalent to Pupil Classroom Ratio (PCR).  
Similar to a pattern in PTR, the national and regional PSR showed a reversal from the 
previous deterioration starting after 2001/02 (for PTR, it was after 2004/5). The most 
recent national PSR at 54:1 is considered closer to the minimum target set for ESDP IV at 
55:1, indicating a better utilization of resources; however, it is still far from an ideal 
environment for student-teacher interactions or for quality teaching and learning. At the 
same time, as the sampled regional and local governments indicated, there were vast 
differences in PSR ratios for primary education (grades 1-8), ranging from 65:1 for 
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Sidama zone (59:1 for the whole region) to 40.5:1 to Samre woreda (41:1 for the whole 
region) in 2012/13. 
 
5.2.2 Repetition and Dropout Rates 
 In a given academic year, a student is faced with three directions: promotion, 
repetition or dropout. Promotion indicates enrollment of new students in a given grade 
who have successfully completed their previous grade (SNNPRS/ESAA 2009/10). 
Repetition and dropout rates are usually used to measure the efficiency of the education 
system in utilizing available resources and time to produce graduates of a specific 
education cycle. While repeating a grade means utilizing more resources than allocated to 
each student, leaving a school (dropout) before completing a particular cycle or stage of 
education is also waste of societal resources (MOE/ESAA 2011/12).   
 In the current Ethiopian education policy, promotion (also known as automatic 
promotion) is based on students’ continuous assessment results for the first three grades 
of primary education; however, repeaters in these grades are still being reported as 
repeaters (at least until all schools are on board) and the rates are considered higher than 
officially expected (Ibid). Furthermore, in Ethiopia, the term “readmit” is used to 
characterize any student not repeating within one year, and differentiated from those who 
repeat the same grade the next year after failing the year-end examination. Since 
readmitted students are not included in the calculation of repetition rate, the repetition 
rate is considered artificially low according to international standards, while dropout rates 
remain artificially high ((ibid). According to the World Bank (2005), the distinction 
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between repetition and readmission is designed to help educators identify two factors 
associated with grade repetition: inefficiency in the teaching process itself, and demand-
side constraints (e.g., poverty, parents’ attitude towards education, and other socio-
cultural factors), which cause students to quit schooling before the end of the school year. 
 
Figure 5.6 Repetition Rate (National, TRS, SNNPRS) 	  
 
Source: MOE/ESAA 2000-2013.  
 The aggregate national repetition rates among primary students show alternating 
trends, oscillating between 3.7 percent and 9.9 percent averages during the period 
covered in the Figure 5.6 above. However, repetition rates are relatively higher in some 
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time, while other regions such as TRS continuously scored lower rates than the national 
average. In addition, the gender gap in completion rates appears to have narrowed in both 
national and regional reports, while the level of repetition remained generally higher for 
boys than girls in most of the periods between 2001/02 and 2011/12. 
 
Figure 5.7 Repetition Rate: Sampled Local Governments 
 
 
Source: TRS/ESAA and SNNPRS/ESAA 2008-2013. 
 
 As shown in Figure 5.7, the local repetition rates in recent years have also 
followed similar alternating patterns as the regional and national ones. Significant 
reduction of repetition rates were reported in the majority of sampled local governments 
in 2008/9 and again in 2011/12, compared to their previous years respectively. Given the 
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were more significant than differences between urban and rural students. For instance, 
Mekelle city and Samre woreda in TRS have mostly maintained lower averages than the 
city of Howassa and Sidama zone in SNNPRS. At the same time, though the urban/city 
differences are not straightforward across regions, when it comes to the rates within most 
regions, the urban zones/woredas slightly performed better than their rural counterparts 
(e.g. the five year average rate for Mekelle at 1.9 was better than Samre at 4.2; and 
Hawassa had 6.8 average compared to 8.3 for Sidama over the same period).  
 In regard to specific grades, the repetition rates for the first grade have 
significantly improved partly because of the policy of automatic promotion and 
continuous assessment. However, some teachers expressed concerns about the pressure to 
pass students to the next grade without due preparation, which, they asserted, only shifts 
the underlying learning problems to the later grades. They also pointed out that the 
system of self-contained classes in the first cycle primary school (1-4), where the same 
teacher teaches all subjects to a group of students, also exacerbates the differences in 
levels of learning among students. Also related to efficiency and quality concerns, 
repetition rates at the end of primary education (grade 8) tend to be higher than in all the 
previous grades. A significant factor to this is the national policy that requires students 
who fail the Primary School Leaving Certificate Examination (PSLCE) to repeat the 
grade before retaking the examination. 
 Besides repetition rate, the proportions of students who leave school before the 
end of their educational cycle (dropouts) also affect the efficiency of student flow and 
thus the whole education system. Dropout rates normally vary from grade to grade, but, 
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as can be observed from Table 5.5 below, rates tend to be consistently higher in the first 
grade of primary education. For instance, at the national level, 22.7 percent students in 
grade 1, enrolled in the year 2011/12, left school before reaching grade 2 in 2012/13. The 
rate is even higher in SNNPRS where 32.2 percent 1st graders left school in 2011/12 
before completing the school year. Likewise, in both regional and national averages, 
more boys dropped out than girls between the year 2005/06 and 2011/12 (except in few 
regions such as Somali and Gambella where girls dropout rates are still higher than boys). 
Over the same time, the national and regional primary school (1-8) dropout averages 
were much lower compared to the first grade but they are still considered higher 
(reaching 16.1% in 2011/12) by global standards. Yet, in both cases, there are no 
identifiable trends that could be observed longitudinally, with the exception of a 
significant gap between the two sampled regions.   
 
Table 5.5 Grade 1 and Grades 1-8 Dropout Rates: National and Sampled Regions 
 
    Grade 1 Grade 1-8 
Year  
Country / 
Region  Male  Female All Male  Female All 
2005/06 National 20.3 19.7 20.1 12.6 12.1 12.4 
  TRS 10.9 10.2 10.6 5.9 5.7 5.8 
  SNNPRS 19.2 17.3 18.4 9.1 10.0 9.5 
2007/08 National 24.1 21.6 22.9 15.9 13.2 14.6 
  TRS 11.5 9.1 10.3 11.0 7.5 9.3 
  SNNPRS 20.8 19.8 20.3 12.4 11.5 12.0 
2009/10 National 20.4 19.2 19.9 13.3 13.5 13.4 
  TRS 11.3 11.1 11.2 10.5 8.7 9.6 
  SNNPRS 23.3 23.0 23.2 13.3 14.5 13.8 
2011/12 National 23.4 22.0 22.7 16.2 16.0 16.1 
  TRS 9.2 5.9 7.6 9.9 6.3 8.1 
  SNNPRS 32.5 31.9 32.2 20.4 21.3 20.9 
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Source: TRS/ESAA and SNNPRS/ESAA 2006-2013.  
 
 




Woreda Grade Gender 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 
Howassa Grade 1 Male 23.2 31.4 - 29.3 23.1 
    Female 21.3 33.1 - 28.1 25.4 
    All 22.2 32.3 - 28.7 24.3 
  Grade 1-8 Male  2.8 16.4 - 9.1 3.2 
    Female 4.6 20.0 - 9.2 5.9 
    All 3.7 18.3 - 9.1 4.6 
Mekelle Grade 1 Male 1.6 10.5 1.7 -9.0 7.1 
    Female 5.1 5.9 2.2 -9.7 7.1 
    All 3.3 8.2 2.0 -9.4 7.1 
  Grade 1-8 Male  -1.9 5.7 -6.8 -21.4 3.2 
    Female -2.7 2.8 -4.4 -21.2 0.8 
    All -2.3 4.3 -5.6 -21.3 2.0 
Sidama Grade 1 Male 29.8 36.3 28.0 36.9 40.7 
    Female 25.9 34.7 27.3 32.8 39.5 
    All 28.0 35.5 27.7 35.0 40.1 
  Grade 1-8 Male  16.0 25.6 12.4 23.0 25.3 
    Female 15.0 26.6 14.8 19.8 26.8 
    All 15.6 26.1 13.5 21.5 25.0 
S. Samre Grade 1 Male 14.8 19.4 7.6 11.5 14.0 
    Female 6.4 16.4 6.6 8.2 12.3 
    All 10.6 17.9 7.1 9.9 13.2 
  Grade 1-8 Male  13.1 12.7 10.6 11.4 9.4 
    Female 11.0 10.6 10.2 7.6 8.3 
    All 12.0 11.7 10.4 9.4 8.9 
 
Source: TRS/ESAA and SNNPRS/ESAA 2008-2013. 
Note that negative dropout rates such as in Mekelle reflect inconsistencies in grade specific enrollment data 
or large number of lateral entry in grade 1 and other grade levels.   
 
 
 The dropout rates at the local government levels (Table 5.6) also reflect similarly 
irregular patterns, with the differences, higher between the regions than between rural and 
urban areas. The high dropout rate, especially in the first grade, has been considered a 
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major problem of inefficiency in the country’s education system. The authorities widely 
indicated that the combination of economic and socio-cultural factors as well as those of 
school related ones as potential causes for high dropout in the country’s schools. These 
factors include: low household income, parent’s high rates of illiteracy, demand for child 
labor, overage or late entry, pastoral life, early and forced marriages (especially for girls), 
illness, overcrowded schools, poor school facilities, and others. Likewise the ESDP IV 
has also stressed the need for reduction of dropout rates (given the existence of more than 
3 million primary age school children who are still out of school within the country) and 
sustaining the momentum of decreasing repetition rates by improving the quantity and 
quality of critical inputs such as teachers, textbooks, classrooms and the like (MOE 
2010).  
 
5.3 Quality and Learning Achievement  
 Despite making major strides towards educational access and equity in primary 
schooling, the decentralized education system has been repeatedly challenged by the 
generally low quality of education, including disappointing student learning achievement 
results.51 The MOE (2008) has acknowledged this outstanding problem, stating that the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Quality in education can be defined in many ways. According to UNESCO, two principles characterize 
most attempts in defining quality in education: the first identifies learners’ cognitive development as the 
explicit objective of all education systems, and the second emphasis education’s role in promoting values 
and attitudes of responsible citizenship and in nurturing creative and emotional development (UNESCO 
2004). Similarly, the World Declaration on Education for All in 1990 and the Dakar Framework for Action, 
a decade later, identified quality as a prerequisite for achieving the fundamental goal of equity and the right 
of every child, respectively. The latter’s expanded definition of quality include the desirable characteristics 
of learners (healthy, motivated students), processes (competent teachers using active pedagogies), content 
(relevant curricula) and systems (good governance and equitable resource allocation) (Ibid.).   
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gains in access have not been accompanied by adequate improvements in quality and in 
fact, that in some areas quality has deteriorated partly as a result of this rapid expansion. 
Thus, the Ministry launched the General Education Quality Improvement Program  
(GEQIP) in 2008/09, covering in its first phase (2009-13) some of the most important 
components of quality improvements, including: -­‐ revision and upgrading of the curriculum, textbooks and national assessment,  -­‐ enhancement of teachers education and professional development,  -­‐ provision of additional funds to schools,  -­‐ strengthening of capacities in school management and administration, and  -­‐ training for school improvement, planning and budgeting.  
 As the on-going implementation of GEQIP and other initiatives indicate, efforts to 
improve the quality of education are complex and influenced by a multitude of factors 
related to students, teachers, parents, local communities and all levels of government. 
Other factors at the school levels are also important for quality of education such as 
learning environment, material resources, teaching method, curricula and assessment, 
leadership and management. Although a comprehensive evaluation of these factors is 
beyond the scope of this study, a closer look on two crucial indicators of education 
quality and achievement, teachers’ qualification and student national assessment results, 
can shed light on the relative impact of decentralized management of primary education.  
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5.3.1 Teacher’s Qualification 
 With the rapid expansion of enrollment, ensuring the supply of qualified teachers 
as well as improving their professional capacities has been a major concern for 
authorities in the education sector. The transfer of responsibilities to administer primary 
education has fallen to the woredas who are entrusted with the hiring, deploying and 
paying of teachers for their schools. Woreda decentralization have also meant that 
regional governments have had to set up and oversee Colleges of Teachers’ Education 
(CTEs) and teachers’ Continuous Professional Development (CPD) within their 
jurisdictions. At the same time, the increasing role of school level leadership, such as 
school directors and PTAs in the recruiting and supervision of teachers, has also been 
part of the deepening of education decentralization.   
 According to the MOE data (MOE/ESAA 2012/13), there are currently 34 CTEs 
in the country, with 175, 142 (70, 340 female and 104,802 male) students enrolled in all 
programs, including regular, evening and summer classes. In most of these institutions, 
there are also more than 20 different departments or streams that are categorized under 
two modalities: linear (subject-based curriculum taught in the upper primary classes) and 
cluster (integrated curriculum for the first cycle primary). As of 2012/13, 43,890 students 
graduated in both modalities, of which 18,928 (43.1%) were female. The number of CTE 
graduates, particularly females, has increased steadily in the last five years with the 
AAGR of 26.1 and 31.8 percent for males and females respectively (Ibid). 
 In the new teacher certification policy adopted since 2009/10, primary school 
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teachers have to complete a three year diploma program after grade 10, while secondary 
school teachers have to take a one year professional teacher training to obtain a Post 
Graduate Diploma in Teaching (PGDT) in addition to the three-year degree program. 
Furthermore, while on the job, teachers participate in CPD programs, although most 
teachers interviewed for this study pointed to the limited availability of these programs. 
According to MOE’s Teacher Development Program (cited in USAID 2010:28), over 
50,000 teachers have benefitted from the upgrading, in-service training programs offered 
by CTEs through cluster resource centers52 and linkage schools, and over 42, 000 teachers 
have upgraded their diplomas to degrees.  
 In addition to improving the quality of education, the upgrading of teachers’ 
qualification requirements and expanding CPD opportunities may also have the effect of 
changing the perception and professionalism of the teaching career as a whole. One of the 
most repeated comments by teachers interviewed for this study was that their profession 
is not sufficiently valued by society and government, given the low level of teachers’ 
salaries, the difficulty of career progression, and lack of incentives and benefits 
(especially in rural areas), only to mention few. At the same time, a good number of the 
teachers themselves viewed the teaching career as a profession of last resort, since they 
joined teacher’s colleges as a result of having low scores on the national exam (taken at 
the end of general secondary or 10th grade).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 School Cluster Resource Centers (SCRCs) are part of the government’s strategy for improving the 
quality of teaching and learning through in-service training and sharing of knowledge, skills and 
educational facilities among schools. Led by woreda-based supervisors, SCRCs vary from place to place 
depending on their management and resources. Some reports (USAID 2010; DFID 2011) indicated that 
these centers face a number of challenges, such as lack of sustainable funding and materials (books, 
computers, internet, and the like), the need for better coordination with Alternative Basic Education (ABE) 
centers, extra workload for teachers at the cluster centers, and inadequate training for CRC supervisors.  
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 As part of increasing teachers’ incentives and benefits, scales of teacher’s salaries 
have recently been adjusted nation-wide according to various rungs of the career 
structure. However, to date only few regions have developed and endorsed local policies 
to motivate teachers through various mechanisms, such as compensations to hostile or 
difficult environments and housing allowances (UNESCO 2013: 35).  
 Another commonly heard comment among interviewed principals and teachers 
was that a significant number of teachers lack competence to teach in the local languages 
and English. This problem has been particularly at the forefront of public discussion in 
SNNPRS, where about 12 local languages as well as English and Amharic are currently 
used as medium of instruction. As a result, language development has been one of the 
major concerns for the MOE since its launching of the Teachers Development Program 
(TDP) in 2003 and GEQIP in 2009. Although the impacts of these initiatives on teachers’ 
language quality are yet to be assessed, substantial evidence from research and classroom 
observations (e.g. AED 2009; Joshi and Verspoor 2013; MOE 2010; USAID 2010) 
suggest the need for increased and sustained CPD interventions to ensure that all who use 
the mother-tongue and English as medium of instruction are proficient in teaching these 
languages and attain up-to-date pedagogical skills.  
 Before the recent change in qualification, the percentage of certified teachers in 
the first cycle primary (1-4) level has consistently met the minimum standard (then a one 
year certification from Teacher Training Institutes [TTI]). In contrast, the number of 
qualified teachers at the second cycle primary (5-8) was constantly much lower than the 
targets set by MOE. For instance, the national target set for 2004/05 was 99% (from 96.6 
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in base year 2000/01) for the first cycle, and 80% (23.9% in 2000/01) for the second 
cycle. But, as the data in Table 5.7 reveals, 97.1 percent of the first cycle primary and 
54.8 percent for the second cycle teachers were certified to teach at their respective levels 
in the same year. 
 
Table 5.7 Teacher’s Qualification: Primary Education % 
  National TRS SNNPRS 
Grades 1-4 5-8 1-4 5-8 1-4 5-8 
2000/01 96.6 23.9 97.2 22.7 95.8 15.5 
2002/03 97.1 30.9 94.6 30.9 98.2 26.1 
2004/05 97.1 54.8 92.7 52.4 99.4 68.8 
2006/07 96.3 53.4 93.7 47.1 99.3 72.2 
2008/09 92.0 71.6 94.1 80.9 88.3 86.6 
2010/11* 20.1 83.3 20.6 72.4 13.1 94.1 
2012/13 43.8 92.0 38.0 96.2 29.4 92.6 
 
Source: MOE/ESAA 2001-2013. * New policy of qualification for primary school teachers was 
implemented and first cycle primary teachers with certificates from TTI are not any more considered 
qualified to teach in grades 1-4.   
 
 Similar MOE data also demonstrated that the gap in the number of qualified 
teachers for the first cycle has been narrowing steadily until 2007/08, reaching 97.3. 
However, in 2008/9, the proportion of certified first cycle primary teachers fell by about 
five percentage points (92%), which was also far from the 99.8 percent target set under 
ESDP III. As the new policy came into effect in 2009/10, there was a noticeable decline 
in the proportion of first cycle qualified teachers; however, the rate of first cycle qualified 
teachers showed remarkable progress increasing by more than 100 percentage points after 
two years. At the same time, there has been also a rapid growth in certification in the 
second cycle in recent years, reaching 71.6 percent in 2008/09. Although this was still a 
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long way from the 87 percent target set in 2008/9 for the level, the proportion of qualified 
teachers for the second cycle primary reached 92 percent after four years, a significant 
increase by about 28 percent points.  
 
Table 5.8 Teachers Qualifications at Sampled Primary Schools  
Qualification  Degree Diploma TTI Certificate Total 
Primary Schools Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male F&M 
Tabor 5 4 30 27 0 0 3 2 71 
Gebeya Dar 5 3 19 15 0 0 7 8 57 
Hayk 6 5 22 17 0 0 4 6 60 
Ats Yohannes 0 0 20 28 2 2 1 0 53 
Adi Haki 0 0 10 14 13 3 0 0 40 
Ayder 0 0 11 9 2 11 0 0 33 
Shiacha 0 1 11 13 0 0 6 8 39 
Gidiwo 1 0 11 13 0 0 10 6 41 
Runja Wicho* 0 0 0 20 0 0 0 15 35 
Samre 0 4 0 15 14 0 0 0 33 
Gijet  0 0 3 15 2 1 0 0 21 
Qisanet 1 2 3 15 2 1 2 2 28 
 
Source: Field Data, 2011. Data from Runja Wicho primary school could not be verified against any official 
records.    
 
 
 As of 2011/12, it appeared that a large majority of teachers in the sampled 
primary schools have already updated their qualifications to the diploma levels or they 
were likely be in the process of doing so (Table 5.8). Generally, those schools located in 
the cities have more certified teachers than the rural ones, given the limited incentives 
available in rural areas because of factors such as difficult working conditions and fewer 
opportunities for CPDs. In regards to gender, the differences between women and men 
teachers’ levels of qualification were minimal at least in most of the sampled schools. 
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But, as mentioned above, in the aggregate, men teachers outnumber women vastly in all 
regions and woredas.  
 
5.3.2 Student Learning Achievements  
 Another indicator related to the quality of education is learning assessments. In 
the last two decades, Ethiopia has administered four national learning assessments 
(1999/2000, 2003/4, 2007/8, 2010/11) at the first and second cycles of primary education 
and two (2008/9, 2011/12) at the secondary level. The National Educational Assessment 
and Examinations Agency (NEAEA)53 of the MOE, in collaboration with the United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID), has conducted these assessments. 
According to the NEAEA, the purpose of these assessments is to “discover how well the 
education system is progressing in general and students are acquiring the knowledge and 
skills delivered by the education system (NEAEA 2004). The tests were developed based 
on the Minimum Learning Competencies (MLC) of the relevant grade set by the MOE 
and standardized by means of pilot tests in selected schools.54  
 As Figures 5.8 and 5.9 illustrate, when compared to the baseline NLA (1999/00), 
the composite mean scores in performance in the key subjects of both grade 4 and grade 8 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 The name of this organization has been changed several times in the last decade, such as the National 
Agency For Examination, the General Education Quality Assurance and examinations Agency, and the 
National Organization for Examinations.   
 
54 In addition to the students’ achievements in subject areas, students’ attitudes about socially relevant 
issues (e.g. health, environment, ethics and civics), as well as other factors which can affect the 
achievement of students’ learning such as students home background, school environments, teachers 
behaviors and community views were also collected as part of these assessments.  
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in 2010/11 have declined from 47.9 percent to 40.1 and from 41.1 to 35.3, respectively. 
The decline in achievement gap was narrower between the first and second NLAs and 
between the third and the fourth NLAs as compared to that of between the second and the 
third NLAs. Nonetheless, the overall test performance of grades 4 and 8 students in the 
four NLAs were below the minimum standard (50%) set by the MOE, with only reading 
(in the first two NLAs) and environmental science (in 2003/4) in grade 4 averages 
slightly surpassing the minimum standard.    
  
Figure 5.8 Comparison of Mean Scores in four NLAs: Grade 4 	  	  
 
 
Source: NEAEA 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2013. Note that the reading comprehension test has been changed 
considerably between the second and the third NLA, hence the large differences in scores between them. 
Without the reading score, the composite score for the four NLAs are 42.6%, 43.4%, 39.8%, and 39.1% 





















































































Source: NEAEA: 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2013. Note that the mean score of physics in the first NLA is not 
available. Excluding physics, the composite mean score in 2004, 2008 and 2011 are 40.9%, 36.4%, and 
35.2% respectively.  
 
 
 Regarding students performance at various proficiency levels, Figure 5.10 below 
demonstrates that in the latest SLA, the proportion of grade 4 and grade 8 students who 
performed below the basic standard (about 50%) is much larger than those who achieved 
the basic (about 34%) and proficient (about 16%) levels.55 While the two core subjects 
(Math and English) in grade 4 had the least number of students with proficiency level and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 According to NEAEA, the three categories (proficient, basic and below basic) are made in reference to z 
–distribution, where the “proficient” category includes those students who fall above a z standard score of 
one standard deviation above the mean, the “basic” category is within a z standard score of zero and one	  
standard deviation above the mean; and the “below basic” category includes those students who fall at or 
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the largest number of students below the basic level in grade 8, the subject with the least 
number of students gaining above the basic level was in math, closely followed by 
chemistry, physics and English. Compared to the mean composite performance scores of 
2007/8, the latest NLA showed minor improvements among students who performed 
above the basic level, increasing from 14.7 percent to 17.3 percent in grade 4, and, from 
13.9 percent to 15.9 percent in grade 8. However, in regard to those who performed 
below the basic level, only the composite average of grade 8 students showed some 
improvements (decreasing from 62.1 to 56.3). At the same time, the proportion of grade 4 
students who performed at below the basic level deteriorated between the first and the 
last NLA, increasing from 47.4 to 57.1.  
Figure 5.10 Performance Standard of Students in Key Subjects Grades 4-8 (2010/11) 	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 Distribution of achievement levels across regions in the last four NLAs also 
showed wide disparities. For instance, in 2010/11, the composite score at grade 4 ranged 
from 52.3 percent in Addis Ababa region to 32.1 percent in Gambella region. Addis 
Ababa was the only region where the composite performance averaged more than the 50 
percent national target. At the same time, other six regions (Dire Dawa, Oromia, TRS, 
Benshangul-Gumuz, Afar and Gambella) scored below the national average (40.1%). At 
the grade 8 level, the composite score ranged from 38.7 percent in TRS to 31.2 percent in 
Gambella region. There were also five regions (Harari, Benshangul-Gumuz, Somali, Afar 
and Gambella) that scored below the national average of 35.3 percent. As Figure 5.11 
below indicates, in the last three NLAs, statistically significant differences existed 
between the two sampled regions, particularly a gap of 6.5 percent and 5.6 percent in 
grade 8 in 2007/08 and 2003/04 respectively, as well as a difference of 3.9 percentage 
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Figure 5.11 Composite Mean Score in TRS and SNNPRS  	  
 
 
Source: NEAEA 2004, 2008, 2011. 
 
 
 In addition to regional variations in student achievements, statistically substantive 
but increasingly narrowing differences in average scores were found between boys and 
girls and urban and rural students in the past four NLAs. For instance, in 2003/04, among 
grade 4 students, boys outperformed girls with a difference of 4 percentage points in the 
national composite score (50.1% for boys and 46.1% for girls), but in 2010/11, the 
difference had been narrowed to about one percentage point (40.5% for boys and 39.6 for 
girls). Over the same years, the gender gap in achievement in grade 8 has been closing 
slowly although remained wider than grade 4. This was reflected in the composite scores 
of 41.6 percent for boys and 36.1% percent for girls (a difference of 5.5%) in 2003/04, as 
well as in the composite scores of 36.4 percent for boys and 34.5 percent for girls (or 
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 Similarly, the gap between rural and urban achievement scores has been closing 
with small variance across regions and subjects. For instance, in 2003/04, the sample 
urban students scored an aggregate average of 49.3 percent in grade 4 as compared to 
48.1 percent for rural students. In grade 8, the average mean scores for urban and rural 
students in the same assessment were 38.7 and 40.8 percent respectively. In the latest 
NLA, the mean difference between urban and rural students slightly favors the urban in 
both grades, which was in direct contrast from the previous NLA (2007/08) where rural 
students outperformed the urban in the composite and key subjects of grade 4 and 8.   
Despite declining patterns of gender and location disparities, analysis of the various 
NLAs data confirms that the overall student performance has not improved over the last 
decade. Each of these assessments have also identified some important variables that 
significantly influenced student learning achievements. For instance, the baseline NLA 
emphasized the importance of such factors as: school organization and management, 
particularly the extent to which the director paid attention to school matters; teachers’ 
characteristics and practices such as pedagogical skills and how the teachers prepared 
their lessons; the level of students’ engagement in doing homework; and the availability 
of books, radio and other instructional material and equipment (NEAEA 2000, World 
Bank 2005).  
 Similarly, the data analysis from the latest NLA (NEAEA 2013) determined that 
the variations in the overall academic achievements of students in grades 4 and 8 could 
be explained (in various degrees) by a combination of students’ personal, home, school 
and teachers related variables. Among the variables that were found to have statistically 
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significant relationships with students achievements include: gender, age, language 
spoken at home, additional reading materials, family size, father’s education, number of 
meals per day, number of times listening to a radio, frequency of homework, number of 
absences, distance from school, supervision of teachers and teacher-parent discussions on 
matters of students learning and behavior.  
 As the analysis of the above assessments indicates, quality educational outcome is 
a result of a complicated set of variables working together at different levels of 
educational inputs and processes. To this end, strengthening decentralized management, 
as well as key relationships, could be one of the ways in which to improve the quality of 
schooling, and ultimately student learning. However, further research and measurement is 
needed in order to establish a direct link between decentralization and the quality of 
education.  
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION AND LESSONS 	  
 Like many post-conflict countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, Ethiopia’s recent 
decentralization policy has been formulated as a necessary means to accommodate 
previously repressed and marginalized ethnic and regional groups and afford them more 
control and participation in the nation’s socio-economic development and political 
process. As part of these larger political objectives, there lays a need to improve basic 
social services at all levels of government, especially at the lower stage where services 
are actually delivered. Thus, beginning in the early 2000s, the expansion of 
decentralization at the woreda level was considered one of the fundamental components 
of democratic governance, poverty reduction, and sustainable development in the 
country. Many of the benefits of decentralization, such as enhancing the efficiency and 
effectiveness of service delivery, are based on the premise that local governments are 
better positioned to understand, respond, and be accountable to local needs, especially to  
those who are most marginalized. However, as this study uncovered, lack of real local 
government autonomy in political and fiscal responsibilities, coupled with a lack of 
downward accountability and administrative capacity, complicates and impedes the 
assumed benefits of full-fledged education decentralization. In Ethiopia, as in most other 
similar cases, the potential advantages of decentralization depend on many factors 
including: institutional arrangements and the process of implementation, as well as the 
political, economic, and socio-cultural conditions that are operating in a country where it 
is implemented.  
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6.1 The Extent of Decentralization 
 In this dissertation, I set out to assess the extent of decentralization reforms in the 
Ethiopian context and their impacts on the provision of basic service delivery. My 
specific aim was to explore the evolution and current status of decentralization at the 
woreda level in the country. At the same time, I focused on primary education in order to 
provide an empirical examination of the effects of decentralization reforms.  
 As distinct from many similar programs in Sub Saharan countries, Ethiopia’s 
decentralization involved a simultaneous “big-push” devolution of all the three 
dimensions of decentralization: political, administrative, and fiscal. To this effect, I think 
it is critical that each of the integrated dimensions are examined in this study to gain a 
comprehensive and holistic understanding of decentralization rather than analyzing from 
a single dimension, which has typically been the case in much of the research on the 
subject. The evidence from the Ethiopian experience suggest that since the 
implementation of woreda decentralization in 2002, there has been remarkable progress 
as well as persistent challenges in most aspects of decentralization reforms. Likewise, the 
process of implementation has had strong bearings on how local governments carry on 
their newly devolved responsibilities and engage in inter-governmental and non-
governmental relationships. Among these components, political decentralization has been 
the more advanced and entrenched, at least from the legal and institutional vantage 
points. It is also one of the most centralized aspects of Ethiopian decentralization 
reforms. In one hand, through regional constitutions and statues, the legal status of local 
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governments (woreda and municipal and to some extent kebele), with their own elected 
executive and legislative councils have been established in all the sample local 
governments and throughout the country. However, despite these legal provisions, in 
practice, regional governments, such as in TRS and SNNPRS, have held considerable 
leverage over their woredas, both in rural and urban settings. This is manifested through 
such factors as: a) in the policy directives and priorities higher authorities (the national 
and regional governments) command hierarchically as ways of establishing standard and 
uniformity across local governments; b) in the supervisory authorities higher authorities 
exercise with strong upward accountability from subordinate entities; and c) in the fact 
that higher authorities posses the power of the purse and better human resource capacities 
as compared to local administrations.   
 Most importantly, political decentralization in Ethiopia has been characterized by 
the centralized structure and dominant position of the EPRDF party and its affiliates that 
have managed to maintain almost complete control of leadership in regional and local 
governments. According to the results of the 2008 local elections, for instance, the ruling 
party swept more than 3.5 million seats out of the 3.6 million available seats in local 
assemblies. According to many observers, the dominance of the ruling party has 
undermined the decentralization process by limiting local competition that would allow 
for the election of officials who represent local interests rather than the interests of the 
national party. For others, single party dominance has created a unified and disciplined 
platform across governments that enabled successful implementation of national 
programs with considerable local input. Yet, despite the general reticence of talking about 
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local politics and elections among the key informants in the four sample woredas, there 
was a common belief that decentralization had increased citizens’ sense of ownership and 
participation in local activities (mostly mentioned in reference to public contributions in 
cash, material or labor), but it had a very limited effect on enhancing downward 
accountability through competitive elections. With the exception of a few government 
and donor supported initiatives being trailed as mechanisms of  “social accountability” at 
the local levels evident in some of the sampled woredas (ex. Citizen’s Report Cards, 
Community Score Cards, and Participatory Budgeting), there is little evidence to suggest 
that decentralization has brought about or facilitated ways of holding politicians and 
service providers accountable in a more direct way than regular elections.    
 While local governments’ administrative responsibilities and functions have been 
delineated with varying clarity among the major regions of the country (particularly in 
the two sample regions), their levels of autonomy and capacity to plan and execute many 
of the devolved basic services, particularly primary education, are still far from adequate. 
In addition to similar dominant party dynamics influencing key administrative decisions 
in areas such as human resource management, procurement, and regulation of services 
and accountability of local officials, numerous other challenges face local governments. 
These include: lack of sufficient financial resources (weak tax bases); inability to train 
qualified staff commensurate with demand; limited incentives to work in difficult and 
remote areas; high staff turnover; weak leadership; and lack of coordination among 
different units of administration. Most of these factors, especially those related to human 
skills and capacity, are more pronounced in rural woredas than urban ones. Although 
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various capacity building programs have reportedly strengthened the personnel, technical 
and institutional capacities at the regional and woreda levels, much remains to be done at 
the remote rural woredas and school level. Therefore, the national plan to deepen 
decentralization at the school level may face increasing challenges from woreda officials 
and KETB, who are likely to insist on having the upper hand on managing primary 
schools. Teachers and school directors may also continue to question the competence of 
parents and community groups to make decisions on such important issues as personnel, 
curriculum and the budget. 
 In the fiscal aspect of decentralization, regional and woreda governments’ shares 
of the total government expenditures and revenues have been increasing steadily 
throughout the last decade. However, while expenditure responsibilities are largely 
decentralized, with woredas currently sharing an average of more than 60 percent of 
regional budget, revenue sources have been limited at the local levels. The lion’s share of 
woredas budget comes from regional “block grants” which are transferred from the 
central government and are based on a formula comprising of such indicators as 
population, expenditure needs, and revenue potential. While these guaranteed and un-
earmarked transfers appear to empower woredas to make key allocative decisions, 
especially related to service delivery, they are mainly used to cover salaries of civil 
servants with little room left for discretionary capital expenditure. Thus, the heavy 
reliance on regional subsidy and the limited own-source revenues, especially in rural 
woredas, has continued to compromise local governments’ fiscal autonomy and 
accountability. At the same time, donor-funded capital expenditures and “specific-
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purpose” grants by the central or regional governments have been instrumental in 
offsetting the fiscal gap faced by woredas in recent years. For instance, multi-donor 
funded “school grants” that are directly channeled to woredas and schools (and ABE 
centers) have complemented the budget shortfalls especially related to non-salary 
expenses such as school maintenance and repairs, teaching materials, and technology. 
Unfortunately, school grants have not yet reached all schools, especially those in rural 
woredas. However, for those who currently do, it raises questions of sustainability and 
accountability, given the fact that aid is hardly guaranteed and the difficulty of getting 
accurate information about various special purpose projects and donor funded activities. 
In addition, community contributions, which are small in the face of great need but still 
significant given the level of overall poverty, have played a positive role in modestly 
increasing school improvements, ownership and financial accountability by different 
stakeholders.    
 
6.2 The Impacts of Decentralization 
 The implementation of full-fledged decentralization in Ethiopia has both achieved 
notable successes and faced on-going challenges; so have efforts to improve basic 
services. Based on the findings of this study, there appeared to be a tradeoff between 
expanding access to primary education and improving its quality and efficiency. This 
tradeoff can be applied equally to all the sample local governments. It is important to 
note, however, that although woreda decentralization has been one of the most important 
government policy measures in the last decade, not all changes in the education sector 
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can be solely attributed to decentralization reforms. Other factors, ranging from 
household socio-economic changes to national political and economic policies to 
international relations and aid could have also played a role in service delivery outcomes. 
Despite these challenges in measurement, this study has identified trends in education 
service delivery coinciding with decentralization reforms throughout the country.   
 A remarkable expansion of access to primary education has been one of the 
greatest contributions of education decentralization in recent years. Despite such 
progress, it is difficult to make a precise longitudinal before and after comparison of 
decentralization between all the sample local governments. This is due mainly to a lack 
of complete data at the local and school levels. However, associations can be seen from 
other valuable pieces of evidence. For example, compared to the level of education 
access when woreda decentralization just started in 2001/02, net primary school 
enrolment in the national aggregate increased from 52.2 percent to 85.8 percent in 
2012/13. This was also accompanied by significant government investment of its 
resources to increasing the number of primary schools from nearly 12,000 to over 30, 000 
during the same period. Moreover, woreda level data in the two sample regions also 
showed similar rates of improvements in access to education, even although there still 
remain significant differences across regions, and between rural and urban woredas.  
 Adding to this narrative, much progress was achieved in closing the gender gap as 
well as well as in bridging the disparities between rural and urban areas. The GPI reached 
0.94 in 2012/13 as compared to 0.7 in 2001/02, while over the same period of time, the 
primary enrollment in rural areas increased from 67.9 percent to 81 percent. However, in 
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spite of these improvements in access and equity indicators, the enduring challenge for 
universal education is reflected in the fact that there are still approximately 3 million 
children out of school in Ethiopia. Unenrolled students are more likely to be from rural 
setting and to be girls. If sustained, the national efforts to reduce poverty and food 
security in disadvantaged communities, coupled with socio-cultural factors such as 
parents’ change of attitude on girls’ education, reduction of early marriage, gender-
sensitive school facilities, recruitment of female teachers, and other gender-specific 
issues, will likely have a deeper impact on equitable access to education. 
 In contrast to strong achievements in access, progress in tackling the 
accompanying problems of low levels of efficiency and quality of education in Ethiopia 
has been limited, at least until recently. As many reports indicated, with a rapid increase 
in enrolment, the education system has been unable to provide sufficient numbers of 
classrooms, nor qualified teachers in a timely manner. For instance, the trends over the 
last decade on efficiency indicators suggest that both pupil-teacher and pupil-section 
ratios at the national level for primary school (with significant variations at the regional 
and woreda levels) were consistently higher than the desired targets, albeit declining 
from 63 and 73 in 2001/02 to 50 and 54 in 2012/13, respectively. At the same time, the 
national repetition and drop out rates showed no appreciable trends over the decade 
following woreda decentralization, decreasing slightly from an average repetition rate of 
9.9 percent in 2001/02 to 7.9 in 2011/12, while dropout rates increased from 12.4 percent 
to 15.7 percent over the same period. The dropout rate was even more alarming for the 
first grade level, as nearly 23 percent of pupils have left school in 2011/12 before 
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reaching the second grade in the following year. Moreover, these national figures often 
hide significant differences between urban and rural woredas.  
 Ample evidence also exists showing poor educational quality and student learning 
achievements such as the results from subsequent national learning assessments 
conducted since 2000, as well as the 2010 early grade reading assessments. The NLAs 
revealed that the majority of students had performed below the basic level (i.e., 50%) in 
core subjects. The average composite scores of grades 4 and 8 declined from 48 to 40 
percent and from 41 to 35 percent respectively during the first and last NLAs. The EGRA 
showed even worse scores with 80 to 90 percent of sampled 2nd and 3rd graders unable to 
read at the expected oral reading fluency standards. Although the general urban and rural 
differences in these assessments seem to be statistically insignificant, rural girls in both 
these assessments performed worse than boys.   
 Another proxy indicator for quality education, the availability of qualified 
teachers, has also been a constant challenge for the Ethiopian government and many 
donor-supported programs, such as GEQUIP and PBS. The redeployment of large 
number of teachers from urban to rural schools and the rapid recruitment of new teachers 
following woreda decentralization are believed to have mitigated the further deterioration 
of the quality of education in the country. However, further reforms were needed in 
recent years to build up the development of teachers (especially female teachers) and 
school leaders as essential component of expediting the country’s progress towards 
achieving universal quality education for all. As a result, major initiatives were launched 
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to improve teachers’ minimum qualification requirements as well as expand pre-service 
and CPD opportunities.  
 These and other projects throughout the country are yet to be systematically 
assessed in order to be able to understand what works and what does not within the 
Ethiopian context. However, as the next section illustrates, there are many lessons that 
could be derived from the Ethiopian experience that will likely prove useful to other 
countries that have pursued or are pursuing similar approaches to decentralized service 
delivery.   
6.3 Lessons from the Ethiopian Experience  
 Comparing and measuring the scope of decentralization in various countries is 
often difficult because of the multitude of ways and degrees to which it is implemented 
and it is often viewed not as an all-or-nothing phenomena but rather a continuum along 
various channels and functions (Hutchinson and LaFond 2004:6). At the same time, the 
effects of decentralization on local service provision vary from country to country 
because of the varied rationales for implementing decentralization and the existence of 
many factors involving policies, actors, institutions, capacities and relationships that 
influence the expected outcomes.  
 Despite the aforementioned challenges, the experiences of individual countries 
such as Ethiopia can provide some insights into the general understanding of 
decentralization reforms and their relative consequences, especially in the context of 
developing countries and countries in transition such as in Sub Saharan Africa.  
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From the Ethiopian experiment on decentralization and decentralized local services we 
can infer the following potential implications for other similar African and developing 
countries:  
§ Ethiopia’s decentralization has been designed and implemented within a federal 
political system in which various ethnic and regional groups are given a stake in 
the country’s political process and development. This on-going experiment has 
implications for many of the multi-ethnic African states both in the federal (e.g. 
Nigeria and Comoros), semi-federal (e.g. South Africa), and unitary (the vast 
majority in the continent) setups. Ethiopian’s adoption of political 
decentralization and federalism based on ethno-linguistic criteria (known also as 
“ethnic federalism”) was considered unique among African countries; however, 
contrary to some predictions (e.g. Ottaway 1994; Seyom and Yocob 1999), it has 
not thus far led to a large scale instability and fragmentation in the country. 
Beyond its impact on improved service delivery, the Ethiopian experiment on 
decentralization-cum ethnic federalism may have important lesson about 
alternative ways of dealing with problems related to ethnicity and its politics.   
§ Similar to many of African countries (e.g. Tanzania, Rwanda, Zimbabwe, and 
South Africa), the implementation of political decentralization in Ethiopia has 
been facilitated through a dominant political party with important ramifications 
for the process of democratization particularly at the local levels. Although local 
governments, through regional constitutions, have been endowed with legal 
authorities to elect their own executive and legislative councils, in practice, the 
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ruling party has had extensive influence over who is elected or appointed to 
almost all positions of power. Despite the fact that decentralization has been 
mostly associated with the exercise of regular and relatively peaceful local 
elections in Ethiopia and other parts of Africa in recent years, its compatibility 
with real competitive politics and promotion of alternative voices at the local level 
has been very tenuous at best. As the Ethiopian case also demonstrates, 
decentralization may facilitate dominant party linkages down to the lowest level 
of administration and in turn contribute to its effectiveness in strengthening local 
governance and service delivery. On the contrary, decentralization may also 
undermine the autonomy of local governments and the downward accountability 
of their elected officials who tend to pay less attention to the demands and 
preferences of local citizens than to party directives and priorities.  
§ The Ethiopian case has presented a mixed process of implementation in terms of 
the sequencing of decentralization. On one hand, Ethiopia has launched what is 
called “big-push” decentralization by simultaneously transferring political, fiscal 
and administrative authorities and resources to legally constituted sub-national 
governments. On the other hand, decentralization, though comprehensive, has 
been implemented in two phases: first at the regional level since 1991 and at the 
woreda level since 2002. At the same time, the implementation of 
decentralization was asymmetrical, first being introduced to the four major 
regions that were considered as better positioned in regard to their institutional 
and resource capacities than other regions of the country. Although the relative 
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successes of deepening decentralization to the lower levels have been 
accompanied with increased government and donor commitments to enhance 
local capacities in Ethiopia, the simultaneous transfer of functions and adequate 
funding might not be suitable in all other cases where these elements are absent.  
§ At the heart of Ethiopia’s fiscal decentralization are the unconditional and 
formula-based block grants that are transferred from regional to woreda 
governments and have allowed relative discretion and predictability for local 
planning and service delivery. However, as is the case with many African 
countries, local governments in Ethiopia often face fiscal imbalances to fund their 
devolved expenditures, and their heavy dependency on central transfers may 
compromise their spending control and priorities. Yet, in order to assess and 
understand these dynamics, more transparency and better access to data is needed 
on public finance both at the higher and local levels than has previous been the 
case.  
§ Decentralization has also coincided with remarkable economic growth in Ethiopia 
during the last fifteen years. This growth has been characterized by an average 
GDP annual growth of more than 10 percent according to the latest Ethiopian 
Economic Update Report. Besides GDP growth, other development indicators 
such as the increasing decline of the number of people living below the poverty 
line (from 45.5 percent in 1995 to 27.8% in 2011/12), according to the United 
Nations Development Program (UNDP), also point to a better future for the 
people of Ethiopia. At the same time, this economic growth has also contributed 
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to a significant increase in subnational spending on public services, particularly 
primary education, thus crediting Ethiopia’s financing as the “most pro-poor 
budget of Africa”(DFID 2009). Therefore, the significant improvements in 
education expansion in Ethiopia has to take into consideration not only 
decentralization reforms per se, but also increased government spending made 
possible by improved economic conditions.  
§ Related to education quality has been the implementation of local language 
policy, a centerpiece of Ethiopia’s decentralization reforms but holding important 
cultural, political, and social implications far beyond the Ethiopian experience. 
Although an in-depth analysis of the process and consequences of Ethiopia’s 
language policy is beyond the scope of this study, it is important to underscore 
here that despite impressive achievement in integrating the multitude of Ethiopian 
languages (about 25 languages are currently used) into the education system, the 
long term implications of this policy for inter-ethnic relations and national unity 
are unclear so far. But, in the short term, the problem of low achievements of 
students learning in these languages, as well as existing disparities in language 
development especially among minority languages will require further 
commitments from all stakeholders.  
§ Finally, the next important step in the process of educational decentralization in 
Ethiopia and in many African countries is the strengthening of school-based 
management and accountability through various mechanisms such as School 
Boards, Parent Teachers Associations and School Management Committees. To 
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date, the roles of these institutions, particularly PTAs in Ethiopia, have been 
limited to mobilizing parents and other community members to monetary and in-
kind contributions. However, there is a growing recognition among public 
officials that school autonomy, led by significant levels of parental and 
community participation in key areas of decision-making is crucial to providing 
access and maintaining high quality of education. To this end, it will be extremely 
valuable to keep track of the various governmental and non-governmental 
initiatives that are currently in progress as part of capacity building at local and 
school levels that will prove useful in assessing their relative impacts on 
education outcomes. 
  This study has attempted to investigate and provide insights on the key 
dimensions of decentralization and related impact on basic services, with a focus on 
primary education. As this body of work confirms, examining both the scope of 
decentralization and its effects offers a more nuanced and holistic understanding of 
decentralization, chiefly in the Ethiopian context. My hope is that future studies will 
further refine ways of assessing decentralization reforms, aided by greater access to data, 
enabling researchers not only to understand the causes of variations within a single 
country, but also to make comparative analysis of multiple countries.  
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A: Interview Questions 
 
 The following general interview questions are often modified during the actual 
interview to make them appropriate for different office holders, including 
politicians/policymakers, woreda and municipal officials, and educators. 
 
1.  What do you think generally about decentralization reforms? How does 
decentralization affect your work?   
2. How is the administrative structure of the Ministry of Education (regional/woreda 
educational offices) changed as a result of decentralization and what are the major 
responsibilities assigned to it and to other tiers of government?  
3. What are the main goals of decentralized education system and how do you 
evaluate its implementations in terms of its successes and drawbacks? 
4. To what extent do you think the transfer of authority to local government 
(municipal and woreda) level affect the (a) accessibility, (b) quality, (c) equity of service 
delivery in education sector? 
5. In the “federal -region-woreda-school” framework how are school plans initiated 
and decisions made and carried out?  
6. How do citizens and local communities participate in the school decision-making 
process, management and budget?     
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7.   Can you explain the process of selection, training, promotion and evaluation of 
educators and administrations? Who does what?  
8. Are there any independent agencies or officials who provide oversight and 
monitoring of public servants?   
9. How do citizen’s express demand for education to their representatives in the 
local government?  
10. How does the public find information about national/regional educational goals 
and objectives, and their implementations and progress? 
11. What do you think are the most significant problems faced by the education 
sector? How are they being addressed? What do you think the best way of addressing 
them?  
12. How do you communicate with other agencies in the line of authority to address a 
particular problem or issue? 
13. What is the source of your budget and how is it allocated? What is the financial 
and material situation like at your school/s?   
14. How does the public find information about national/regional educational goals 
and objectives, and their implementations and progress in municipal and woreda schools?  
15. What do you think are the major differences between the city and the rural areas 
in the provision of primary education?   
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APPENDIX B: List of Key Informants 
 
Ministry of Education, Addis Ababa 
 
Mr. Fuad Ibrahim, State Minister 
Interview: Monday, March 7, 2011 (12:30pm – 1:15pm) 
  
Mr. Theodros Shewarget, Head of Teachers Education and Training Leaders 
Development Core Process 
Interview: Friday, March 11, 2011 (8:30am – 9:30am) 
 
Bureau of Education, Hawassa (SNNPRS) 
 
Mr. Tessema Dima Batuta, Head Owner of Teaching-Learning & Assessment/Core 
Process 
Interview: Friday, April 15, 2011 (3:45pm – 4:30pm)  
 
Mr. Tadesse Wolde Gamu, 
Education/Development/Planning/Preparation/Monitoring/&Evaluation Process Owner 
Interview: Monday, April 18, 2011 (9:00am – 10:00am) 
 
Hawassa Municipality Office (SNNPRS) 
 
Mr. Taye Biliso Chuluke, Education Department Head 
Interview: Monday, April 25, 2011 (2pm – 2:45pm)  
 
Mr. Wendwesen Worku, Education Development Plan, Monitoring and Evaluation 
Officer 
Interview: Thursday, January 12, 2012 (2pm – 2:40pm)  
 
Mr. Yonas Yosef Sanbe, Mayor  
Interview: Monday, January 30, 2012 (9am – 9:35am)    
 
Sidama Zone Administrative Office (SNNPRS) 
 
Mr. Million Matteos Korsisa, Sidama Zone President 




Dr. Nigussie Meshesha, Chair, School of Social Sciences and Humanities 
Interview: Thursday, February 16, 2012 (10am – 11:00am)  
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Tabor Primary School, Hawassa 
 
Mrs. Tamenech Leka, Academic Vice Principal 
Interview: Tuesday, January 17, 2012 (2pm – 2:45pm) 
 
Mrs. Abebech Sisay, Teacher of Integrated Science 
Interview: Wednesday, January 18, 2012 (8:30am – 9:30am) 
 
Mr. Tegegn Telore, Teacher of Mathematics, Chair of Training Board 
Interview: Wednesday, January 18, 2012 (9:50am – 10:45am)  
 
Mr. Fikadu Telila, Principal 
Interview: Monday, January 23, 2012 (8:30am – 9:30am) 
 
Mr. Lemma Gemechu, PTA President 
Interview: Saturday, February 25, 2012 (2:15pm-3:00pm) 
 
Gebeya Dar Primary School, Hawassa 
 
Mr. Yidnekachew Musie, Academic Vice Principal 
Mrs. Meskerem Zenebework, Administrative Vice Principal 
Interview: Monday, January 20, 2012 (8:30am – 9:30am) 
 
Mr. Tamru Mulu Neh, Mathematics Teacher and Section Leader 
Interview: Monday, January 20, 2012 (9:30am – 10:25am) 
Mrs. Mammit Geredaw, Social Studies and Civics Teacher 
 
Interview: Monday, January 20, 2012 (10:30am – 11:15am) 
Mr. Yosef Mella, PTA President 
Interview: Monday, January 20, 2012 (2:00pm – 2:40pm) 
 
Hayk Primary School, Hawassa 
 
Mrs. Zelalem Bogale, Principal 
Interview: Tuesday, January 21, 2012 (8:30am – 9:30am) 
 
Mr. Biset Meashu, Mathematics Teacher 
Interview: Tuesday, January 21, 2012 (9:30am – 10:30am) 
Mr. Tekeste Tiabebu, Teacher of Integrated Science 
Interview: Tuesday, January 21, 2012 (10:45am – 11:30am) 
 
Mr. Ayele Ade, PTA President 
Interview: Tuesday, January 21, 2012 (2:00pm – 2:45pm) 
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Aleta Wendo Woreda (SNNPRS) 
 
Mr. Mekuria Laukamo Noe, Head of Education Bureau and Vice Administrator 
Interview: Tuesday, February 28, 2012 (4:30pm – 5:15pm)  
 
Mr. Tamru Samuel Gosooma, Chief Administrator 
Interview: Tuesday, February 28, 2012 (5:20pm – 6:00pm) 
 
Shaicha Primary School, Aleta Wendo Woreda 
 
Mr. Bizuneh Tadesse, Principal 
Interview: Monday, March 5, 2012 (9:45am – 10:45am) 
 
Mrs. Asrat Teshome, English Teacher 
Interview: Monday, March 5, 2012 (10:50am – 11:30am) 
 
Mr. Wagaye Wariko, Science Teacher 
Interview: Monday, March 5, 2012 (11:30am – 12:00pm) 
 
Mr. Samuel Wutessa, PTA President 
Interview: Monday, March 5, 2012 (12:00pm – 12:30pm) 
 
Mr. Lensame Ne’e Gotta, Vice Principal 
Mr. Meles Feleke Dassa, Administrative Vice Principal 
Interview: Monday, March 5, 2012 (2:00pm – 2:45pm) 
 
Gidiwo Primary School, Aleta Wendo Woreda 
 
Mr. Mulugeta Kassa, Academic Vice Principal 
Mr. Solomon Makonnen, Administrative Vice Principal 
Interview: Tuesday, March 6, 2012 (2:00pm – 3:00pm) 
 
Mrs. Mulatwa Zemedkum, All-Subjects Teacher Grades 1-4 
Mr. Workagegnew Lemma, English Teacher 
Mrs. Worknesh Argeta, Sidamigna Language Teacher 
Interview: Tuesday, March 6, 2012 (3:00pm – 3:45pm) 
 
Mr. Fikre Kumalo, PTA President 
Interview: Tuesday, March 6, 2012 (3:45pm – 4:15pm) 
 
Runja Wicho Primary School, Aleta Wendo Woreda 
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Mr. Daniel Gojo, Principal 
Mr. Teklu Yohannes, Academic Vice Principal 
Interview: Thursday, March 8, 2012 (2:30pm – 3:15pm) 
 
Mr. Mekonnen Sunnare, PTA President 
Interview: Thursday, March 8, 2012 (3:30pm – 4:00pm) 
 
Mr. Samuel Sabeka, Grades 1-4 Mathematics Teacher 
Interview: Thursday, March 8, 2012 (4:00pm – 4:30pm) 
 
Mr. Kassa Kamme, Mathematics and Statistics Teacher 
Interview: Thursday, March 8, 2012 (4:30pm – 5:00pm) 
 
Mekelle City Administration (TRS) 
 
Mr. Negussie Gebre, Mayor of Mekelle 
Questions Submitted: Monday, March 19, 2012 
Answers Returned: Tuesday, April 17, 2012 
 
Mekelle City Education Bureau (TRS) 
Mr. Zemenfeskidus Fiseha, Vice Administrator  
Interview: Tuesday, March 20, 2012 (9:30am – 10:15am)  
 
Tigray State Education Bureau, Mekelle  
 
Mr. Gobezay Woldearegai, Head of Regional Education Office 
Interview: Friday, March 30, 2012 (2:30pm – 3:10pm) 
 
Atse Yohannes Primary School, Mekelle  
 
Mrs. Mihret Assefa, Vice Principal 
Interview: Monday, April 9, 2012 (8:30am – 9:30am)  
 
Mr. Tesfai Kebede, English Teacher 
Interview: Monday, April 9, 2012 (9:45 – 10:15)  
 
Mrs. Kidan Redai, Amharic Language Teacher 
Interview: Monday, April 9, 2012 (10:25am – 11:05am) 
 
Mrs. Abeba Belai, PTA President 
Inteview: Tuesday, April 10, 2012 (8:00am – 8:35am) 
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Adi Haki Primary School, Mekelle 
 
Senait Fiseha, President of Student Parliament 
Haben Teklehaymanot, Vice President of Student Parliament 
Interview: Wednesday, April 18, 2012 (10am – 10:35am) 
 
Mr. Tesfamariam Hailu, PTA President 
Interview: Wednesday, April 18, 2012 (10:45am  – 11:15am) 
  
Mr. Tsegaye Alemayehu, Principal 
Interview: Wednesday, April 18, 2012 (11:20am – 11:55am) 
 
 Mr. Assefa Gugssa, All-Subject Teacher Grade 1-4 
Interview: Thursday, April 19, 2012 (11am – 11:35am) 
 
Mr. Kidane Negusse, Amharic Language Teacher and Unit Leader 
Interview: Thursday, April 19, 2012 (11:35am – 12:15pm)  
 
Ayder Primary School, Mekelle 
 
Mr. Yemane Hadera, Academic Vice Principal 
Interview: Tuesday, April 17, 2012 (8:30am – 9:15am) 
 
Mr. Teka Gebremedhin, Amharic Teacher and Unit Leader 
Interview: Tuesday, April 17, 2012 (9:20am – 9:50am) 
 
Mrs. Genet Gebrehiwet, Mathematics Teacher 
Inteview: Tuesday, April 17, 2012 (9:55am – 10:35am) 
 
Germanesh Taye, President of Student Parliament 
Biruk Melaku, Vice President of Student Parliament 
Interview: Tuesday, April 17, 2012 (10:40am – 11:10am) 
 
Mr. Said Desalegn, PTA President 
Interview: Tuesday, April 17, 2012 (2pm – 2:45pm) 
 
Samre Woreda, TRS 
 
Mr. Seum Gebre Tekle , Chief Administrator  
Interview: Monday, April 30, 2012 (10:30am – 11: 20am) 
 
Mr. Kaliay Hailu, Vice Administrator  
Interview: Monday, April 30, 2012 (11:30am – 12:15pm) 
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Eyasu Redaii, Head of Curriculum Implementation, Vice Education Administrator 
Interview: Thursday, May 3, 2012 (8:30 – 9:00am) 
 
Samre Primary School, Samre Woreda 
 
Mr. Belai Molla, Principal 
Interview: Friday, May 4, 2012 (9:00am – 9:40am) 
 
Woldesenbet Adera, PTA President 
Interview: Friday, May 4, 2012 (9:45am – 10:20am) 
 
Mrs. Hadas Zeru, All-Subject Teacher, Grade 1 
Interview: Friday, May 4, 2012 (10:25am – 10:50am) 
 
Solomon Berhanu, President of Student Parliament 
Abrahaley Zeresenai, Vice President of Student Parliament 
Interview: Friday, May 4, 2012 (10:55am – 11:20am) 
 
Mr. Niruse Berhe, Physics Teacher 
Interview: Friday, May 4, 2012 (11:25am – 11:55am) 
 
Gijet Complete Elementary School, Samre Woreda 
 
Seid Abdulkadir, PTA President 
Interview: Monday, May 7, 2012 (2:00pm – 2:30pm) 
 
Mr. Solomon Dubale, Principal 
Mr. Miruz Gibre’egziher, Academic Vice Principal 
Interview: Monday, May 7, 2012 (2:35pm – 3:15pm) 
 
Fitaw Gebriye, President of Student Parliament 
Girmay Desta, Vice President of Student Parliament 
Interview: Monday, May 7, 2012 (3:20pm – 3:45pm) 
 
Mr. Abadi Negese, Mathematics Teacher 
Interview: Monday, May 7, 2012 (3:45pm – 4:20pm) 
 
Ms. Shewit Abai, All-Subject Grade 1-4 Teacher 
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Qisanet Complete Primary School, Samre Woreda 
 
Mr. Assefa Gebretsadik, Principal 
Interview: Wednesday, May 9, 2012 (10:00am – 10:45am) 
 
Mr. Derbe Bayleyegn, All-Subject Grade 1-4 Teacher 
Interview: Wednesday, May 9, 2012 (10:50am – 11:20am) 
 
Mrs. Tigist Negussie, English, Amharic, & Tigrigna Languages Teacher 
Interview: Wednesday, May 9, 2012 (11:25am – 11:55am) 
 
Mr. Gebru Kahisay, PTA President 
Interview: May 9, 2012 (2:00pm – 2:30pm) 
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